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ABSTRACT
A comprehensive study of the "Drug War" with particular emphasis on
the increased role of the U.S. Military. Application of military force should be
based on an understanding of the political, social and economic impact of
Andedn narco trafficking. This thesis addresses these issues, evaluates current
anti-narcotic strategies, and defines the most prudent use of military
resources. Initially, the thesis highlights the Latin American drug connection
and its impact on political instability, guerrilla insurgencies, corruption and
respective economies. Based on this foundation, the "supply" and "demand"
strategies of the United States are presented and evaluated. Finally, the thesis
proposes limited usage of U.S. air and naval assets in support of law
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As East-West tensions ease and each side cautiously withdraws from the
rhetoric of the Cold War, more attention is being focused upon internal or
domestic issues. Undoubtedly one of the major issues confronting the United
States is that of narcotics. The issue itself is not new as the United States has
historically attempted to control this disruptive domestic intruder. The
nineteen eighties included greater emphasis on this problem and few would
dispute that it has become one of the major issues for the nineteen nineties.
The "narcotics" problem is more than a political issue, although it has
often been masked as one. It is an issue involving the basic erosion of society
through a number of dimensions. The problem has been complicated,
however, by short bursts of interest, lack of direction and the introduction of
trendy terms such as "narcotrafficking," "crack," "drug lords," "drug war," the
"Latin Connection," and a host of others that a mere decade ago were only
familiar to drug enforcement personnel. Additional capitalization on the
narcotics issue can be seen with television movies and series productions. In
all this hype however, there remains a serious problem, the resolution of
which has yet to be identified.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the narcotics problem as a
national security issue and the feasibility of using the United States military
in drug enforcement activities. As the drug problem continues to grow, the
"military option" is being considered far more seriously by members of
Congress, the administration and the American public. However, this option
presents a number of problems and if not examined prudently could result in
complicating rather than reducing the problem. Consequently, this thesis will
begin with an overview of the narcotics issue and conclude with a detailed
examination of the military option and suggestions for its application.
Although many countries are involved in the production and trafficking
of drugs this thesis will focus on the major players of Colombia, Mexico,
Bolivia and Peru. Before analyzing the international dimension however, it
is necessary to examine the critical impact of drugs on society.
In terms of consumption in the United States, Cocaine has become the
major narcotic of concern. It is presently estimated that there are between 8-14
million regular cocaine users1 in this country. The volume of the alkaloid
entering the American market has expanded to between 54 and 74 tons as of
1987, more than doubling since the seventies. According to the Drug
Enforcement Agencies annual Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, cocaine usage
rose by 11 percent in 1988. Furthermore, the number of people with cocaine-
rAl,ted problernas seeking admission to drug rehabilitation centers climbed by
600 percent from 1976-1981.2 Latin America is the major actor when one
considers that all the cocaine, 80 percent of the marijuana and one third of the
heroin is supplied from this region. Needless to say the increased
consumption rate of illegal substances by Americans has been the driving
factor in the nation's drug eradication effort. However, in Latin America as
well there is growing realization that consumption among their own people




is on the increase. In Colombia, for example, there was a drastic increase in
cocaine usage during the 1970's. This was due to inflation in the United States
which resulted in decreased consumption by North Americans.
Consequently, the cartels turned to the Colombian population for distribution
of excess cocaine products. Drug usage by Latin Americans has been on the
increase ever since.
The political implications of narcotrafficking are extremely volatile,
particularly in Latin America where the stability of democracy constantly
comes to question. MacDonald claims that many of the "drug lords" are not
exagerating in their ability to pay off their countries' foreign debt.
Consequently, the power of these "drug barons," in Latin America, is often
underestimated by American officials. Furthermore, as this thesis attempts to
indicate, one readily finds deep forms of corruption, alliance with
revolutionary movements and even outright attempts at control of central
governments by drug lords in Latin America.
As cocaine, marijuana and heroin, have increasingly become addictive
among the social classes, so has it created an interest by governments, drug
enforcement agencies, the military, the media and a host of other players. All
are fascinated by the complexity, the amount of capital it generates, the
characters involved and its overall implications. Between North and Latin
America however, there has been a great deal of finger pointing and
reluctance to examine the relationship between cause and effect. The Latin
Americans tend to blame North Americans for their insatiable appetite for
narcotics and in turn the North Americans tend to argue that if the Latin
countries would cease in narcotic production and trafficking the problem
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would be self eliminating. From the outset it can be seen that two different
approaches are being applied to the same issue, one from the supply
perspective and the other from the demand perspective.
In this introduction an attempt has been made to provide a brief indicator
of the multifaceted complexity of the drug issue. In order to provide a basis
for understanding the drug issue, and the implications for the use of military
force for enforcement, the following vital subjects will now be analyzed in
detail:
I. The Actors and their Expanding Arena
II. Narcoterrorism, Instability and Insurgency
III. The Economic Impact of the Drug Trade
IV. Current Strategies
V. The U.S. Military in Narcotics Enforcement Recent Trends
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
These subjects will serve to highlight the "narcotics issue" and each must
be considered before the United States commit itself to a policy of increased
military interdiction in the narcotics arena.
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II. THE ACTORS AND THEIR EXPANDING ARENA
The United States has clearly demonstrated that the "war on drugs" is
more than a political issue wrapped in rhetoric. Subsequently, since the issue
has been likened to war, certainly the source of conflict has almost exclusively
been isolated to four major Latin American countries. The administration
has concentrated the majority of its efforts to counter narcotics production
and trafficking in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico. Since all the cocaine
and the majority of marijuana can be traced to these couniries, the strategy
appears in line with the perceived threat. Consequently, the four principle
Latin American actors will be examined in some detail. However it should be
noted that many other Latin American countries are expanding their narco
markets as well. Incidentally, this has been attributed to the pressure being
exerted by the United States on the main four. As a result of the flexibility of
this market, the United States must be flexible in its strategy to counter the
narcotics threat.
It would be misleading, as well, to focus attention on the principle actors
without shedding some light on the multidimensional stage on which they
perform. The "drug problem" is being felt in areas other than society and the
governmental enforcement agencies. As efforts to battle the problen mount,
effects are being seen in foreign policy decision making and in multilateral
relations throughout the Latin American region. The "war on drugs" has
become far more than the simple matter of right and wrong or good versus
bad. The United States federal budget, and related programs, the media,
judicial system and the average citizen, have all become springboards for this
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social issue of the nineties. Consequently, we begin our chapter with an
examination of these complicated elements.
A. THE LATIN CONNECTION: PRINCIPLE ACTORS
1. Colombia
Colombia has been described by Scott B. MacDonald, in Dancing On A
Volcano, as the "core of the volcano" and the "kingpin" of the
narcotrafficking countries. It is the Medellin cartel and their guerrilla allies
that have professionalized the drug trade to the point of being compared to
the activities of a nation-state. The technology and capital available to the
members of the cartel are without parallel even in the more legitimate
corporate activities of the business world.
...... they have created transnational trade networks, established trading
posts, such as Miami and New York City and when challenged, have
demonstrated that they are capable of assassinations, bribery of
international officials, and full-scale military assaults. 3
The in-country Colombia network has been expanded to include
M-19 guerrillas of Marxist-Leninist ideology. At first glance this alliance
appears contradictory, yet for the protection and assault capability of the
guerrillas, the drug cartel pays enormous fees. This capital is in turn used to
finance the leftist movement within the Colombian political arena. The
cartel and their alliance have chosen Colombia as the drug capital of Latin
America, a capital from which the United States reportedly receives all of its
3Ibid. p. 28
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imported cocaine. According to MacDonald Colombia is the logical capital for
four basic reasons.
1. geopolitical position. It is strategically located between Bolivia and
Peru and has controlled access to the Caribbean and Central America.
2. the vast central forests, excellent for concealing clandestine operations.
3. the entrepreneurial skills of the Colombian people.
4. the willingness of elements of the Colombian community in the
United States to provide access to markets.4
It has been recognized by all involved, on both sides of the law, that
Colombia is without question the controlling country in the narcotrafficking
process.
2. Mexico: "The Marijuana Border"
Mexico, because its lengthy border with the United States, about 1900
miles, has always enjoyed the benefit of smuggling with ease. The
commodities of choice, at least among narcotics, includes marijuana, cocaine
and heroin. Whereas the Colombians maintain the corner on the cocaine
market, Mexico provides the United States with 80 percent of its marijuana.
Additionally the Mexican dealers assist the Colombians in the delivery of
cocaine when other routes prove to be too costly, as in periods of sporadic
crackdowns by the United States and other regional governments. The
overland route through Mexico is more expensive, but less risky.
Mexico has increased its monopoly on marijuana as other Latin
countries moved to more compact, transportable items. The growing
conditions are ideal and the bulky product is easily moved across the border.
4Ibid., p. 29.
7
Despite the fact the Mexico controls the marijuana market, many of Mexico's
most powerful drug lords maintain subservience to the Colombian cartels.
Along the border in Mexico there also exists a sub-culture of border smugglers
who function as messengers for drug lords throughout Latin America.
While poor people in Southern Mexico and in other Latin countries
turned to the political left, the people of the border turned capitalist and
cynical. [According to one member of this culture] All the United States is to
Mexico is a rich, fat whore who wants to be plundered.5
Clearly Mexico is more than a transit state for narcotrafficking. It
dominates the market for marijuana production and delivery and extensive
ties have developed to drug dealers in other source countries. However even
the marijuana traffickers must inform Colombian drug lords, through a
series of messengers, as to their move.
3. Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the major coca leaf producers in the world and it is
estimated that coca crops yield about $3 billion per annum. Five tons of coca
paste are shipped to Colombia every week for refinement and processing.
The attractiveness of Bolivia to narcotrafficking is apparent as Bolivia has
traditionally lacked a high degree of political stability and has had close to 200
coups since its independence from Spain in 1821. MacDonald attributes four
main reasons for the development of the contemporary Bolivian drug
industry.
5Shannon, E., Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War
America Can't Win, (New York: Viking Press, 1988), p. 46.
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1. the longstanding weakness of the political center vis-a-vis the
periphery.
2. the existence of a traditional coca industry which has cultural
significance for the Indian part of the population.
3. developments in the economy following the 1952 revolution.
4. increased international demand for cocaine.6
Bolivia's role in the drug industry increased exponentially in the
1980's primarily as a result of the "cocaine coup" of July 17, 1980. The next
five years were highlighted by the rule and influence of the "cocaine
generals" who succeeded in destroying Bolivia's legal economy and adding to
the corruption and confusion characterizing the central government. In 1985
Bolivia returned to democratic rule under Victor Paz and in 1986 the United
States provided the Bolivian government with military personnel to assist in
the eradication of the cocaine processing and transportation problem. Despite
these efforts the results were only temporary, once the program had reached
its conclusion the cultivation and trafficking process rapidly resumed.
Bolivia remains a major producer of cocaine and continues as Colombia's
major supplier.
4. Peru
In Peru, as with Colombia and Bolivia, cocaine and coca exports have
pushed aside the traditional commodities and are now the major exports for
the country. The drug network is very similar to the ones previously
described, however in Peru there exists a subtle difference. Coca use has
6MacDonald, S. B., Dancing on a Volcano (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1988), p. 52.
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historically been practiced by the native Indians of Peru and its modern
cultivation is not seen as a moral question. Not only does the growth of coca
provide economic benefits, it also remains a socially acceptable practice.
Additionally, the Peruvian peasants, scattered throughout the countryside,
have suffered discrimination from the central government. Consequently
they feel independent with little allegiance to the government structures of
Peru. The drug matter is further complicated in Peru with the presence of
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). These particularly violent leftist
guerrillas have worked in concert with the narcotraffickers when doing so
means rebellion against the central government. Former President Alan
Garcia has acted against these narcotraffickers but it would seem more out of
fear for the growing threat of the Shining Path. As the efforts of the Peruvian
government increased, the extent of the narcotics problem became fully
realized.
In August 1985, Garcia sent Peruvian troops into the Amazon jungle
to hit the trafficker's border sanctuaries. At the same time, Colombian forces
moved into their side of the frontier, squeezing the traffickers in a pincer
movement. Operation Condor, as the Peruvian foray was called,was a
military success, but it also demonstrated that the Peruvian cocaine-refining
industry was far more-advanced than had been ever imagined.7
The purpose of the previous section is to briefly highlight the
complexity of the narcotrafficking issue among the four major players. Not
7Shannon, Desperados, p. 366.
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nearly enough has been said about the internal affairs and less is known
about the "cross-border relationships," but it does give flavor to the problems
yet to be explored. Chapter II of this thesis will examine the internal
complications of these actors in much more detail.
B. EXPANDING MARKETS: JAMAICA, BELIZE & THE TRANSIT STATES
Cocaine is the major target of concern for the anti-narcotics campaign.
This is because it is seen as an enormous threat to the welfare and stability of
North American society. Consequently the focus of the "war on drugs" has
predominantly been limited to the four major cocaine producing and
transporting countries. However, marijuana, and other illegal narcotics,
have their markets and origins spread throughout the Caribbean, South
America and Central America. The role of these smaller actors merits a brief
discussion since these markets have grown at an exponential rate, and since
they contribute to the overall complexity of the narcotics issue. Moreover,
"balloon-type" affects result from the pressures being applied by the various
law enforcement agencies and the United States government. This concept
was explained by DEA agent Bob McGuire. In other words, as pressure is
applied to Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia and Peru, either by their respective
governments or by the United States, the market and transit routes are
temporarily shifted to another area. Therefore it would erroneously appear
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that production and trafficking are in decline: in fact the operation has just
been transported to another country such as Venezuela or Brazil.8
This "balloon-effect" makes enforcement and intelligence gathering
much more difficult and emphasizes the need for flexibility in the current
strategies of the drug fighting countries.
Add to the ballooning affect the growing markets of the less significant
actors and the drug trade begins to reveal itself as a much broader problem.
Other actors are examined here to illustrate this point.
1. Jamaica
Marijuana, referred to as Ganja, has become a major part of the
Jamaican way of life. Many have attributed this to the influence and practices
of the Rastafarians who condone the use of ganja and delight in the chaos it
creates among the "white" class. The Jamaican government has blamed and
acted against the Rastafarians since 1961, but the growth and export of
marijuana has increased many times over. Today marijuana is Jamaica's
largest export, is transported almost exclusively to the Unites States and has
contributed enormous sums of "narcodollars" to the Jamaican economy.
In the 1978-81 period, the DEA estimated that an average of 740-1,400
metric tons of marijuana were supplied to the U.S. market by Jamaica. By the
1980's cannabis had become the leading income earner for at least 6,000
Jamaican farmers, and, according to one estimate, in 1982 there was a total of
8Interview with DEA agent Bob McGuire on March 16, 1990, (San
Francisco Regional DEA Office, U.S. Federal Building, San Francisco, CA).
Discussions of balloon effect being seen throughout Latin America.
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19,000 acres under cultivation. As of 1985, the cannabis "narcodollar"
contributed between $1 to $2 billion to the island's foreign exchange earnings,
more than all the other exports combined.9
The cultivation and trafficking of marijuana in Jamaica, however, is
not the result of Rastafarian culture alone, but rather elements of organized
crime from the United States. The DEA, Coast Guard and the FBI are all
aware of the organized crime connections but have had little success in
controlling the growth of the ganja market, especially with the emphasis
being channeled so heavily on the cocaine and heroine element.
2. Belize
Marijuana cultivation has been popular in Belize since 1960 and has
largely been managed and controlled by North Americans. This small
country with a population of around 168,000 has found it difficult to actively
combat the narcotrafficking problem. However Belize officials have appeased
the United States on several occasions by allowing crop eradication through
the use of pesticides. The last attempt, 1982-83, enraged the indigenous
population as much of the arable land was damaged and surrounding food
crops poisoned. The program was controversial but effective, however, the
United States left Belize as quickly as it came. Naturally, with the pressure
off, Belize once again attracted marijuana growers and now has been adopted
as a transit stopover point for the shipping of Colombian cocaine. Belize
continues to fade in and out of the narcotrafficking picture, perhaps because
9U..S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency, Drugs of Abuse:
1989 Edition, (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 45.
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of its small size and relative insignificance. Although the jungles of Belize,
her isolated airstrips and the proximity to the United States still serve as a
warning that Belize too must be considered in the multidimensional
narcosphere.
3. The Transit States
As a whole the transit states should be viewed as a collection of
smaller actors who, when standing alone, are a mere nuisance to anti-
narcotrafficking activities. Unfortunately it is in this light that current
strategies are being formed. Together these transit states, which include the
entire Caribbean and most of Central America, supply pit stops to traffickers
and provide an elaborate money laundering nexus.
The transit states are an important element in the Latin American
drug trade. Without the use of the Caribbean's and Central America's bases,
penetration of the United States and Canadian markets would be much more
difficult. In addition to functions as pit stops to the Colombian's, the
Caribbean populations are increasingly able to provide networks of friends
and family in North America.1 0
One would assume, based on the strategy of the United States
government and the explosive media coverage, that the "war on drugs" is
exclusively limited to-Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Bolivia. Little coverage
and effort has been channeled to the smaller players and/or transit states.
Albeit the major supply of cocaine, heroine and marijuana can be traced to
IOMabry, D. J., Ed., The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National
Security, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 36.
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the principle four, the significance of the smaller actors should not be
underestimated. The narcotrafficking problem may have its heart in
Colombia, but its influence can be felt throughout the Western Hemisphere.
This dimension of narcotrafficking must be factored into any strategy,
especially involving the military, designed to reduce the narcotic threat to
society.
C THE UNITED STATES: RELATIONS & POLICIES
The United States has responded to the "narcotrafficking" problem with
the establishment of policies and the broadening of powers for the various
agencies involved. The "policy" from Washington is itself quite generic and
difficult to fully define. Reasons for this can be attributed to the sensitivity of
the issue within our country and the sensitivity of the issue in relation to
other agreements and transactions with Latin America. However, American
policy is essentially broken down into a two pronged anti-production and
anti-consumption approach. The first encompasses the elimination of the
drugs themselves before they reach the borders of the United States. This
approach involves such groups as the Agency for International Development
(AID), the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotic Matters
(INM), and by international agencies such as the United Nations Fund for
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). The second policy approach includes the
elimination of drug traffickers. This approach is serviced by enforcement
contingencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the United States
Coast Guard and other military groups and law enforcement officials working
on the periphery. It is the second approach that has received the most
attention and the most effort. Latin American governments are far more
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receptive to requests for cooperation against traffickers as opposed to
producers, as they see the apprehension of traffickers as more closely tied to
their own conception of national interest.
To begin with, apprehending traffickers is an indirect way of drying up
the demand for farmer's illegitimate produce without directly incurring their
political wrath. Secondly, although the trafficker targets may be harder to
identify than the producers, they are fewer in number and often foreigners
who are less significant politically. Thirdly, while production of opium, coca
and marijuana is often legal, or officially tolerated, in many countries,
trafficking in those products is clearly not.11
An additional reason for foreign governments to approve of this latter
approach is the desire to maintain a sense of control over their own
population. These governments have a vested interest in preventing any
individual or group from attaining such power that it can challenge
governmental authority.
On occasion, such individuals or groups are politically or ideologically
motivated and trafficking in drugs to gain revenues with which to buy
weapons and support.' 2
Nonetheless the obstacles to even anti-trafficking approaches can not be
underestimated. Although it became apparent, particularly in the 1980's that
anti-trafficking practices are more acceptable to foreign governments, there is
'
1 Nadelman, Ethan A., "International Drug Trafficking and U.S. Foreign
Policy," The Washington Quarterly, (Fall 1985; v. 8, no. 4.), p. 88.
12Ibid., p. 89.
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still a fundamental reluctance to give full support. This reluctance is in part
due to the deep involvement of officials in various governments in the
trafficking business. This involvement received international attention with
the disappearance of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in February of 1985. The
Mexican government, although working closely with the United States in
anti-narcotics trafficking, did little to shed light on the murder of this agent.
Resulting investigations would trace corruption from the local police to high
ranking government officials in Mexico City. Even in this country obstacles
were met within the Reagan administration due to the sensitivity of
U.S./Mexican relations in other areas. 13
Evaluation of current U.S. policy approaches is a bit disheartening. Given
the demand for illicit drugs in this country the United States government has
been unable to stop the flow. Despite the increased law enforcement efforts
and the bilateral agreements with the source countries, the supplies of heroin,
cocaine and marijuana have been little affected. The problem of current
foreign policy objectives in the drug effort is not in the approaches but rather
in the inconsistency in which these approaches are utilized. It is clear that the
United States government has identified this issue as an objective of policy
making but the bureaucracy has yet to catch up to its relative importance.
Other foreign policy objectives clearly dominate the policy arena including
the stability of otherwise friendly regimes. The frustration of spontaneous
reactions, and contradictory policies are not unique to the drug issue
13Shannon, Desperados, p. 39.
17
however, this problem plagues the entire U.S. policy making process. If the
drug issue remains an objective of the United States government and
withstands the test of time, perhaps more cohesion will be obtained.
Currently the narcotics issue is important but remains subservient to other
long-range objectives.
D. DRUG TRAFFICKING & U.S. LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS: CASE
STUDIES
In President Bush's National Drug Control Strategy released in September
of 1989, the following were listed as international objectives:
" Elevation of drugs as a bilateral foreign policy issue.
U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffick in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, along with
other pending Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. Other nations w1111 be
urged to ratify the Convention.
Support for the U.S. foreign aid certification process in order to achieve
more effective supply-and transit-country compliance with American
drug control objectives.
Bilateral and multilateral efforts against international money
laundering activities." 14
The President's statements indicate the central importance of the
relationship between the United States and Latin America in a coherent d-ug
strategy. Although the impact can be felt throughout Latin America, the four
predominant source countries will be discussed. Indeed many of the same
characteristics can be found throughout the relations with other players but
14The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, September 1989), p. 60.
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Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia and Peru have certainly received the most
attention.
1. Colombia
The Colombian government has found itself in a very uncomfortable
position. Whereas the desire to act against the traffickers is currently on the
government's agenda, such actions have resulted in extremely violent
reaction. Recent activity on the part of the Colombian military has been met
with assassination, kidnapping and bombing of public buildings. As a
consequence one might consider their efforts to be less than enthusiastic.
However it is not the Colombian's repulsion of violence preventing action,
but rather the degree to which legitimate institutions have been infiltrated by
the narcotraffickers. In this context the relationship between the United
States and Colombia has experienced a number of levels ranging from
apathetic distrust to mutual crusades. Colombia became identified as the drug
king in the 1970's and has been unable to stop the escalation of this image.
This image was largely created by the United States, and the Colombians are
naturally resentful of this fact. In addition it has been difficult to convince
the Colombian government that a concerted effort on their part is first and
foremost in their nation's best interest. The tendency of Washington to
dictate policy and agenda items is greatly resented by the Colombian
government. This resentment is still present as Colombia feels that the
United States approaches these issues from the standpoint that Colombia's
government is basically incompetent. In 1979 a GAO study on drug control in
South America singled out the corruption in the Colombian government as a
major cause of the massive trafficking problem. Moreover a CBS 60 minutes
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report, of the same year, accused several Colombian presidential hopefuls as
being narcotraffickers.15 Needless to say the tarnish of these incidents, and
several like them, has yet to be polished away. Recently the relationship
between Colombia and the United States has been on the upswing. This has
been largely due to the efforts of the Reagan and Bush Administrations. The
approach by the United States is changing from dictation of policy to
cooperative efforts with Colombian officials.
The events of the past year seem to indicate Colombia's recognition
of the drug problem, and the willingness of Colombian officials to work for its
eradication. Respecting the sovereignty of Colombia and working with this
country as a peer has done much to relieve previous tensions. Colombians
have far more to lose in the war on drugs than do North American citizens.
This is evident with the recent political assassinations and the knowledge
that their economy is heavily dependent on the capital received from
narcotrafficking.16
2. Mexico
Traffick in illicit narcotics has been a crucial factor in Mexico-U.S.
relations since 1960. Until the mid nineteen eighties the relationship, at least
on this issue, has been favorable. Both governments agreed on the need to
curtail narcotrafficking and worked closely on cooperative agreements. Prior
1SCraig, R. B., "Colombian Narcotics and United States Relations," Journal
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, (August 1981 v. 23, no. 3), p. 252.
16Lee, R. W. L, IIl, "The Latin American Drug Connection," Foreign
Policy, (Winter 1985-1986, no. 61), p. 147.
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to 1985 the only real stalemate occurred over the desire of the United States to
use herbicides in crop eradication. The reluctance on the part of Mexico was
due to possible side effects of the chemicals and the general outrage at this
idea by the Mexican people. However this was approached by both
governments and the result was Operation Condor. Nothing before or since
Condor has had such an impact on the Mexican drug scene and so pleased the
United States. Condor was designed to please all participants:
"* Enthusiastic support by the Mexican Justice Department.
* A firm commitment from the Secretary of Defence [Mexico] who was
supplied with an airwing, from the U.S., larger than available to most
Latin American countries.
• Unprecedented coordination between the Mexican Federal Police, the
military and U.S. narcotics officials." 17
The results of the above cooperative effort were enormous but its
success was soon forgotten as other more pressing matters such as the foreign
debt and immigration began to occupy the agenda of both countries. Bilateral
relations suffered quite a blow when the Camarena case attracted so much
attention. Although President Salinas and President Bush have discussed
increased coordination efforts between the two governments, the tone of this
effort reached an all time low with the January 1990 NBC airing of the "Kiki
Camarena Story." This pseudo documentary cast a broad shadow of
corruption on the Mexican government and was severely criticized for its
insensitivity by many Mexican officials. The problem was further aggravated
when an official request by the Mexican government not to air this movie
17Craig, R. B., "Illicit Drug Traffic and U.S.-Latin American Relations",
The Washington Quarterly, (Fall 1985, v. 8, no. 4), p. 119.
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was unequivocally denied. Although the United States and Mexico are still
discussing future possible coordinated efforts, J. J. Mateer of the San Francisco
DEA states that it may well take some time for the wounds to heal.' 8
3. Bolivia
The governments of Bolivia and the United States have worked
closely to control narcotrafficking. Bolivia has been responsive to American
policy goals and quite willing to assist in efforts to curtail cocaine production.
However the government has suffered from past corruption, as with the
"cocaine generals," and in Bolivia, the central government loses effectiveness
as the distance from La Paz increases. Political-economic chaos in Bolivia
presents the biggest obstacle to a serious anti-drug program. The institutions
and government of Bolivia are attempting to reorganize and are willing to
continue cooperative efforts with the United States, despite past
confrontations with narcotraffickers. When governments feel threatened by
the drug problem they are willing to react.
A recent joint effort occurred in July of 1986 when U.S. military
personnel and equipment were sent to Bolivia to aid in the fight against
processing and transportation of cocaine.19
18Discussion on March 16, 1990 with DEA Regional Director J. J. Mateer on
U.S./Mexican relations in regards to narcotics enforcement. (San Francisco
Regional DEA Office, U.S. Federal Building, San Francisco, DA).
19MacDonald, Volcano, p. 60.
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In effect this could be viewed as direct military intervention. The
results were gratifying but short lived. Once again after limited success both
governments moved on to more pressing matters.
4. Peru
Peruvian officials have long been suspicious of the "imperialistic"
intentions of the United States. The Alan Garcia administration recognized
the threat of drugs and narcotraffickers to his country but was also gravely
concerned with the objectives of the guerrilla Sendero movement. However
he tried to go at his many battles alone and was lukewarm to the courtship of
aid from the United States. Unfortunately this trend continues under the
new administration. Additionally, as highlighted before, the military, the
police and the guerrilla's all have different objectives, which only
occasionally touch upon the drug issue. The complexity of this web is
significant and often underestimated and it is in Peru where the United States
has the least influence. Although drugs are recognized as a threat:
Garcia governs an economic basket case, a poverty stricken country
plagued by political instability, a restless military and a deadly serious
revolutionary group.20
Realistically former President Garcia's agenda included many other
more pressing problems, problems which remain a concern for Peru's new
government.
2OCraig, R. B., "Illicit Drug Traffic and U.S.-Latin American Relations",
The Washington Quarterly, (Fall 1985, v. 8, no. 4), p. 110.
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The recent "drug summit," conducted on 13 February 1990 in
Cartagena Colombia, was attended by government officials of the Andean
region and by President Bush. This summit has shown a willingness on the
part of the United States to recognize the sovereignty of these nations and
that the drug issue, although important to the United States, is only one
problem on the agenda of these other countries. From this summit it was
decided that efforts will be more coordinated, mutually beneficial and will
not, in the near future, include the use of the military.
E. U.S. BILATERAL NARCOTICS AGREEMENTS/TREATIES
Due to the need for diplomatic discussion and an agency qualified to
initiate and formalize these discussions, the Bureau of Narcotics Matters was
created in February of 1980. This Bureau falls under the jurisdiction of the
State Department and has worked since its inception to formalize
international treaties and agreements for narcotics matters. Congress, as well,
has its fact finding body, the Task Force In International Narcotics Control
(INC). In reviewing the 600 page report from the INC, dated August 1986,
ambiguity of the treaties enclosed stands apparent.21 For example, in
Colombia several agreements exist with the purpose of eradicating crop
production and acting more aggressively in the pursuit of narcotraffickers.
The only other major agreement is the Extradition Treaty of 1982, which
allows for the deportation of Colombian nationals, suspected of drug
21U.S. Department of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United States in Force on I January 1986,
Section D, p. 332.
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trafficking, to be tried in the United States.22 From early 1980 to 1989 little
existed in the way of combined international strategy. In October 1989
military equipment in the form of helicopters, land vehicles and small arms
were distributed to Colombia with additional capital to be allocated at a later
date. Similar transactions have taken place throughout the "drug source
region."
All major "drug source" countries in Latin America have agreements
with the United States concerning the insertion of DEA agents and special
military units. The degree of mobility in which these individuals may
operate varies from country to country. As of 1989, all may now carry
firearms for self defence, but none have arresting powers. The jobs of these
units are loosely defined but include training and intelligence assistance.
Arrests must be made in the presence of local law enforcement agencies. 23
Mexico has perhaps the largest number of agreements with the United States
and has entertained U.S. law enforcement officials since 1960. However even
in Mexico their powers are severely limited.
After reviewing the data it became apparent that the majority of
agreements comprised one-time operations, and have not as yet addressed the
more sensitive issues of jurisdiction and arresting powers. This in part is
221nternational Legal Matters, Colombian Supreme Court Decision on the
Extradition Treaty with United States, (March 1988, v. XXVII, no. 2).
231nterview with DEA agent Bob McGuire on March 16, 1990, (San
Francisco Regional DEA Office, U.S. Federal Building, San Francisco, CA).
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based upon the mutual distrust that is still prevalent among all actors
involved.
F. SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND IN NARCOTICS CONTROL
The current problem with the control of narcotic trafficking is
multifaceted, but the majority of sources consulted seem to agree that a
supply side attack has simply not been effective. The reasons for this include:
" Supply side strategies, even if temporarily successful in one country,
will not much reduce the supply of cocaine in the United States;
growing and trafficking simply move elsewhere.
" Because coca-cultivation for local consumption of the leaf has been
traditional and legal for centuries the cocoa growers there are well
organized to defend their interests through legitimate political
channels.
* There has not been a realistic evaluation of the political, security, and
social costs to the countries of programs aimed at the farmers who
cultivate the coca leaf.24
Although coordination between the involved countries has certainly
improved over the years, the limited results are indicated by the exponential
rise of the drug problem. According to a recent Rand Corporation study,
arrests and sentences are up and seizures of drugs have reached record levels.
Despite this, the market prices of imported drugs (particularly cocaine) have
fallen. In standard economic models this either means that demand has
decreased sharply or that more drugs are reaching the market. Ample direct
evidence suggests that demand is not dwindling, and indirect evidence
24Treverton, G. F., "Combatting Cocaine in the Supplying Countries:
Challenges and Strategies," World Peace Foundation Report, (May 1989), pp.
3-4.
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indicates that quantities shipped have increased even more than seizures
have.25
As Washington increases its efforts on the supply side of the drug war,
Latin America responds with less and less enthusiasm. Again this goes back
to the finger pointing of who is to blame, and which method is best to fight
the drug war. Latin American cynics argue that it is politically easier for
Washington to fight the drug war abroad than it is at home. Additionally
there is skepticism in Latin America about the enthusiasm in which
American officials approach the issue, considering, for example, that
marijuana is the number two cash crop in the United States. The rhetoric of
Washington, the lukewarm attitude of Latin America and the corruption that
runs throughout, makes it extremely difficult and dangerous for those who
actually serve as the ioot soldiers. Both Latin American and U.S.
enforcement officials are frustrated with the inconsistency and ambiguity of
their respective government policies. If in fact a consensus were reached to
fight this "war" from the supply side then certainly more of an effort must be
generated. Our conclusion is taking the drug war abroad was in fact the easier
of the two possible strategies. Even within the United States enforcement and
judicial proceedings have become very difficult. It should be obvious that
efforts must be increased both in the war at home and the war abroad.
Credit must be given to the governments of all concerned however,
because increased consolidation of efforts are apparent. Agencies have been
25Cave, J. A. K., Remarks on Recent Elements of Drug Policy, (The Rand
Corporation, May 1988), p. 2.
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created, studies have been funded and a more cooperative attitude among the
players can be seen. How much each country is willing to devote to the
problem of narcotics control remains to be seen, but if it in fact becomes the
agenda item of the nineties, more definite guidelines must be developed.
Cooperation between the United States and Latin America, on narcotics
issues, has improved considerably in recent years. Isolated incidents have
added stress to the relationship but cooperative efforts will continue to
expand and improve because each needs the other's help. Rhetoric
notwithstanding, Latin American leaders now realize as never before that
narcotraffick and all that it implies represents a threat to existing political
systems. Bolivia and Colombia afford exemplary case studies. Furthermore,
drug abuse is no longer a U.S. monopoly. It is a universal reality that is
growing most rapidly in source countries where surplus heroin, coca
derivatives, and marijuana are flooding local markets. In the long run
however Latin America's drug abuse and production problems will require
future administrations to address their domestic raison d'etre.
The narcotraffickers have been extremely successful in expanding their
arena of operations and enlisting the aid of many throughout the cultivation-
production-trafficking network. Recognition of these complexities will serve
as a foundation for the development of more successful strategies.
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III. NARCOTERRORISM, INSTABILITY & INSURGENCY
It might be considered a bit extreme to identify the narcotics problem as a
threat to national security, as President Reagan did on April 8, 1986 when he
signed a national security directive designating the drug trade as a national
security issue. However, if one is to take the definition of national security
and compare it with the existing drug threat, the viability of the argument
becomes apparent. According to Mabry, national security includes "protection
of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten
fundamental values and the vitality of the state."26 Keeping this definition in
mind recall that the United States has a $100 billion illicit drug appetite by 23
million of its people. 27  This must eventually translate into lower
productivity, an erosion of social values, especially among the children, more
frequent accidents resulting in the loss of property and life, an exponential
increase in violent crime, and the loss of economic resources through non-
returnable investment. The threat of the narcotics trade on the national
security of the United States is real indeed and if not arrested will cause more
damage, in the long run, than the crisis of the moment whether it be Panama,
Iraq or the perception of any threat. Since the threat of narcotics does not
26Mabry, Narcotics and National Security, p. 1.
2 7The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, September 1989), p. 1. NOTE: Estimates based
on usage at least once in a thirty day period, in other words some form of
illegal drug usage once a month.
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immediately affect the survival of the United States, the tendency is to refrain
from a full attack on the problem. Note that there has been little mention of
the "war on drugs" throughout the Middle East crisis which began in August
of 1990. Granted the threat posed by the Middle East is more immediate, but it
is unnerving to think that the biggest threat previous to this crisis has all but
been forgotten by the government, the media, and to a large extent, the
citizens.
The domestic turbulence caused by the narcotics trade is only one part of
the overall threat to national security. The biggest and most immediate
threat is the affect that narcotrafficking is having on regional political and
economic stability. Instability of this type is certainly not unheard of in Latin
America but the problem is compounded with the growth of the narcotics
nexus.
Therefore the threat is obviously not limited to the national security of
the United States but to the region and the individual countries involved.
It is the habit of the United States government to focus on immediate
threats and causes of instability, especially in the Western hemisphere.
Insomuch as this is the trend it warrants an overview of the conditions in the
principle narco-producing countries. Certainly from the view of the principle
actors, narcotrafficking is seen as an immediate threat to the legitimacy and
effectiveness of their respective governments. The extent to which
narcotrafficking promotes instability in Latin America is enormous and it
occurs at all levels. Corruption exists in government and the military,
criminal elements are massing incredible economic power bases, and the
people, as a rule, have found that although cultivation and production are
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illegal, it is more of a benefit to the welfare of their family than former
enterprises. Comparatively speaking the political and destabilizing affect of
the narcotics trade is far more serious in Latin America than the United
States. This is no great revelation, however, it must be realized that regional
instability and gradual domestic erosion are in themselves a threat to the
national security of the United States.
The focus will now shift to the political threats and seeds of instability
that are readily identified in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico. In these
countries the threat of narcotics is not from domestic consumption but rather
from the cultivation, production and trafficking elements. However this is
not to suggest that the political threat is limited to these four countries or that
the United States is excluded from the picture. On the contrary the entire
Western hemisphere has been affected in one way or another, and the fact has
been illustrated that regional instability poses another element of danger to
all the actors involved.
Instability and political threats have been fueled through the use of
narcoterrorism and to a lesser degree, insurgency. These catalysts have dealt a
firm blow to the efforts of governments and the arms of narcotics
enforcement. Insurgency and terrorism are not new concepts, especially in
Latin America, and -the narcotraffickers have adapted these tactics to
undermine legitimate power bases and discourage competition. At the outset
it should be clearly pointed out that insurgents, although contributing to the
chaos on an occasional basis, can not be linked directly to any narco
movement. The few cooperative efforts noted in the past have been purely
out of mutual convenience. The degrees to which insurgency and
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narcoterrorism are used differ from case to case, but undoubtedly Colombia
tops the list. This in part is due to her history of violence and the fact that the
major cartels operate from within her boundaries.
In encouraging the Andean nations in their fight against narcotics, the
U.S. has advocated a militarization of the drug war. The purpose of this
chapter is to explore the implications of militarization for the countries of the
Andean Region. It will concentrate on the dilemmas faced by the Andean
military and law enforcement institutions, as well as the dilemma faced by
the governments of the region as they attempt or resist a militarization of the
drug war. It will also present an assessment concerning the variety of threats
faced by security forces and the capabilities of Andean military establishments
in addressing these threats.
A. A BRIEF MILITARY ANALYSIS
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru are confronted by a variety of obstacles
that stand in the way of a successful drug interdiction campaign. The first and
perhaps the most basic is geography. The region in which the various anti-
narcotics forces must operate is extremely arduous. Colombia, the main
processing center of coca paste into its final stage of cocaine hydrochloride, is a
large country with rugged terrain. Colombia has three major mountain
ranges which run its length, as well as heavy rain forest intersected by river
networks along its border with Peru, and Brazil.28 In addition the narco-
28Trainor, B. E., "A Hard War for Colombia," New York Times, 20 October
1989.
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traffickers have legitimately purchased over 2.5 million acres of Colombian
farmland. 29 There has been a trend away from the large centralized
processing laboratories, towards the smaller so called "kitchen sink" labs.
Given the amount of acreage to be covered, the task of the Colombian anti-
narcotics forces is a formidable one.
Peru and Bolivia present a different set of circumstances. Both of
these countries are primarily growers of coca leaf and process it only into a
crude paste for shipment to Colombia. The primary growing areas in both
countries are well known: in Peru the upper-Huallaga valley, and in Bolivia
the Chapare River region. Still the areas under cultivation are quite large,
Bolivia having approximately 120,000 acres and Peru 250,000 acres under coca
cultivation.30 As in Colombia, the growing areas in both Peru and Bolivia are
rugged and present logistical and operational difficulties for government anti-
narcotics forces.
Another factor that significantly complicates the interdiction effort is
the presence of indigenous resistance groups in both Colombia and Peru.
Peru must contend with the most serious guerilla threat in Latin America,
the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement, as well as a lesser threat
29Collett, M., "The Cocaine Connection: Drug Trafficking and Inter-
American Relations," (New York: Headline Series, Foreign Policy
Association, Fall 1989), p. 15.
30 Painter, J., "Bolivia Seeks U.S. Aid to Strengthen its Economy," The
Christian Science Monitor, 15 February 1990. U.S. Department of State
Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (USDS-BINM) (1988) International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (March), Washington: U.S.-D.S.-BINM.
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from the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Front (MRTA). Colombia, in addition
to having to contend with narco-terrorists, must also struggle with five major
revolutionary movements, the most serious being the Colombian
Revolutionary Armed Forces or FARC, as well as approximately 130
paramilitary groups.31
Bolivia is the only country of the Andean coca producers that is not
threatened by a serious revolutionary guerilla movement. The complicating
factor in Bolivia is its peasant coca growers association, organized under the
Associacion Nacional de Productores de Coca (ANAPCOCA). 32 As discussed




Peru is primarily a coca leaf producer, providing approximately 55-60
percent of the World supply.33 (Note Figure 1) Peru does not possess any
significant drug cartels threatening the legitimacy of its government, as is the
case in Colombia. What Peru does have is the Sendero Luminoso insurgency
31Youngers, C., "Colombia Military's Link with Drug Dealers," The
Christian Science Monitor, 1989.
32Healy, K., "Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, v. 30, (Summer/Fall 1988), p. 109.
33Riding, A., "Peru's Forces Press Ahead in Drug War," New York Times,
August 17, 1986, p. A12.
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Figure 1. Estimated Coca Leaf Production. The Andean Countries, 1985-1988
Sendero is one of two insurgent movements in the Andean region
that is currently involved in the drug trade.34 Its area of operations is the
upper-Huallaga valley, Peru's primary coca growing region. Though it is
doubtful that Sendero has formed a formal alliance with drug traffickers in
the Upper-Huallaga valley, there is no doubt that they are helping the coca
34The other insurgent group is the Colombia Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FARC). Colombia's M-19 guerrillas had alleged links to Colombian
narcotraficantes but they have since disbanded and entered the realm of
legitimate politics.
35
growers of the region in their dealings with drug traffickers. In turn Sendero
finances its insurgent operations by collecting a 5 to 10 percent tax on the
growers coca crop, and charges traffickers $5,000 dollars per flight of coca paste.
This equates to an estimated yearly income of between $20 and $30 million.3 5
Sendero was founded in 1970 by Guzman, then a professor of
philosophy at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in
Ayacucho. 36 Briefly stated, the political objective of Sendero is to stimulate a
"peasant armed struggle" that will lead to the overthrow of the current
constitutional government and install a leftist, ethnic Indian State by the year
2000. 37 Utilizing his position with the university, Guzman was able to
undertake a methodical recruitment process involving his university
students. By the mid-1970's Sendero was able to expand its initial base of
support beyond Ayacucho into the surrounding areas of Cusco, Apurimac,
Huacavelica, and Junin, as well as into the city of Lima.38
By the early 1980's Sendero was seeking a peasant base of support in
the Upper-Huallaga valley. Up to that time the movement had largely
ignored the jungle areas. The desire to expand into the valley occurred as the
movement came under increased pressure from the Peruvian military's
35McCormick, G. H., "The Shining Path and the Future of Peru," RAND,
March 1990, p. 22.
36Ibid., p. 3.
37Terrorist Group Profiles, (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1989), p. 106.
3aMcCormick, "Shining,", p. 5.
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counterinsurgency campaign in Sendero's home department of Ayacucho. In
addition the valley provided a remote inaccessible territory with Vietnam
like savannas and rain forests. Potential financing from taxing coca growers,
and the ever important peasant base formed from a disaffected peasantry
angered by the U.S. backed Peruvian anti-narcotics campaign provided
additional motivation. 39 Sendero's entrenchment in the valley was further
assisted when Peruvian President, Alan Garcia, lifted the state of emergency
that had existed in the valley from July 1984 to December 1985. During this
time period the army was given virtually dictatorial powers in the region.
The Army was more concerned with pursuing Sendero, while tolerating the
narcotics industry in the valley. When the state of emergency was lifted, and
army protection with it, Sendero was able to step in and present themselves
as defenders of the coca growers.40
Sendero's current combat strength has been estimated at a low end of
4,500, to as high as 10,000.41 Regardless, Sendero is a significant force in Peru,
39Gonzalez, R., "Coca y Subversion en el Huallaga," QueHacer, 48
(September-October 1987), p. 72. Collett, M., "Maoist Guerrilla Band
Complicates Anti-Drug War in Peru," Washington Post, 4 June 1988, p. A22.
McClintock, C., "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, v. 30, nos. 2 and 3, (Summer/Fall,
1988), pp. 137-138.
40Bridges, T., "Peruvian Rebels Supplant Army as Shield for Drug
Producers," The Wall Street Journal, 4 May 1987, p. 23.
41Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, (Department of State Publication,
1989), p. 72. McCormick "Shining," p. 3.
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and its presence in the Upper-Huallaga valley means it cannot be divorced
from U.S. backed interdiction campaign.
A second, though lesser Peruvian insurgent threat, is the Tupac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). MRTA was first formed in 1983
and performed its first terrorist acts in 1984. MRTA's cadre has been
estimated to number several hundred (possibly as high as 600), and its
terrorist acts have largely been limited to the urban areas around Lima.42
Despite MRTA's small numbers it did contest Sendero for a position in the
Upper-Huallaga valley. But by 1987 Sendero had gained the upper hand in
the valley, and displaced MRTA in most of the area. 43 Though MRTA does
not present a threat as powerful as Sendero, and is not currently involved in
the Upper-Huallaga valley, it is still part of the narcotics equation as it
siphons off Peruvian military and police assets that the U.S. would like to see
utilized in anti-narcotics operations.
2. Colombia's Revolutionaries
The drug war in Colombia is probably the most complex of the three
Andean nations being examined. Not only does Colombia suffer from
several guerilla insurgencies, one of which is directly involved in the drug
trade, but also must contend with a narco-terrorist network that has directly
42Graham, C., "New Guerrilla Group Increases Peruvian Pressure
Cooker," The Wall Street Journal, 26 February 1988, p. 15.
43Gonzalez, R., "El Retorno de lo Reprimido: El Huallaga, Un Ano
Despues," QueHacer, 54 (August-September 1988), p. 46. McClintock,
"Peruvian Case," p. 138.
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challenged Colombian institutions. To further complicate the situation 150
legally sanctioned paramilitary organizations operate in the rural areas.
The largest Colombian guerilla insurgency, and the one that currently
is directly involved with the drug industry, is the Colombian Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FARC). FARC is currently estimated to have approximately
4,500 to 5,000 armed combatants and 10,000 supporters.44 FARC's objectives
are to overthrow the established order in Colombia and replace it with a
leftist and anti-American regime. FARC is considered to be the best trained,
equipped, and one of the most effective guerilla organizations in Latin
America.
Largely operating in the countryside, FARC was presented with the
opportunity to profit from the drug trade where its operational fronts
overlapped into areas of coca production. Thus, as in Peru with Sendero,
FARC was able to utilize narco-dollars to finance its operations. FARC's role
in the drug industry was first brought into light in April 1984, when a
complex of seventeen processing laboratories in the eastern lowlands was
raided. Cocaine worth an estimated $1.2 billion was seized, and the forty to
sixty employees of the complex were protected by 100 FARC guerrillas.45
Like Sendero, FARC initially received its revenues by taxing coca
growers who then provided coca paste to the drug cartels. FARC has since
decided, in certain cases, to directly manage coca cultivation and cocaine
44Global Terrorism: 1989, p. 72.
45MacDonald, Volcano, p. 72.
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processing facilities.46 In fact the Colombian magazine Semana has called
FARC the third cartel. This cut out the cartels' role as middlemen and
precipitated their refusal to purchase coca paste from FARC, thus ending the
uneasy relationship that had existed between the guerrillas and the cartels.
FARC has periodically attempted negotiating truces with the
Colombian government. In 1984 the government and FARC signed a cease
fire that allowed the rebels to enter electoral politics. The Patriotic Union
Candidates won 10 congressional, and 19 mayoral positions. But at the same
time FARC expanded its rural-base fronts from 27 to its present 40. The truce
that the government apparently had with FARC also did not prevent guerilla
ambushes against army units. 47 Part of the difficulty in negotiating with
FARC is that the various "fronts" usually operate as individual groups, with
little or no coordination between them.
Recently there have been overtures of another truce between FARC
and the Colombian government. But documents discovered by the
Colombian military indicate FARC may not yet be ready to lay down their
weapons. The documents detail a long-range plan by FARC to seize power in
Colombia by 1997. Under the plan FARC intends to create 38 additional fronts
to include 32,000 guerilla fighters. The plan is to be financed with 25 million
46Lee, R. W. L, III, "The Cocaine Dilemma in South America," in The
Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security, ed. Donald J.
Mabry, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 70.
47Collett, M., "Battling for Power with Bullets and Ballots," The Christian
Science Monitor, 16 May 1988, p. 10.
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pesos obtained from kidnappings, blackmail, and from narcotics. 48 The plan
also outlines the building of landing sites, creating a FARC war headquarters,
and actions to paralyze the country's transportation, power, and
communication systems. 49 Though this plan may be extremely optimistic, it
does indicate FARC intends to remain a major actor within Colombia. As
such it cannot be discounted in any anti-narcotics interdiction strategy.
As in Peru, with MRTA, Colombia contains several other insurgency
groups. Like MRTA these insurgencies may not be directly involved in the
narcotics industry, but they cannot be discounted from the narcotics equation
because they operate in narco-trafficking areas and confront Colombian
security forces being used in anti-narcotics operations.
The National Liberation Army (ELN), though small in numbers, has
been one of the most active insurgent groups in Colombia.5 0 ELN is a pro-
Cuban, Marxist-Leninist organization. ELN has been particularly effective in
crippling Colombia's oil industry. Since 1986 it has inflicted major damage
48Additional documentation captured concerning FARC's revenue
raising operation indicates that all but seven of the movement's forty fronts
were instructed to raise $28,169 every month. The remaining seven fronts
were instructed to contribute $563,380 each month. Significantly, the seven
big contributors are the fronts operating in Guauiare, Uraba, Cordoba, the Yari
plains, Caqueta, Putamayo, middle Magdalena, and Middle and Lower
Caguan--all Colombian coca-growing area. ("Doubts over FARC's Peace
Commitment," Andean Group Report, RA-89-04, 18 May 1989).
49
"Army Comments on FARC Plan, Extraditables," Bogata Inravision
Television, 20 January 1990, FBIS-LAT-90-014, 22 January 1990, p. 54.
50ELN strength is estimated to be between 1,000 and 2,000 (Global
Terrorism: 1989).
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on Colombia's oil pipeline. ELN has also clashed with Venezuelan National
Guard Units involved in anti-narcotics patrols along the
Colombian/Venezuelan border.
Two Colombian insurgent groups, M-19 and the Peoples Liberation
Army (EPL), have recently made peace with the Colombian government. M-
19 was particularly significant because its actions most clearly demonstrated a
possible symbiosis between narco-traffickers and an insurgent group. M-19's
boldest act of terrorism was its storming of the Colombian Palace of Justice in
1985. Over 100 people were killed in the ensuing shootout with Colombian
military units. Initially, the motives for the attack were thought to be M-19's
desire to reopen negotiations with the government. But subsequent
investigations revealed that M-19 may have been paid $5 million by the
Medellin cartel to conduct the attack, the purpose being to destroy
government files of cartel members facing extradition to the United States.s5
The last two elements of the Colombian terrorist equation is the
direct use of terror by the cartel 'sicarios' (hitmen) as well as the involvement
of the approximately 150 Colombian paramilitary organizations. Cartel
financed-terrorism has directly challenged Colombian institutions,
intimidating judges and the press, assassinating policemen and going as far as
to threaten political candidates.52
SlAnderson, J., and Van Atta, D., "The Medellin Cartel/M19 Gang,"
Washington Post, 28 August 1988, p. B7a.
52Most narco-financed acts of terror are conducted by the Medellin Cartel,
the Cali cartel being content to operate behind the scenes.
42
Some of the most spectacular and most publicized acts of terror have
been accomplished by the 'sicarios' of the Medellin Cartel. Most of the sicarios
are recruited directly from the urban slums of Medellin. Many of them are
little more than teenagers, who are given guns, trained in their use, then
given motorcycles and sent on their terror missions. The price for a death can
range from as little as $40 to as much as $8,000, which was the amount agreed
upon for the murder of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 1984.53 In
1986 sicarios assassinated Col. Jaime Ramirez, former head of the
antinarcotics police, and Guillermo Cano, editor of Colombia's second largest
newspaper, El Espectador.54
The most notorious assassination occurred on August 18, 1989, when
popular presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan was murdered by a sicario
hit team. This resulted in galvanizing the Colombian anti-narcotics effort.
The Colombian military and police offensive involved more than 80,000
personnel, and seized an impressive amount of cartel hardware, including:
367 aircraft, 72 boats, 710 vehicles, 4.7 tons of cocaine, 1279 guns, and 25,000
rounds of ammunition.55 Despite this impressive effort by Colombian
security forces the Medellin cartel still was able to fight back with a vengeance.
53Collett, M. "Political, Criminal Violence Increasing in Colombia,"
Washington Post, 3 October 1987, p. A20.
54Ross, T., "Colombia's New Antiterrorism Campaign: A Paper Tiger?,"
The Christian Science Monitor, 1 February 1988, p. 12.
55Brooke, J., "War Report from Colombia: Fight Will Be Long," New
York Times, 18 September 1989, p. 12. "Barco Wages All Out War against
Narcos," Andea Group Report, RA-89-08, 5 October 1989.
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From mid-August to mid-October 1989 narco hitmen staged 222 terrorist
attacks (bombings and assassinations) killing 22 people, wounding 109, and
causing $18 million in property damage.5 '
Part of the cartel's advantage is their almost unlimited financing,
with which they can provide intense combat training and the latest in
weaponry to their soldiers. One source for both weapons and training has
been Israel. The discovery of a weapons cache on a remote ranch owned by
the late cartel kingpin Jose Rodriguez Gacha has called into question the
Israeli connection. Yair Klein, a retired Israeli lieutenant colonel,
acknowledged training armed groups in remote areas of northern Colombia.
The weapons found on Gacha's ranch included 178 Galil assault rifles. The
rifles were part of a lot of 400 Galils, 100 Uzi submachine-guns, and 200,000
rounds of ammunition.5 7 Colombian security forces have alleged that eleven
British mercenaries have also helped train sicarios for the cocaine cartels.58
The United States is also guilty of providing weapons for the cartels.
A U.S. official estimated that as much as 80 percent of the weapons utilized by
the cartels are of U.S. origin. The weapons are sold legally in the United
56" Narcos Resume Selective Murders," Andean Group Report RA-89-10,
14 December 1989, p. 3.
5 7The weapons were part of a shipment allegedly bought by the
government of Antigua for its 80-man defense force. After arriving in
Antigua on 23 April 1989 they were transported to Colombia and into the
hands of Gacha. (Farah, D., "Colombia: U.S. Arming Traffickers,"
Washington Post, 12 June 1990, p. A16. McAllister, B., and Diehl, J., "Israeli
Arms Went to Colombian Cartel," Washington Post, 7 Mary 1990, p. A14.
18McAllister and Diehl, "Israel Arms," P. A14.
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States as semi-automatics which can then be modified into automatics. The
weapons include Ingram and MAC-13 machine pistols, used in the killing of
three presidential candidates, M-16s, AR-15, and AK-47 assault rifles. The
weapons are bought two or three at a time and then shipped to Colombia in
lots of 15 or 20.59 The lengths to which the cartels are willing to go was
revealed in May of this year when two drug dealers, working for the Medellin
Cartel, tried to buy 120 Stinger antiaircraft missiles for use against Colombian
government aircraft.60
Paramilitary groups have also entered the picture as an armed asset
for use by the cartels. Colombian paramilitary organizations were legally
sanctioned in 1968 by the passing of Law 48 of the Colombian Constitution.
This law authorized the use of civilian personnel in activities and tasks for
the "re-establishment of normality." What the law meant was that the
Defense Ministry had the power to hand over army issue weapons to private
citizens.61 This law was initially passed to confront Colombia's growing leftist
insurgency movements. Colombian authorities estimate that approximately
59Farah, "Arming Traffickers," P. A16.
601sikoff, M., "Two Colombians Arrested in Scheme to Buy Missiles,"
Washington Post, 8 Mary 1990.
61
"Colombia Acts against Private Armies," Andean Group Report, RA-89-
05, 22 June 1989, p. 4.
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150 such groups now operate in Colombia with a total strength of between
4,000 to 5,000 men.62
In the mid-80's the Medellin cartel began buying huge tracts of land
in central Colombia. To protect their landholdings the cartel began using Law
48 as a pretense in forming their own self defense groups, as a cover for
establishing their own private armies. In addition the cartels strengthened,
trained, and gave modern weapons to the paramilitary groups that already
were in existence in these areas.63
These paramilitary groups are responsible for much of the violence
in rural Colombia. They have been linked to peasant massacres, the killing of
judges and policemen investigating paramilitary violations, and the
assassinations of two leftist presidential candidates. A leader of one of the
Medellin cartel's paramilitary forces is Fidel Castano, who owns a ranch of
250,000 acres. Despite the uncovering of numerous mass graves on his
property, it has been reputed that his paramilitary forces are able to pass
through military checkpoints because he uses his forces against leftist
insurgency groups. Though there has been an arrest warrant issued against
Castano, authorities give little hope in catching him. This is partly due to
support from the locals because he has been effective in controlling guerilla
62
"Paramilitary Groups Offer to Give Up Arms," Miami Herald, 10 May
1990.
63
"Private Armies," p. 4. Farah, D., "Cartel Enforcer Linked to Massacres,"
Washington Post, 6 May 1990, p. A28.
46
activity. In addition no one can be found to testify against him out of fear for
reprisals by Castano.64
3. Confusion In Bolivia
Bolivia is unique among the Andean coca growing countries because
it is not threatened by narco-terrorism or an effective guerilla movement. 65
The group that most interferes with Bolivia's drive to rid itself of coca
cultivation, and frustrates U.S. drug policy there, is Bolivia's rural labor
organizations.
As in Peru, coca cultivation in Bolivia has a long history.
Traditionally, chewing coca leaf has been source of energy and protein for the
rural population. Following Bolivia's 1952 revolution the peasantry emerged
independent and well organized. The boom in cocaine prices in the late 70's
coupled with a collapse in tin prices brought a large influx of peasants into the
Chapare and Yungas regions to cultivate coca.
With the cocaine industry directly employing 350,000 to 400,000
people, in a relatively small and poor country, cocaine growers have become a
regional and national political force.66 These coca producers have organized
64T "Private Armies," p. 4. "Cartel Enforcer," p. A28.
65Bolivia does possess one little-known revolutionary movement called
the Armed Liberation Forces Zarate Wilka (FAL). Its armed strength is
believed to be relatively small. Its most notable terrorist acts to date have
been the bombing of former U.S. Secretary of State, George Schultz's
motorcade in La Paz in August 1988, and the assassination of two Mormon
missionaries in May 1989. (Global Terrorism: 1989)
66Lee, R. W. III, "Cocaine Dilemma," p. 60.
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themselves into the Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Coca
(ANAPCOCA). Their goal is to thwart government crop control and law
enforcement by the use of mass demonstrations, occupation of government
buildings, roadblocks, and occasionally violent clashes against government
forces.67
The peasantry's effectiveness has been demonstrated on a number of
occasions, when they have forced the reversal of government decisions
concerning coca or resisted eradication forces. One of the earliest examples of
this occurred in January of 1986 when 245 members of the Bolivian anti-
narcotics police UMOPAR (Mobile Units for Rural Areas, also known as the
'Leopards'), moved into the Chapare region to destroy illegal coca paste
operations. The Leopards were eventually besieged by approximately 17,000
protesting farmers, for five days. The siege ended only when Bolivian
President Victor Paz Estensorro agreed to meet with the farmers himself, and
hear their grievances. 68
In a more recent incident, in June 1989, a peasant union leader by the
name of Evo Morales incited 1,500 to 2,000 Bolivian farmers to surround a
force of the Leopards. Four of the Leopards managed to escape into the
jungle, the other five were beaten before they managed to be rescued. Also in
June, 15,000 peasants gathered in a peaceful protest at the main Leopard base
67Healy, K., "Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988,"
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, v. 30 (Summer/Fall
1988), pp. 110-111.
68Shannon, Desperados, p. 361.
48
at Villa Tunari, to mark the anniversary of a peasant death during an attempt
to invade the Leopard base.69
Bolivian peasants are also capable of more violent acts of protest as
demonstrated by an incident occurring on 22 June 1989. In this incident the
Leopards raided the house of a well-known drug trafficker. In the resulting
shootout, 5 of the traffickers bodyguards were killed and 5 wounded. But the
Leopards had no time to capture the trafficker, Hugo Rivera Villavicencia,
because a gun battle ensued between the Leopards and an armed crowd of
approximately 300 people drawn to the initial shootout. The Leopards
managed to escape, but two of the evacuation helicopters were damaged in
the fire fight.70
Bolivia's narco-traffickers have taken advantage of the organized coca
growers by trying to establish coca "red zones." These red zones are coca
growing regions where the traffickers have infiltrated civic groups and
peasant union organizations. The peasants are then directed to resist
government eradication teams. In these zones only people known by the
residents are allowed in. The most successful red zones are located in the
Chapare region and have greatly complicated the anti-narcotics campaign
there.71
69Long, W. R., "Bolivian 'Red Zones'-Havens for Drugs," Los Angeles




These examples show the effectiveness of Bolivia's rural coca
growers. This effectiveness has not gone unnoticed by Bolivia's narco-
traffickers.
4. The Mexican Illusion
The Mexican political machine, dominated by the Partido
Revolucinario Institucional (PRI), is undoubtedly one of the most stable in
Latin America. Albeit not democratic, Mexico' political system nonetheless
continues to withstand attacks from opposing political fronts. Superficially it
would appear that the drug trade has had little impact on the credibility and
strength of the Mexican system. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The Mexican case differs somewhat from her Latin partners in that her
security is not immediately threatened but the gradual impact of the narcotics
trade has been enormous. As stated by Mabry, "...narcotrafficking has done
what even the most corrupt politicians could not do; it has rendered
dysfunctional the cement of Mexican politics." 72 This became quite clear in
the Camarena murder of 1985, when scores of commanders and agents from
Mexico's Federal Judicial Police and the Federal Security Directorate were
directly implicated in drug trafficking. Resulting investigations uncovered
links between narcotraffickers and government personnel at all levels. Not
unlike Colombia in this form of infiltration, and the situation is probably
worse given the levels of corruption that are accepted as normal business in
Mexico.
72Mabry, Narcotics and National Security, p. 29.
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Perhaps the greatest security threat to Mexico is the level of
narcoterrorism, particularly in the past five years. Literally hundreds of
federal and local police have been assassinated by the narco mafia and it
would appear that the Mexican government is actually losing territory.
Whether by corruption or intimidation, they exercise de facto power
in portions of six states: Sinaloa, Durango, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Veracruz,
and Oaxaca. In the process 'los narcos' have demonstrated time and again
that the supposedly all encompassing government in Mexico City does not
truly enjoy unlimited reach. 73
The loss of this territory by the Mexican government is a direct result
of the rural neglect demonstrated over the past 20-25 years. Not unlike Peru,
the campesinos have resorted to marijuana cultivation and trafficking as a
method of subsistence that had previously been impossible. This, combined
with a drastic increase in domestic addiction, poses a severe national security
threat to Mexico's political system. The internal threats are often
compounded by pressures from the United States and as a consequence
Mexico is often guilty of indecisiveness.
Considering the proximity of Mexico to the United States, she is often
viewed as the biggest narco-security threat. The porous border that exists
between the countries is a major avenue for the infiltration of narcotics,
illegal aliens, smuggled terrorists and various other contraband. Forty
percent of Colombia's cocaine is shipped through Mexico to the United States
731bid., p. 31.
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and as pressures are increased in the Caribbean this percentage increases to as
high as seventy percent. The border situation is familiar to the population of
both sides, however little can be done to rectify the ease with which the
border can be penetrated.
The illusion that Mexico has its problem under control is clearly a
result of the sensitivity of bilateral relations with the United States. Unlike
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, the bilateral relationship between the United
States and Mexico is based on much more than the problems of narcotics
control and occasional trade agreements. As a result of this both countries
tend to play down the severity of the Mexican connection, especially when
referring directly to the issue of cocaine trafficking. However, as time passes,
it is becoming increasingly evident that the Colombian cartels will continue
to refine the Mexican delivery system because of its illusive and cost effective
potentials.
C. THE MILITARY DILEMMA: GUERRILLAS & NARCOTICS, PERU,
COLOMBIA & BOLIVIA
1. The Drug War. Peru
The drug war in Peru presents a dilemma for Peruvian security
forces, particularly the Peruvian military. On one hand Peru is faced with the
Sendero insurgency, which members of the Peruvian army see as the primary
threat to their country. On the other hand Sendero cannot be divorced from
the drug war because they receive most of their financing by collecting taxes
from coca growers in the upper-Huallaga valley. But the Peruvian Army
does not wish to antagonize the coca growers for fear of driving them into the
arms of Sendero.
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The U.S. stance on this Peruvian dilemma seems rather clear. A DEA
report in 1989 concluded that the Peruvian Guardia Civil, including its anti-
narcotics police, lacked proper weapons, military skills, and thus was a threat
to individuals and property. State Department investigators were told that
there were 18 instances over the past two years of self inflicted wounds by
Guardia Civil Personnel. 74 Therefore, the U.S. has placed its hope that the
Peruvian military institutions would enter the drug war and provide the
decisive factor in its outcome.
Peru's 80,000-man army, in fact, could provide important assets to the
drug war in the Huallaga valley. The increased manpower would enable
closer monitoring of traffick along the valley's main highway, military radars
could track cartel aircraft as they fly into Peru from Colombia, and the
military could provide increased protection for DEA agents and CORAH
workers (Peru's crop eradication teams) as they attack the coca fields.75 The
army would also be able to provide important air assets including 34 Mi-8
helicopters, a particular badly-needed commodity.
In fact the Peruvian military has been used against drug traffickers in
the past. In 1986 President Alan Garcia launched a renewed phase of the
ongoing 'Operation Condor.' Peruvian Air Force aircraft strafed and bombed
airstrips while troops seized drugs and destroyed processing laboratories. By
the end of 1986, Operation Condor forces had seized 165 airstrips, 36
74Isikoff, M., "Anti-Cocaine Programs called Ineffective, Wasteful,"
Washington Post, July 1989.
75Massing, "Cocaine War," p. 88.
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laboratories, seventy aircraft, and 30 tons of coca paste.76 Operation Condor
has been the exception to the rule. Generally, the Peruvian military has been
kept out of the drug war; the military has actively opposed a role in the war.
In resisting efforts to become involved, the army has also hampered the
effectiveness of the Guardia Civil and the DEA in prosecuting narcotics
operations.
Until December 1989 General Alberto Arciniega was in command of
the 4,000 Peruvian troops assigned to the upper-Huallaga valley.77 His
attitude exemplified what the Peruvian military sees as the primary threat to
Peru and how to best deal with it. His strategy has frustrated both U.S. and
Peruvian narcotics officials in their attempts to deal with the narcotics
problems present in the valley.
General Arciniega perceives the Sendero Luminoso movement as
the worst threat to Peru. Though the use of coca financing helps strengthen
Sendero, the general did not see crop eradication as a solution to help cripple
the movement. General Arciniega viewed the 150,000 peasants growing coca
in the valley potentially a vast pool of support for Sendero, if their coca
livelihood was wiped out. He considers winning over the peasants as the key
to defeating Sendero in the valley, and the only way to accomplish this is
with a viable crop substitution plan operating in tandem with eradication.
76Shannon, Desperados, p. 366.
7"General Arciniega was replaced by General Luis Chacon.
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With crop substitution not feasible at this time, he supported the peasants in
their fight to grow coca.78
Many in Peru agree with the General's position, they do not consider
drug consumption as a serious problem in Peru, and the country does not
suffer from narco-terrorism of the kind that plagues Colombia. But General
Arciniega's attitude was at odds with those of Civil Guard Genera, Juan
Zarate, whose anti-narcotics police are responsible for stopping drug
trafficking in the valley. Zarate, who relies on the U.S. for logistical support,
has a vested interest in seeing cocaine as his prime target. 79
With these two different viewpoints guiding policy in the Huallaga,
conflicts have arisen. The Peruvian army has been accused of overtly
hampering UMOPAR (Peruvian anti-narcotics strike police) and 7DEA
operations in the region as well as providing blatant help to traffickers. There
have been instances of the Peruvian military failing to come to the aid of
police units under attack from insurgents.80 General Arciniega himself has
been accused of taking payoffs from traffickers to ignore their operations and
to gain any information from traffickers that may help against Sendero.81
78Massing, M., "In the Cocaine War: The Jungle is Winning," New York
Times, 4 March 1990, Sec. VI, p. 88.
79Greve, F., "Two Generals Key to Peru's Control of Coca Valley," Miami
Herald, 30 September 1989.
8
°Getler, M., and Robinson, E., "Peru's Rebels Muddy Drug Drive,"
Washington Post, 3 November 1989, p. A32.
81Greve, F., "Two Generals."
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With little help forthcoming from the Peruvian Military, the anti-
narcotics strategy in Peru has centered around the base at Santa Lucia in the
upper-Huallaga valley. The base is manned by thirty to forty U.S. DEA agents
and 100 members of UMOPAR. The idea to work from a base in the valley
resulted from a forced retreat by the DEA from the valley due to increased
hostility from coca growers, and especially from the threat of Sendero. The
base was designed by two former members of the U.S. Special Forces, and
epitomizes the growing militarization of the drug war in Peru. It is equipped
with watchtowers, sandbagged bunkers, and a mined perimeter. From it the
DEA and UMOPAR have been able to conduct helicopter forays into the
valley in search of coca processing labs and illegal airstrips.8 2 Operating from
the base in January and February 1990, UMOPAR and the DEA, in fact, were
able to destroy 24 coca processing labs and three illegal airstrips. The United
States is considering expanding the use of such bases by building one near the
emerging coca area near the juncture of the Tombo and Ene rivers.8 3
Though the base at Santa Lucia has shown some promise in the drug
war, there have been some problems and potential shortcomings with the use
of the fortified bases. When the base was built it was assumed that it was so
fortified that Sendero, relying on a mixture of weapons, would not be strong
enough to attack it. On April 7 1990 this assumption proved wrong when the
82Brooke, J., "Peru Builds Base to Combat Coca Production," New York
Times, 13 June 1989, p. A9. Reid, M., "Peru and U.S. Squabble over Base," The
Christian Science Monitor, 7 November 1989.
83Brooke, J., "U.s. Giving Major New Arms Aid on Drugs to Peru," New
York Times, 21 April 1989, p. A8.
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base was attacked by a force of 200 to 300 insurgents. There are also
indications that Sendero, for the first time, is in possession of mortars, which,
without army support, would make the base that much more vulnerable to
attack.84 With the amount of money earned by Sendero in the valley, there is
little doubt they have the ability to escalate the conflict if they so wish.
Another problem is that the base only operates with eight helicopters,
and there have been problems with the civilian contract pilots who fly them.
Some of the pilots have struck for better pay (they can earn as much as
$150,000 per year), and there have been allegations of fraud and
misappropriation in the operation of anti-narcotics aircraft by the contractor,
Corporate Jets.
2. The Drug War Colombia
Unlike Peru, Colombia has enlisted about 20,000 members of its
military into the drug war. There may be several reasons for this. Like Peru,
Colombia is faced with an insurgent movement that is a confirmed player in
the narcotics industry (FARC). But unlike Peru, Colombia is faced with an
additional adversary with the presence of the powerful drug cartels. This
combination has taxed the ability of the National Police Force to handle the
problem.
The Colombian military institution has recognized the threat
presented by the combined narco-terror and armed insurgency movements.
It has been vocal in denouncing the threat of drug trafficking and has
84Brooke, J., "U.S.-Peruvian Teams Renew Drive on Coca," New York
Times, 18 march 1990, p. 6.
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exhorted the Colombian people to cooperate in the struggle against
narcotics 85
At the same time the armed forces hierarchy is keenly aware of the
difficulty of the task. Of particular concern is that the image of the armed
forces as guardians of the state will be tarnished by the corrupting influence of
drug money. This has been a concern of army commanders since the armed
forces was assigned tasks relating the drug war by President Virgilio Barco in
May 1988. President Barco reportedly overruled military concerns about
corrupting influences on the armed forces after recognizing that corruption
and fear had paralyzed the police's anti-drug role.86
In March 1989 former Army Commander, General Nelson Mejia,
acknowledged that drug traffickers were seeking to infiltrate the armed forces.
By November 1989, shortly after the assassination of Presidential Candidate
Luis Carlos Galan, there was increased recognition of the widespread presence
of corruption within the armed forces. A spokesman for the defense ministry
conceded that there were military men linked to drug traffickers within army
ranks, but emphasized that they make up less than one percent of the armed
forces.
But Colombian Attorney General Alfonso Gomez Mendez was even
more vocal in his denouncement of armed forces corruption. Gomez
85
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Mendez stated that the war against the drug cartels should be carried out
solely by the police, without the military. Gomez Mendez stated to top
military commanders that use of the armed forces in the drug war was a
mistake, and that if the rebels had infiltrated the military forces as the drug
traffickers have, the rebels would have seized power a long time ago.8 7
In fact instances of corruption have been significant. In 1989 over
2,100 military men including 130 officers were fired or asked to retire due to
bad conduct. Their offenses ranged from running weapons for the Medellin
cartel to actively taking part in acts of terrorist bombings. Two of the assassins
who took part in the assassination of Galan turned out to be former
Colombian security agents.88 Though the firing of so many members of the
armed forces does show that infiltration of the institution is serious, it also
demonstrates that the Colombian government is making efforts at rooting
out corruption.
Part of the problem in involving the Colombian military with the
drug war is similar to the situation faced by Peru, in that the military has a
tendency to see the guerilla insurgency problem as being more important
than stopping drug trafficking. This is manifested in the army's seeming
toleration of the numerous paramilitary groups originally formed to fight
communist insurgencies, but recently having come under the control of the
87
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drug cartels. The paramilitary groups have increasingly been involved in
drug related terror, but they also have been effective in eliminating leftist
insurgencies in their areas of operation, thus benefiting the military. The
dilemma faced by the military is demonstrated by the fact that former cartel
kingpin Carlos Rodriguez Gacha was seen in the company of army officers
presiding over graduation ceremonies of drug funded anti-guerilla squads in
Colombia's Magdelena region. One expert on the Colombian drug war stated
that "it is hard for an army officer to turn overnight against the guy, who
until the day before was his partner in fighting the guerrillas."8 9
As the drug war has progressed the Colombian military has come
under increased criticism concerning its inability to capture the major drug
traffickers, particularly Pablo Escobar. This criticism has centered on the
armed forces' structure, as well as a lack of coordination between the
institutions involved in fighting the drug war.
The criticism of the structure of the armed forces is that since the
time of independence Colombia's concept of security has been based on the
idea of confronting an external enemy. The only foreign war that Colombia
has experienced was a brief border confrontation with Peru, whereas
Colombia has suffered and is currently suffering from an internal threat
manifested by the presence of leftist insurgencies and narco-terrorists. The
critics argue that the emphasis on the external enemy has led the armed
forces to purchase sophisticated weapons such as Israeli-made Kfir fighters,
89Oppenheimer, "Traffickers Corrupt."
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and for repairs to its submarine force, weapons systems that would be of little
or no use in the drug war.90
The other critical areas are a lack of coordination between the separate
branches of the armed forces' and other government intelligence agencies.
The lack of coordination between armed forces branches usually comes down
to a simple lack of communication, a situation not uncommon among many
armed forces throughout the world. Prior to his being killed, Rodriguez
Gacha was allowed to escape when Air Force A-37's took off too early in a
planed army/air force operation. The aircraft alerted Gacha before the army
was ready to move in, and he was allowed to escape.
Intelligence, an area critical in fighting narco-terror, has also come
under increasing criticism. The five agencies concerned with the gathering of
intelligence in Colombia are DAS (Colombia's FBI), DIJIN (Judicial and
Investigative Police), and the intelligence branches of the army, air force, and
navy. Though there has been cooperation between DAS and DIJIN, the
Colombian intelligence community suffers from the lack of an overall
coo' dinating agency that would be able to effectively utilize the various
intelligence communities. 91
9 Sources indicate that 70 percent of the Colombian Navy's budget is to be
spent on the repair of its submarine fleet. While the Navy had only five
vessels to monitor the numerous waterways that are used as weapons and
rug routes by the narco-traffickers. ("Armed Forces Pursuit of Escobar
Discussed," FBIS-LAT-90-106, 1 June 1990.).
91Ibid.
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Colombia, until 1988, almost exclusively relied on its 70,000 member
national police force and DAS to combat its burgeoning drug trade.92 Even
with Colombian military involvement, the National police still conduct 85 to
90 percent of anti-narcotic operations in Colombia. But their inability to
control the drug trade and related violence forced President Barco to call in
the military.
Part of the problem with the National Police, like all of the
institutions involved in the drug war, has been the corrupting influence of
narco-dollars. A Colombian policeman earns $128 dollars a month, and may
receive $255 dollars a month from the traffickers. A police captain who earns
$180 dollars a month, may receive as much as $5000 dollars a month. One
narco-trafficker's ledger showed that he paid $100,000 a month for police
protection. Needless to say, the amount of money that can be earned illegally
by law enforcement officers not only for turning a blind eye to narco-
trafficking but also in providing traffickers with valuable intelligence, gives
the cartels a significant advantage in the drug war.93 Police corruption has
forced out the former commander of the National Police force, and shortly
after taking over in February 1989 General Miguel Gomez Padilla fired over
2000 police officers for links with drug traffickers.
92Colombia did in fact use the military in an attempt to control marijuana
trafficking in the Guamira Peninsula during the late 1970s. The military
voluntarily withdrew from the campaign due to th. widespread corrupting
influence of narco-dollars.
93Treaster, J. B., "Colombian Policemen and Soldiers are Reportedly
Tipping Off Drug Figures," New York Times, 4 September 1989, p. 3.
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The National Police also suffer from a lack of modern equipment,
and have been critical of President Bush's September 1989 emergency aid
package. Many of the National Policeman still carry the forty-year-old M-1
carbine, while their narco adversaries are armed with the latest automatic
weaponry. In considering the overwhelming role of the police in fighting the
drug war, General Gomez Padilla was particularly critical of the U.S. $65
million emergency aid package. The equipment sent included A-37 jets,
jeeps, helicopters, machine guns, and two C-130's, and was earmarked for the
Colombian military. The police desire for sophisticated equipment to aid
intelligence bureaus went largely unheeded.
General Gomez Padilla's police forces need surveillance and tracking
equipment as well as bomb detectors, and equipment for tracing telephone
calls and scrambling police phone calls. Intelligence gathering equipment is
recognized as an key element in aiding the police in fighting narco-trafficking.
On the plus side, Colombia has recognized some of the deficiencies in
its abilities to fight the drug war. It has reversed its policies which allowed
the hand out of military issue weapons to civilians in the formation of anti-
guerilla self defense units, by suspending the pertinent clauses of Law 48.
This has significantly reduced the ability of the cartels to legally form their
own private armies. The government has also attempted to coordinate the
various intelligence agencies by creating the National Intelligence Council
(NIC). NIC is chaired by the Minister of the Interior and includes the
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Justice, the Chief of DAS, the General
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Commander of the Armed Forces, and the Director General of the National
Police. 94 In an effort to alleviate the corrupting influence existing in the
National Police, the government created the Elite Corps. The Elite Corps is a
handpicked anti-narcotics strike force drawn from the National Police with
the power to call on the support of the military as well as all of the
intelligence forces.95
Though statistics can be subject to varyilig interpretations, Colombian
anti-narcotics forces have made steady progress on drug seizures and on the
number of arrests. In 1985 there were 1,951 arrests made, 3,699 in 1986, 4,724
in 1987, 5,596 in 1988, and 1,707 in the first six months of 1989. The amount of
cocaine seized doubled in 1988 (18,701 kilos) from 8,326 kilos in 1987. In the
first six months of 1989 15,879 kilos were seized. From January-June 1989 244
labs were destroyed (831 labs were destroyed in 1988). 326 hectares (one
hectare is equal to 2.5 acres) of coca were eradicated in the first six months of
1989, compared to 230 hectares in all of 1988.%
In October 1989 a Colombian general announced that the war declared
by the drug kingpins had been neutralized. While this statement may have
been premature, the stepped up war on drugs in the wake of the Galan
94Though the creation of NIC is sound in theory, the council has never
formally met, and the various intelligence agencies still operate as separate
entities. ("Armed Forces Pursuit of Escobar Discussed," FBIS-LAT-90-106, I
June 1990, p. 57.)
95
"Assessing Colombia's Anti-Drug War," Andean Group Report, RA-89-
08, 5 October 1989, p. 5 .
96Ibid., p. 5.
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assassination yielded some significant results, at least in the short run, which
included the killing of cartel drug lord Rodriguez Gacha, the capture Jose
Ocampo Obano (the right hand man to Pablo Escobar), and the seizure of a
record 19 tons of cocaine in early May 1990, which caused a drop in the price
of coca leaf in Bolivia and Peru.97
3. The Drug War. Bolivia
Until recently Bolivia has resisted the overt use of the armed forces
in fighting narcotics traffic. Not directly threatened by narco-terrorism, or a
significant guerilla insurgency, and wary of antagonizing a well organized
coca growing peasantry, there seemed no real need to call on the Bolivian
Armed Forces. Bolivia was able to rely on its 1,200 man UMOPAR (Mobile
Units For Rural Areas) anti-narcotics strike force, with the navy and air force
providing logistical support to maintain its fight against drug trafficking.
The military as an institution, as well as Bolivian President Jaime Paz
Zamora, had resisted the use of the army. President Paz Zamora and army
generals have felt that bringing the army into the drug fight will expose it to
corruption by narco-dollars. Also the Bolivian army was still smarting from
the infamous 'cocaine coup' of July 17, 1980. The coup was led by General
Luis Garcia Meza, who was paid $1,300,000 by coca dealers to lead the coup.
Colonel Luis Arce Gomez (a relative of a major Bolivian cocaine dealer) was
made the Minister of the Interior. U.S. anti-narcotics operations were
97
"Leave the Army out of Colombian Anti-Drug Operations," The Wall
Street Journal, 18 May 1990, p. All. Gugliotta, G., "Drug Wars-Hay, We're
Winning!," Washington Post, 11 February 1990, p. C1. "Army Reports Drug
Kingpins War 'Neutralized'," FBIS-LAT-89-208, 30 October 1989, p. 65.
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abruptly halted shortly thereafter. Government mismanagement eventually
led to Garcia Meza's ouster, but the military as an institution was sullied by
the affair.98
In the middle of 1989 government sources began making
pronouncements that the role of the army in the drug fight was being
reconsidered. In August 1989 Defense Under Secretary Gonzalo Torrico stated
that UMOPAR was suffering from a lack of resources and that its 1,200 man
force was too small to handle the increasing strength of the drug traffickers. 99
In October 1989 Bolivian Defense Minister Hector Ormachea confirmed that
the government was considering a more decisive role for the army in the
fight against drug trafficking, though noting that the final decision had to be
made by the president.100 Later statements by the armed forces commander
and again by the defense minister toned down the rhetoric by stating that the
armed forces were ready to step in if needed, but that UMOPAR had sufficient
resources to handle the situation.
Just prior to the President Bush's drug summit in Cartegena,
Colombia, President Paz Zamora confirmed that the armed forces would
98MacDonald, Volcano, pp. 56-57.
99
"Official Terms Antidrug Forces Insufficient," FBIS-LAT-89-167, 30
August 1989, p. 33.
100
"Expansion of Army's Antidrug Role Considered," FBIS-LAT-89-195, 11
October 1989, p. 35.
66
actively participate in his country's anti-drug struggle. The plan called for
5,000 Bolivian soldiers to participate in the campaign.101
Despite this proclamation by President Paz Zamora no troops were
committed against the drug traffickers other than logistical units. Just prior to
the Cartagena summit the military again began a lobbying campaign for
greater involvement in the drug war. In early January 1990 Bolivian Army
Commander General Rolando Espinoza announced in the newspaper 'La Paz
Presencia' that the Bolivian Army would participate in the anti-drug struggle.
In the same issue of La Paz Presencia, the Commander in Chief of the Army
stated that the Bolivian Army could participate in the drug war only if proper
technical and economic support could be obtained at the drug summit. The
defense undersecretary added that direct participation by the army against the
drug mafia is "necessary and must be implemented." It seemed clear that the
army's agenda was to be given a role in the drug fight.102
In April 1990 Paz Zamora's National Revolutionary Party (MNR)
officially supported use of the armed forces in the drug fight, though the
MNR stated that it should be a special force composed of armed forces and
police units under a joint command. In what seemed a test case to gauge
public reaction, in mid-April 1990 the army's 300 man 'Barrientos' Battalion
was deployed to the Chapare coca growing region for what was termed a
101"Armed Forces to Participate in Antidrug Struggle," FBIS-LAT-89-241,
18 December 1989, p. 37.
102"Arrmed Forces to Participate in Antidrug Struggle," FBIS-LAT-89-241,
18 December 1989, p. 40. "Armed Forces Role in Drug Fight Depends on Aid,"
La Paz Presencia, 9 January 1990.
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training exercise. The reaction of ANAPCOCA peasants was swift and vocal
concerning the deployment of the battalion. Peasants were particularly
concerned that the increased army involvement signaled a heightened crop
eradication drive without a viable crop substitution plan to fill the vacuum.
The reaction forced the defense minister and President Paz to reassure the
peasants that the troops were not taking part in anti-drug operations, but only
undertaking routine training.103
In May 1990 Paz Zamora seemed to take one step closer in involving
the army in the drug fight by authorizing the 'Ustarez' Army Regiment to
enter the Chapare region. In response to peasant protests Paz reiterated that
the regiment was there only to conduct jungle training exercises. But he
added one important caveat in that the army could conduct 'dissuasive'
missions at sites where the commanders believe it to be necessary. Though it
seems that he is still trying to reassure peasants, the deployment of the
regiment indicates that President Paz is ready to fulfill, at least superficially,
his agreement at the Cartagena summit to involve the Bolivian Military in
the drug war.104
Why did the Bolivian Army change its stance on the use of its
military in drug interdiction? One reason may be to restore its reputation
103
"Army Conducts Exercises in Chapare Coca Region," FBIS-LAT-90-075,
18 April 90. "Defense Minister on Fighting Drug Trafficking," FBIS-LAT-90-
075, 18 April 1990. "Commander Says Troops only Training in Chapare,"
FBIS-LAT-90-076, 19 April 1990.
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sullied during the Garcia Meza dictatorship. Also, with no viable external
threat, the army may be an institution in search of mission. Another reason
may be to strengthen the armed forces as an institution. In November 1989
the Bolivian Defense Minister announced that the ministry owed $8 million
to creditors and was suffering total bankruptcy. In February 1990 the defense
minister commented that defense was the only area that had received a cut in
its budget, and that the ministry would barely be able to cover its most basic
expenditures such as food, payroll and clothing. The antidrug plan
emanating from Washington called for $265 million in aid for Bolivia in
1990. Included in this aid would be $41 million in military assistance. Since
this aid was contingent on increased military participation in the drug war,
the Bolivian Military had an incentive for pushing a greater role in the drug
war.105
Will the Bolivian military make a difference? That remains to be
seen. It is still not clear if they will have an increas -d role in the drug war.
But if they do, the military will surely suffer from some aspect of drug
induced corruption, as have plagued other Andean enforcement institutions.
The Bolivian Navy, which already provides logistical support for UMOPAR,
has been accused of being riddled with corruption, including becoming
involved in fire fights against UMOPAR and DEA units. 106
105"Defense Ministry 'Suffering Total Bankruptcy'," FBIS-LAT-89-218, 14
November 1989, p. 42. "Defense Minister on Budget Cuts, Foreign Troops,"
FBI,-LAT.90-030, 13 February 1990, p. 34.
106
"Navy Reportedly Protecting Drug Traffickers," FBIS-LAT-88-190, 14
October 1988, p. 21.
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As in the other two Andean narcotics-supplying nations, the
Bolivian police, in cooperation with the DEA, have borne the brunt of anti-
narcotics operations. Given the fact that there is no serious rural insurgency
in Bolivia, DEA tactics have been able to be more aggressive than in either
Peru or Colombia.
The 1,200 man UMOPAR force is Bolivia's primary anti-drug force.
Like the agencies in Colombia and Peru it suffers from corruption and a lack
of resources. Many members of UMOPAR still carry M1 rifles, while the
narco-traffickers are supplied with the latest in automatic weaponry. To
improve training, the United States sent a U.S. Army Special Forces team in
May 1987. President Bush's aid package should upgrade UMOPAR
capabilities, as $22 million is eariLarked for police and judicial drug
suppression, and $3.5 million for increased intelligence capabilities.
Despite corruption that assists narco traffickers in eluding security
forces, UMOPAR has scored several major successes against Bolivia's drug
lords. This has included the capture of one of the leading cocaine traffickers
in all of South America, Roberto Suarez Gomez (involved in the Garcia Meza
affair) in 1988, and more recently Jose Ali Parada, one of Bolivia's five most
wanted traffickers, in September 1989. In cooperation with UMOPAR, the
DEA has launched a new drive with new tactics against illicit coca paste labs
in Bolivia. The raids are conducted at night, using coordinated military style
tactics, including simultaneous strikes from air, land, and water. The agents
use UH-1 (Huey) helicopters and zodiac boats for insertion into the labs
jungle hideaways.
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Even with the new tactics the impediments presented by the juutgle
terrain offer significant obstacles for anti-drug forces. In a recent assault in
Beni Province the new tactics were used in the attempt to find 10 coca paste
labs. During the week of anti-drug operations only 3 labs were located and
destroyed. The mixed results from this operation indicates the new tactics
will need an extended period of evaluation.107
D. MILITARIZATION: THE POLITICAL DILEMMA
Just prior to the 1990 Cartagena drug summit, delegates from the United
States, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia met in Santa Cruz, Bolivia and reached a
tentative agreement to include military units from each of the Andean
countries armed forces in an escalated war on drugs. The issue had been a
volatile one in the strategy debate on how to best conduct the narcotics war.
The Andean nations have been reluctant to involve their armed forces in the
drug war which has frustrated the United States in its efforts for a stepped-up
drug campaign. It is an important issue for a number of reasons, which will
now be outlined.
One reason is economic. All three of the coca-producing countries are
experiencing economic difficulties, with Peru and Bolivia by far in the worst
situation. The coca industry directly employs 200,000 to 300,000 people in each
of the Andean countries, as well as supplying a significant portion of foreign
exchange earnings.
107Jehl, D., "U.S. Launches a New Drive against Illicit Cocaine Labs," Los
Angeles Times, 25 May 1990.
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With military involvement escalating the anti-narcotics campaign, a
large pool of disaffected peasants could be created. This pool could supply a
large support base for the various leftist insurgencies operating in Peru and
Colombia, or contribute to social unrest due to government institutions not
being able to handle the influx of unemployed.
The Andean nations also see using the military to fight narcotics as
treating a symptom and not the cause. They are not totally opposed to
escalating the drug war, but they have insisted on economic aid in
conjunction with increased interdiction to ease the strain on those employed
in the industry.
The United States is also missing an important point in insisting on the
increased use of the military in fighting narcotics. The countries of Latin
America have had a far different experience with their military institutions
than has the United States. Bolivia has suffered some 180 military coups
since gaining idependence from Spain, and Peru in 1980 ended a 12 year
period of n y rule. The presidents of these countries have been careful in
nurturing ti . fledgling democracies. Even Colombia, which has been fairly
stable since the period of 'La Violencia' (1946-1958) needs to be cautious. It
would not be the first time in Latin America that a country with a long
democratic history experienced a coup in response to domestic unrest, a
prime example being Uruguay, with the military taking over in response to
the Tupamaro urban guerilla movement.
The fear, then, is that by accepting military aid along with the greater role
of the military in the drug war, the relative position of the military in
relation to civilian institutions is strengthened. It then should not have
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surprised the United States that in May 1990 Peru's President Alan Garcia
rejected the $35 million U.S aid plan that included the training of six
Peruvian Army and Marine Battalions. The Battalions were to operate in the
upper-Huallaga valley. Garcia stated that the war on drugs could not be won
with military force alone, and that he would not sign any military agreement
that did not include military aid. New Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori
has expressed similar concerns over the U.S. aid package and has yet to ratify
it.108
One last concern that the governments may have with the use of the
military, is that it could increase the number of human rights violations.
This has already occurred in areas where Colombian and Peruvian forces
have been operating against guerrillas. If it were occur in the coca growing
regions, with their substantial peasant populations, the guerilla movements
could greatly enlarge their support base.
To their credit, though the Presidents of the supplying nations have been
reluctant to militarize the drug war, to a certain extent they have realized a
need to increase interdicting narcotics. Colombia was faced with a 'fait
accompli' in involving its military. The drug violence had reached such a
stage, that it called into question law enforcement ability to handle the crisis.
Colombia has also held the military accountable for its performance in the
drug war. In August 1990 Generals Jose Nelson Mejia (armed forces
108Ray, M. R., "Peru Balks at U.S. Military-Aid Offer," The Christian
Science Monitor, 3 May 1990. "Fujimori Comments on U.S. Aid, Military
Changes," FBIS-LAT-90-147, 31 July 1990.
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commander), Jesus Armando Arias Cabrales (commander of the army), and
Alphonso Amaya Maldonado (commander of the air force), were fired by
Colombian President Virgilio Barco and President elect Cesar Gaviria. A
variety of explanations were espoused for the firings. These included, their
tolerance of corruption, and the military's involvement in the dirty war. The
explanations considered most likely though, were the military's inability to
capture drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, and their failure to halt the wave of
narco-terrorism. 109
As noted earlier in this chapter Bolivia too seems to be increasing the role
of its military in drug interdiction, though it is not clear exactly what their
role will be. Considering the volatility of this issue in Bolivia, President Paz
Zamora's announcement and the moving of troops into the Chapare is
significant, though it may have been a superficial gesture to ensure U.S. aid.
On the other hand, President Paz may actually intend an overt role for the
armed forces, planning to prevent a Colombianization of his nation's drug
war before the traffickers become the powerful threat that the Colombian
cartels have become.
Peru is the only Andean nation that still actively resists the involvement
of its armed forces in the drug fight. With the region's most serious
insurgency threat in Sendero, it may have the most to lose if it drives the coca
peasantry into the arms of the guerrillas. But like Colombia, Peru may be
faced with a 'fait accompli'. If Sendero becomes an even greater threat, Peru
109"Shake-up of Colombian Military," Andean Group Report, RA-90-0, 2
August 1990, p. 4.
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may be forced to accept the training of the six battalions and the $35 million
military aid package whether or not economic aid is included as part of the
deal.
The militarization of the drug war is clearly a sensitive issue for the
United States as well as for the countries of the Andean Region. Like all
issues pertinent to the narcotics problem there are no simple or pat solutions.
There seems to be no question that an aggressive interdiction campaign is one
of the keys in attempting to bring the drug war to a successful conclusion. But
it is a fallacy to consider militarization a cure all for the drug problem.
Without a decrease in demand from the United States the best that an
aggressive interdiction campaign can hope for is a temporary decline in the
price of coca leaf. The economic question is also pertinent. The drug industry
provides significant foreign exchange earnings for the Andean region, and
without significant economic aid a military led eradication campaign cannot
have a lasting effect on a peasantry totally reliant on coca for their livelihood.
In addition there is a legitimate threat that a disaffected peasantry could
become the decisive base that a movement like Sendero would need.
A full understanding of the narcotics problem faced by the Andean region
is essential in implementing an effective anti-narcotics strategy. As this
chapter shows the military solution to the problem, one advocated by the
United States, is much more complex than may be realized in North
America. With an increased understanding of the special dynamics existing
in the Andean region, potential solutions that are effective as well as
politically acceptable to both the United States and the 'first tier' nations can
then be implemented.
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IV. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE DRUG TRADE
The current U.S. supply side anti-narcotics effort favors a drug
interdiction/eradication strategy as the best course of action in fighting the
drug war. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the feasibility of such a
strategy, by scrutinizing the narcotic industry's economic impact on the
Andean region. The core of the chapter concerns a comparative study
between the successful Mexican anti-narcotics campaign, in the 1970's, and
the situation as it now exists in the Andean region. This chapter is not
intended as an in-depth analysis of the Andean economies, rather it proposes
to show the impact the narcotics trade has on the region's economies.
By doing so, it will become apparent that strategies must take into account
long-term economic well-being in terms of overall regional stability.
A. MEXICO: A PYRRHIC VICTORY
Prior to the current concern with the inflow of illicit narcotics from the
Andean region, Mexico was considered the primary origin of narcotics
entering the United States, and was t'.., enter of focus for a U.S. drug
interdiction program. Although the program was fairly successful, it would
have unforeseen implications for the present American narcotics problem.
Initial U.S. concern with illicit drugs entering from Mexico occurred in
the 1920's and 1930's. Although Mexico was a transshipment point for illegal
narcotics entering the United States, it was soon looked at as a potential
source of supply. By 1945 Mexican brown heroin was seized for the first time
by U.S. drug enforcement authorities. By the 1960's Mexico had become a
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major marijuana producer and by the 1970's Mexico dominated the illicit
marijuana drug market in the United States.110
The U.S. demand for drugs, coupled with higher available incomes,
generated opportunities for entrepreneurs and cash poor peasant farmers,
who were willing to participate in the cultivation and processing of narcotics
in order to increase their standard of living. During the 1970's a campesino in
Northern Mexico could earn approximately $400 a year from cultivation of
traditional crops. By cultivating opium poppy he could increase his income
to between $2000 and $4000 per year.111 This additional income could mean
the difference between subsistence and relative economic well being for the
campesino. Although the U.S. State Department recognized these basic
economic facts and what they meant to the campesino, no concerted effort
was made for a crop substitution program in Mexico.112
The Mexican narcotics industry was dominated by three organizations,
the Herrera, Sicilia-Falcon, and Arauja groups. The profitr generated by these
illicit Mexican narcotics organizations were enormous. The drug lords sent
the lions share of their profits back into Mexico, and had a tendency to utilize
their economic gains to make investments in Mexico. The DEA estimated
that at the time the Herrera group sent over $100 million to Durango, Mexico
'
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over a four to five year period.113 The Alberto Sicilia-Falcon organization for
a period of three to four months sent $32 million pi veek to Mexico, and
had bank deposits of $260 million in Sinoloa.114 Between September 1975 and
October 1978 the two Araujo groups sent more than $32 million to Mexico. 115
As such, during Mexico's dominance in supplying narcotics for U.S. markets,
between $500 million to $1 billion in U.S. currency left the United States and
entered the Mexican economy. 116
The situation existing in Mexico during the middle to late 1970's is
similar to the current situation in the Andean region, namely, the illicit
narcotics industry generating massive amounts of foreign exchange, with a
large amount finding its way back into the local economy. From the
perspective of a Third World nation, the inflow of narco-dollars would then
seem a benefit, so long as drug production was for export only, it could be
tolerated."17
The difference between Mexico in the 70's and the current crisis in the
Andean region is that the U.S./Mexican drug policy ultimately would be
relatively successful, while the Andean outcome is still very much in doubt.
113U.S. House, Investigation of Narcotics Trafficking Proceeds, p. 63.
114U.S. Congress and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Illegal Narcotics Profits.
Hearings, %th Congress, 1st Session, December 7, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1979, p. 94.
115Ibid., p. 19.
"
6Lupsha, "Mexico and Colombia," pp. 100-101.
"lIbid., p. 101.
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An important factor being the Mexican government's desire to crack down on
marijuana and poppy producers, as well as drug traffickers. Mexico went
from supplying 90% of heroin and 70% of marijuana consumed in the United
States, to less than 30% of those drugs in 1980.118
Favored U.S. policies towards Mexico's war on drugs were similar to
those being utilized or proposed today for the drug war in the Andean region.
U.S. policy makers emphasized the use of cooperative agreements and joint
operations, such as Janus, Condor, and the Trizo programs. These programs
dealt with the drug problem from a supply side aspect. In addition, U.S.
money and equipment was provided to finance high technology and an aerial
spraying campaign which was to become an important cornerstone of the U.S.
supply eradication strategy." 9
By 1977 the massive influx of U.S. aid and technology, as well as greatly
increased levels of cooperation from the Mexican government, was coupled
with the use of paraquat to spray drug crops. The strategy soon began to pay
dividends as there was a drop in demand for Mexican marijuana. At the
same time improved interdiction, as well as supply eradication, lowered the
purity and quality of the market for Mexican heroin. 120
The seeming victory that emerged from this supply side campaign would
prove to be short lived. With no slack in demand from U.S. markets other
"
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suppliers moved to fill the vacuum created by the successful Mexican
campaign. By 1978 high grade Colombian marijuana, and increasingly
cocaine, became the drugs of choice among the user North. Mexico returned
to its previous status, as a way point for drug shipments entering the United
States.121
Why did the supply side strategy work in Mexico? Similar to conditions
currently existing in the Andean region, drug crops materially improved the
standards of living of poor peasant farners, and aided badly needed foreign
exchange dollars to the Mexican economy. Then it would seem Mexico's
dilemma was the same facing Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia today. Several
factors might account in part for the success of the supply side strategy in
Mexico. First the PRI has been in power for over 60 years giving Mexico a
strong sense of political stability. Through its infrastructure the Mexican
government can make its will felt in every state of the Republic. Second, the
Mexican resource base, the diversification and sophistication of its economy,
as well as its per capita income (estimated at $1,160 in 1977 and at $2,100 in
1980), made it one of the more developed states in the third world. The
relative affluence of Mexico enabled a less painful transition away from
narco-dollar dependence. Third, the Mexican military has been traditionally
subordinate to the government as well as integrated with the government. It
does not act as a force outside the ruling regime. From a geo-political
standpoint Mexico saw its image being tarnished by narco-trafficking, and
121Ibid., pp. 97-105.
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therefore jeopardizing its potential leadership role in the Caribbean Basin.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the narco-dollars entering the country
were centered in a number of outlying states. This threatened to delegitimize
the dominant centralized political position of the PRI. Jeopardizing the PRI's
coveted political prerogative, galvanized it to greater efforts against the
narcotics trade than otherwise may have been the case.1 22
B. THE DRUG TRADE MOVES TO THE ANDEAN REGION
With no decrease in the demand for illegal narcotics, and with a reduced
supply from Mexico, satisfying the market in the U.S. dictated finding new
suppliers. The Andean region (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia) provided an ideal
alternative to Mexico. Geographically, Colombia was in perfect position as a
transition point, while Peru and Bolivia, each with a long history of coca
cultivation, could easily become the major source of raw coca paste.
Colombia's legal economy has traditionally relied on the export of coffee
to generate the bulk of its hard currency earnings, though flowers have
recently become an important hard currency source. Exporting primary
products has been a traditional source of hard currency generation in Latin
America, as well as a source of economic instability due to fluctuations in
world market prices. At the time of Mexico's slide as the main U.S. supplier
of narcotics (approximately 1977), Colombian per capita income stood at $710
1221bid., pp. 98-99.
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making it one of the poorest developing countries in Latin America. 123
Along with its low per capita income Colombia suffered from one of the
worst income distribution rates in South America, with some remote areas of
the country barely being touched by the mainstream economy. These remote
areas such as the Guajira Peninsula, as well as the Pasto and Leticia regions
became the main coca paste processing regions, well outside the
government's control or influence. 124
With Colombia's domestic economic situation ripe for exploitation by the
illegal drug market, domestic cultivation and processing made steady progress
throughout the 70's, as shown by the amounts confiscated by Colombian law
enforcement. In 1972 this amounted to 400 pounds of cocaine and 18 tons of
marijuana, by 1975 the amounts had increased to 1 ton of cocaine and 164 tons
of marijuana, and in 1982 the amount of cocaine being smuggled into the U.S.
market had skyrocketed to 45 metric tons.125 The combination of Colombia's
economic situation, a rise in U.S. demand for cocaine, and eradication
programs in Mexico as well as the Caribbean, had caused a geometric increase
123Central Intelligence Agency, National Basic Intelligence Fact-Book, p.
41. Lupsha, "Mexico and Colombia," p. 103.
124Lupsha, "Mexico and Colombia," p. 103.
125Ibid., p. 104.
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in Colombian drug smuggling.126 Colombia now provides 70-80 percent of
refined cocaine and 50-60 percent of marijuana available on the U.S. market.
The drastic increase in cocaine smuggling has had a profound effect on
the Colombian economy, creating an enormous underground economy, with
narco-dollars providing the bulk of its input. In 1979 it was estimated that $3
billion in foreign exchange entered the Colombian economy via drug
trafficking, with $600 million to $700 million in the form of U.S. currency
(which was an increase from $150 million earned in 1975). The amount of
U.S. currency generated in the 70's has steadily climbed to where today it is
estimated the Medellin cartel alone is reputed to earn $2 billion to $4 billion
per ye--, and rivals many Fortune 500 companies in global reach. 127 With
legal exports reaching $4 billion yearly it is obvious that narco-dollars are an
important source of hard currency generation, with estimates that drugs
provide 36 percent of Colombia's gross national product.128
With this large influx of narco-dollars the Colombian banking
community had to adjust in order to handle the flow, establishing what was
to be called the 'left handed window' for large currency transactions. This
"window" enabled U.S. dollars to be converted into pesos and thereby
126 1bid., p. 105. U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse and Control, South American Study Mission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1977 , p. 11.
127Bagley, B., "Colombia and the War on Drugs," Foreign Affairs, Fall
1988, p. 72. Lupsha, "Mexico and Colombia," p. 106.
128Freemantle, B., The Fix: Inside the World Drug Trade (New York:
Tom Doherty Associates, Inc., 1986), p. 78. McDonald, Volcano, p. 45.
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brought into the national economy. In 1980 it was estimated that one half of
Colombia's international reserves originated from narco-dollar activity. 129
Although there is some dispute as to how much of the narco-traffickers
wealth is distributed within Colombia, there is little doubt that a substantial
portion trickles down, to the benefit of a large segment of society. First, the
Colombian construction industry has managed a growth rate well above the
growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. In 1980 the construction sector
expanded at a substantial 9.7 percent, followed by 7.1 percent in 1981, 4.0
percent in 1982, and 5.1 percent in 1983.130 The corresponding GDP growth
rates were 4.2 percent, 2.3 percent, and 0.9 percent. The Colombian drug
merchants have also donated money for low-income housing, charities, and
public facilities. This gives them wide support from the populace, as well as
relieving the Colombian government from providing these services. 131
Second, the drug industry has also affected the wages of Colombia's
agricultural workers: a field hand on coffee, cotton, tobacco, or banana
plantations made $3 to $4 dollars per day; in contrast, in the marijuana fields
he could earn $7 to $8 dollars per day. Indians who have traditionally been
outside the main stream economy, can now earn 100 pesos per trip ferrying
129"Banking Superintendent's Speech on "La Ventanilla Siniestra," FBIS:
Latin America, 3 June 1980. Lupsha, "Mexico and Colombia," p. 107.
130Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: Natural Resources,
(Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1983 Report), p. 236.
McDonald, Volcano, p. 45.
131MacDonald, Volcano, p. 45.
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narcotics out to waiting mother ships. Finally, employment in the drug
industry has been estimated at 500,000 Colombians. This is a far cry from the
100,000 to 150,000 employed in the narcotics trade in the mid-1970's. This
large employment industry has therefore been able to function as an
important buffer for the Colombian economy, especially the agricultural
sector, with its fluctuating dependence on world markets. Overall, cocaine
and marijuana have been able to absorb unemployment from the legitimate
economy and forestall possible social unrest.132
Though the economic impact of the narcotics trade is serious in
Colombia, it is more so for both Bolivia and Peru. From 1981 through 1986,
Bolivia suffered through a severe economic crisis. In 1981 and 1982 Bolivia's
GDP contracted by more than 9 percent. Inflation began a steady rise from
123.5 percent in 1982, to 11,750 percent in 1985, reaching the astounding level
of over 30,000 percent in 1986.133 In 1983 bad weather hurt the agricultural
sector, and falling commodity prices in 1984 and 1985 had a detrimental effect
132Bagley, B., "The Colombian Connection: The Impact of Drug Traffic on
Colombia," in Coca and Cocaine: Effects on People and Policy in Latin
America, ed. D. Pacini and C. Franquemont (Petersborough: Transcript
Printing Co., 1986), p. 99. Martin, E. G., "Colombian Gold: Guajira Peninsula
Becomes Chief Source of Marijuana for U.S.," The Wall Street Journal, 28
November 1978, p. 1. Lupsha, "Mexico and Colombia," P. 108. McDonald,
Volcano, p. 45.
133Hybel, A. R., "America's Immersion in Drugs has Lifted Bolivia from
its Misery," Los Angeles Times, 25 September 1989, and Economic and Social
Progress in Latin America 1987 Report, (Inter-American Development Bank),
p. 238. MacDonald, Volcano, p. 58.
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on the mining and industrial sectors. 34 Subsequent to elections in 1985, the
newly elected Victor Paz administration was confronted with an ever
worsening economic situation. Bolivia traditionally had been a large exporter
of tin. But, in October of 1985, tin prices collapsed sending Bolivia's economy
into a worsening tailspin. These economic setbacks deeply cut into the
country's economic base, forcing the government to borrow, thereby raising
its external debt burden. In 1980 Bolivia had found its $3 billion external debt
burden impossible to service, by 1985 its external debt had risen to over $3.7
billion.135
With Bolivia's economic problems, the capacity of the legal economy to
provide jobs and income was severely reduced. This was compounded by the
fact that Bolivia was already one of the poorest nations in the Western
Hemisphere, with a per capita income of only $470.136 As in Colombia the
coca growing industry provided a lucrative alternative to the newly
unemployed Bolivians. In Bolivia no other agricultural product generated
the same income as coca. The Chapare valley in central Bolivia produces
most of the coca grown in the country. Approximately 30,000 to 40,000
134McDonald, Volcano, p. 58.
135External Debt Statistics: The Debt and other External Liabilities of
Developing, CMEA and Certain other Countries and Territories, (Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1987), p. 16.
McDonald, Volcano, p. 58-59.
136McDonald, Volcano, p. 52. World Bank, World Bank Development
Report 1987 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 202.
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families eke out an existence in the area.137 In a good year a cocaine cultivator
can earn $2,500 per hectare (2.5 acres), where as he could only earn $200 per
year growing soya. This disparity is reflected in the increase in the amount of
land under coca cultivation, from 85,000 acres in 1985 to 130,000 acres in
1989.138 Given the economic multiplier effect on the economy it is estimated
that about 300,000 Bolivians live off coca growing and its early processing
stage.139 Of the $1.5 billion generated by coca and the cocaine economy around
$600 million stays in country, a figure roughly equal to Bolivia's legal
exports.140
In Peru, like Bolivia, coca cultivation has become an important part of the
economy, generating approximately $600 million annually.1 4 ' In 1987
between 98,000-120,000 metric tons of coca leaves were cultivated accounting
for 55 percent of the world's cocaine. 142 Coca, as in Bolivia, is a traditional
crop which is indigenous to Indian culture and has been cultivated for
13 7Barham, J., "Bolivia's Withdrawal Pain," Financial Times of London,
15 February 1990.
138 Painter, J., "Bolivia Seeks U.S. Aid to Strengthen its Economy," The
Christian Science Monitor, 15 February 1990.
1391bid.
140Ibid.
141Monahan, J, "Peru," The Latin American and Caribbean Review 1987,
(Harmondsworth, United Kingdom World of Information, 1987), p. 121.
McDonald, Volcano, p. 61.
142Riding, A., "Peru's Forces Press Ahead in Drug War," The New York
Times, 17 August 1986, p. A12.
87
centuries, though the industry did not fully develop until external demand
was stimulated in the 1970's. As in Bolivia, cocaine production is often the
sole source of revenue in many isolated areas of Peru, the main growing
region being the Upper Huallaga Valley. It was estimated in 1986 that 100,000
peasant families lived entirely off the income produced from coca plantations
which covered an area of over 125,000 acres.143
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR SUPPLY SIDE ERADICATION
Given the U.S emphasis on supply side eradication, we must examine the
effects that this immensely profitable underground economy has on the
governments involved. These effects may make an interdiction/eradication
program extremely difficult to implement.
In examining the governments of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, the
question needs to be asked: Is it in their best interests to bring an end to the
narcotics industry? This question must be looked at not only from a purely
economic standpoint, but from a political one as well.
On the surface Colombia's economy looks as if it would be in the best
shape to be weaned off reliance on narco-dollars. In the Andean region it is
considered to have the healthiest and best managed economy. In addition,
despite $1.2 billion narco-dollars circulating in Colombia, the Colombian
government has managed to restrict the impact of narcotrafficking on the
economy. Some economists have stated that with cautious and proper
143Strung, D. L., "The Foreign Policies of Cocaine: Comments en a Plan to
Eradicate the Coca Leaf in Peru," in Coca and Cocaine, ed. Pacini and
Franquemont, p. 78. McDonald, Volcano, p. 61.
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management, Colombia could emerge economically well off without th
narcotics industry. 144 Observer, who believe that Colombia would not be
severely hurt by the loss of the narcotics trade point to a variety of factors to
support their conclusion. First, Colombia's GNP of $35-$40 billion breaks
down as follows: coffee providing 30 percent, oil 30 percent, minor exports
(agriculture and light industrial products) 30 percent, and what is called the
underground economy providing 10 percent of which drugs accounts for only
2-3 percent.1 45 Second, of the $6 billion Colombia earns in foreign exchange,
$1.2 billion comes from drugs. A substantial amount to be sure, but not one
that the Colombians could not live without. Finally, it is pointed out that
most of the economic gains generated by the drug trade does not find its way
back into the Colombian economy. It is estimated that of the $4 billion
grossed annually less than half is brought back into the country, and of the
amount brought back, 70-80 percent is spent on luxury goods. Thus it is
believed Colombian's will not suffer economically from an end to the narco-
trade.146
Overall, these factors suggest that the Colombian economy could weather
the loss of the drug industry. However, it would be naive to think that its
loss would be inconsequential, and that the Colombian government is not
aware of this fact. For one thing the "multiplier effect" expands the 20,000 to
144Freed, "Colombia Likely to Survive Loss of Drug Money," Los Angeles




30,000 who work directly in the drug trade to 500,000 whose jobs are affected
in one way or another by the narcotics industry. One American trained
Colombian financial expert argues that the costs to Colombia would be
tremendous if the narcotics industry were to be shut down suddenly: it would
destroy 5 or 6 years of work, about what it took for Colombia to recover from
its last recession in 1984-1985.147 While experts point out that the overall drug
income figure is low compared to the country's total worth, regional effects
must be considered when contemplating an end to the narcotics trade. Areas
where the drug business is concentrated already confront unemployment
rates of 12-16 percent. In addition, the loss of $1.2 billion in narco-dollars
might be inflationary causing the price of imports to increase, raising the price
of consumer goods, as well as products required for domestic industries.1 8
Although the situation is serious in Colombia, there is some room for
optimism. Bolivia and Peru present a different picture. Bolivia's economy is
much more dependent on coca cultivation, with the narcotics industry being
the mainstay of the nation's economy. Coca leaf is the nation's major export,
and largest source of dollar reserves. The approximately $600 million that is
brought in annually from coca leaf production is enough to pay the whole
public sector payroll, according to U.S. and Bolivian government statistics. 149
Bolivian officials are well aware of how important the cocaine industry has
147 bid.
148Ibid.
149Germani, C., "Drug Lords and Public on Collision Path in Bolivia," The
Christian Science Monitor, 10 August 1988.
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been for the country, most households sport television antennas as well as
the latest models of small trucks or Jeeps. Some observers feel that the
revitalization of Bolivia's cities, with buildings and homes being constructed
at an unprecedented rate is directly attributed to the drug trade.150
With unemployment hovering at around 25 percent and having to
endure the austerity measures that has reduced the annual inflation rate
from a raging 24,000 percent to 10 percent, it would almost be impossible for
Bolivia to replace such a large component of its economy. Two Bolivian
businessmen perhaps best sum up the importance of cocaine to Bolivia,
stating "without cocaine, Bolivia would not have been able to rise from its
misery."151
Peru's situation is even more complex than Bolivia's. Peru is suffering
not only from dire economic conditions, but also from the threat of one of the
more vicious guerilla organizations in the world, the 'Sendero Luminoso.' 152
The populist policies of former Peruvian President Alan Garcia has left Peru's
economy in a severe situation. In trying to stimulate economic growth Garcia
used up the nation's dollar reserves. Peruvian industry can not now obtain
the foreign exchange necessary to buy essential foreign components to
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economy has been a shrinking of the Gross Domestic Product by 28 percent in
the first quarter of 1990, an inflation rate at 5,000 percent, and 50 percent of
Peru's work force unemployed or underemployed' 5 4
Given the dynamics of the current economic crisis, Peru, like Bolivia,
would confront severe economic difficulties without its narco-dollars. The
narcotics industry has helped absorb the unemployed. The U.S. embassy has
estimated that unemployed workers from as far away as Lima have appeared
in the Upper Huallaga Valley as coca growers. Coca also generates badly
needed foreign currency that Peru requires.1,55 In addition to the direct threat
from Sendero Luminoso, the government must rely on coca employment to
prevent the unemployed from becoming so discontented that they will begin
actively supporting the movement.
Now to return to the question: Are the Andean governments being as
cooperative as they should in trying to bring an end to the drug industry? It is
acknowledged by government officials that the narcotics industry has fostered
narco-terror from traffickers, as well as Marxist guerrilla groups, both of
which are threatening the legitimacy of Colombian and Peruvian
governments. Nevertheless the economic and political conditions outlined
in this thesis have suggested government officials may not always feel
sufficient incentive to cooperate fully in a supply side
154Nunn, S., and Lieberman, J., "Hooked on Coca," The Washington Post,
14 February 1990.
55Schmidt, C., "Misfires in the Drug War: U.S. Weapons Won't Cure
Coca Belt Poverty," The Washington Post, 3 September 1989.
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eradication/substitution strategy, The example of the Cali Cartel, in Colombia,
illustrates the lack of full resolve on the part of a source country's
government to fully implement a crack down against the cartels: while the
Colombian government has been persecuting the Medellin cartel, the equally
powerful Cali cartel (both cartels together supply 80 percent of the U.S. cocaine
market) has almost escaped notice. The Medellin organization being much
more violent, and making attempts at entering the political arena, was seen
as much more of a threat to governmental legitimacy. The Colombian
government then had the incentive to crack down on them. The Cali cartel is
seen as a much more benign and sophisticated organization. Eschewing the
violence characterized by the Medellin cartel, the Cali cartel has chosen to buy
into the system. Most people do not even know the names of the Cali cartels
leaders, and they have been ignored by the Colombian government during
the crack down.156
In assessing the benefits of the successful supply side
interdiction/eradication campaign in Mexico during the seventies several
domestic strengths were noted: First, a stable political system as manifested by
the powerful PRI; second, Mexico's economic diversification and resource
base made it one of the more developed states in the Third World; third, the
Mexican government through the PRI could make its will felt in every state
of the republic, and fourth the Mexican government had the will to
156Farah, D., "Cali Drug Cartel Avoids Crackdown," The Washington Post,
15 October 1989.
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crackdown on the marijuana and poppy producers' 5 7 These factors in one
degree or another are missing from the present situation in the Andean
region. Consequently a one dimensional campaign based on an
interdiction/eradication/substitution program may be impossible to conclude
successfully. Though eradication/substitution will be an important aspect of
the supply side battle it must be coupled with a comprehensive economic
package that is tailored to each country's needs and circumstances. By
coupling an economic strategy with interdiction the Andean governments
will then have a viable alternative to the narcotics industry. Therefore a
political and economic solution presents itself.
D. U.S. STRATEGY PERCEPTIONS
One sign of encouragement, if on a small scale, are indications that some
Andean campesinos are willing to become part of crop substitution programs.
In Bolivia in December 1989 and January 1990, 1,266 hectares (2.5 acres) were
eradicated in the Chapare coca growing region. This compares with 2,504
hectares for the whole of last year. By February 16, 1990 a further 474 hectares
had been eradicated, and at that rate, the Bolivian government could reach its
1990 eradication target of 6,000 acres.' 5 8 In addition, a United Nations
sponsored aid program has shown some signs of success in both Colombia
and Peru. In Peru the U.N. program has grown from a membership of
'
57Lupsha, "Mexico and Colombia," p. 98.
V 'lPainter, J., "Bolivian Coca Growers Voluntarily Eradicate Crop as Price
Drops," The Christian Science Monitor, 21 February 1990.
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around 2,500 to approximately 20,000, and in Colombia around 9,000 families
have signed up for the program. 159 The Bolivian effort involves the state
eradication agency (DIRECO) registering each peasant who then receives
$2,000 from the government for each hectare eradicated, the monetary
amount being somewhat comparable to what the campesino could earn from
a hectare of coca. The U.N. program emphasizes education, self-awareness,
and a will to change, brought about by farmers being fed up with the violence
associated with the narcotics trade.160 The program teaches farmers to grow
other crops allowing them to gradually make the shift from coca. 161
The actual amount of acreage eradicated and families involved with crop
substitution programs is small compared to total acreage under coca
cultivation, and the total number of families growing coca. But of great
interest campesinos seem to be more amenable to switches to alternative
crops when the price of coca leaf is low. This, it seems, is what happened
recently in the Bolivian case. During the recent slump in coca prices, the
price of a 100 pound bag has fallen from $60 in January 1989, to as little as $5
now. With $30 a bag being considered the break even price to make
economically worth while for a farmer to grow coca.
159Ross, T., "U.N. Aid Helps Some Colombians Shake Free of Coca
Dependency," The Christian Science Monitor, 5 January 1988., and Stevenson,
S., "In Peru Coca Plan Succeeds," the Miami Herald, 9 October 1989.
160Painter, "Coca Growers Eradicate Crops."
1619bid.
95
The reason the price of coca slumped, has implications for the
coordinated strategy that is needed to make an eradication strategy work. The
primary reason prices slumped is due to a decreased demand coming from
the coca processing regions in Colombia. The Colombian government, under
pressure from the United States, had stepped up its campaign against coca
processing laboratories. This effectively caused a drop in demand for coca
paste, which in turn caused the price in the growing regions to fall below the
break even point for cultivators.
The second factor to consider in a coordinated substitution/eradication
campaign is the availability of legitimate alternate crops for cultivators and a
market available for the export of substitute crops. Forced eradication is
unlikely to be successful unless the Peruvian and Bolivian growers have
some other source of income besides growing coca leaf. In addition, the
growers in Bolivia and Peru are extremely well organized, enabling them to
effectively resist forced eradication. The situation is further complicated in
Bolivia due to the fact that there is an almost total lack of economic
infrastructure to support alternate crops. Most legitimate crops spoil before
getting to market due to the lack of storage facilities and transportation
corridors. Consideration must also be made that any substitute may take
several years before becoming profitable. Ample credit will have to be
provided to see growers through. Thus, a United States economic strategy not
only must help ensure a viable market for substitute crops, it must also assist
a country like Bolivia in building the infrastructure necessary for those
alternate crops.
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Another serious area of contention on a U.S. economic strategy in the
drug war, is the often unilateral decision making and lack of overall
coordination involved in economic decisions made by the U.S. involving the
Andean region. This has been particularly evident in U.S./Colombia
relations. In July 1989 the United States let expire the 74 member nation
International Coffee Agreement. The Agreement ensured a fixed price on
coffee, which then helped Colombia earn hard currency from its main
legitimate export. Earning hard currency assisted Colombia in its battle
against the narcotics industry.162 U.S. reasoning for withdrawing support for
the 27 year old agreement made sound market sense, the agreement led to
excessively high prices and restricted access to good quality coffee beans.
However once free of the trade quotas established under the old accord a
world glut caused the price of coffee to plunge more than 40 percent between
July 1989 and October 1989. The expiration of this agreement was
counterproductive to the war on drugs. Not taking into consideration the
effects on Colombia, and the effects on that country's ability to fight the drug
war. Without the accord Colombia confronts a potential loss of between $300-
$500 million per year in foreign services. The magnitude of this loss is likely
to weaken the governments anti-drug posture.
162Treaster, J. B., "Coffee Impasse Imperils Colombia's Drug Fight," The
New York Times, 24 September 1989.
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In another recent action the U.S. Commerce Department threatened
Colombia's $200 million export trade in cut flowers. 163 In a January 1990
decision, the Commerce Department accused the Colombian cut flower
industry of dumping their product on the U.S. market to drive out
competition, and is considering increasing import duties on cut flowers from
4.47 percent to 8.5 percent. Colombians see this U.S. action as an attempt to
drive their cut flower industry out of business, just when they need to
diversify their exports to assist them in the anti-drug war.164
These decisions were not made in the political caldron with U.S. domestic
politics, special interests, and economic concerns playing significant roles.
But two striking points did emerge in regards to these two economic
decisions: First, alihough the Bush administration did show concern over the
Commerce Department's decision, U.S. trade laws make it impossible for
other governmental agencies to intervene on grounds other than the narrow
economic issues at stake, as in the flower dispute; and second, in Senate
hearings on the drug war, drug policy director William Bennett and a State
Department narcotics official testified that they were not even consulted
about the coffee negotiations. 165 At the same hearings the Colombian
ambassador to the United States expressed frustration at U.S. policy of
163Passel, P., "Fighting Cocaine with Coffee, Flowers," The New York
Times, 20 Septnber 1989.
164Isikoff, M., "Colombian President Complains to Bush about U.S.
Policies," Washington Post, 13 February 1990.
165Isikoff, "Colombian President."
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simultaneously urging an end to the drug industry while permitting a
collapse of the International Coffee Agreement.' 66 The shortcomings shown
here suggest broad changes in U.S. decision-making are of critical importance
to the overall drug strategy. First, there needs to be better coordination
between the various agencies within the U.S. that are making decisions
regarding the Andean region; second, the U.S. should move away from
unilateral decision-making and make these economic issues a multilateral
effort, and third the United States needs to set its economic priorities.
If the drug war is a serious threat then is it more important for U.S. policy
makers to make economic decisions strictly in accordance with free market
interests? Perhaps the U.S. should make political and economic decisions that
will enable the Andean countries to wean themselves away from the
narcotics industry even if those decisions involve a temporary lapse from free
market priorities.
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY
Given the current international situation and the shrinking amount of
U.S. foreign aid funds available, there is great debate as to where the United
States should concentrate its global ecoromic efforts. Do we wish to aid
Eastern Europe as it distances itself from communism, assist Gorbachev and
the Soviet Union as it attempts a transition to a market oriented economy,
utilize our assets domestically, or fight the war on narcotics by assisting the
Andean region away from its dependence on the drug industry?
166Nunn and Lieberman, "Hooked."
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Currently there is $14 billion dollars in the U.S. budget earmarked for
foreign aid programs, of which $261 million is destined for the Andean
region.167 According to current estimates much more will be needed to make
any kind of impact in the region. Colombia estimates that it will need $250
million a year in direct U.S. aid for the next 2 to 5 years to soften the impact of
losing the $1.2 billion in drug money. Colombia is currently receiving $65
million in emergency military assistance from the U.S. with the U.S. offering
a further $90.2 million in military and police aid.168
Anibel Aguiler, President of the Interamerican Commission for the
Control of Substance Abuse of the OAS conducted a study estimating that in
Bolivia an integrated eradication and substitution program would cost $670
million over 5 years. 169 Currently, Bolivia receives $100 million per year in
U.S. aid including $15 million for drug interdiction and only $10 million for
crop substitution programs. 170 In addition, Peru also currently receives
approximately $100 million per year to fight the drug war. Both Peru and
Bolivia have asked the United States for $500 million per year in aid to fight
the drug war.171 Although the estimates for the economic costs may be too
high and the amounts the respective governments are asking for in weaning
167Nunn and Lieberman, "Hooked."





their economies away from narcotics dpendency may be unrealistic, it seems
clear that current U.S. economic efforts are inadequate to make a substantial
impact in the drug war. The piecemeal fashion in which we are currently
Lirowing our money at the problem is making little impact. It is just being
swallowed up by the enormous scope of the narcotics trade.
What is needed is a long-term outlook in developing the Andean
economies. Colombia already has a broad economic base and mainly needs
the proper support to soften the blow in removing itself from the narcotics
industry. Bolivia and Peru lack a proper economic infrastructure and will
need long-term economic nurturing to see them through the narcotics crisis.
In summary, this chapter has attempted to show that the U.S./Mexican
interdiction/ eradication strategy in the 1970's did in fact work, but due to
circumstances unique to Mexico. In applying the same strategy to the Andean
Region, the U.S. could be making a fundamental error. By assuming that the
particular economic and political dynamics are similar to both cases, the U.S.
Andean strategy coula well invite failure.
The contention of this chapter is that the Andean
,r terdiction/eradication strategy must be combined with economic
development in order to succeed. Currently the Andean region can ill afford,
and government officials probably do not want to see, an immediate end to
the narcotics industry. The combined strategy that has becn outlined should
help provide the safety valve for the Andean governments to muster the
necessary political will to wean their economies away from the narcotics
industry. The focus of the thesis will now shift to a specific evaluation of
current U.S. strategies.
101
V. CURRENT "DRUG WAR" STRATEGY
It was in the mid 1980's that President Reagan officially launched his
campaign against the growing narcotic threat. In the early years it would be
accurate to label this campaign as little more than rhetorical politics; a game
that became increasingly dangerous for the foot soldiers whose job has always
been to control the narco markets. Initic,1y there was no "national drug
control strategy," fiscal support, coordination between agencies or even dear
objectives outlined by the President. By the late 1980's however, the
President's anti-drug campaign had become the "war on drugs" complete
with a drug czar, William Bennett. It was Bennett, who for the first time,
expressed a number of objectives and demonstrated to the United States that
the government was serious in its desire to eradicate the drug problem.
At the outset, the Office of National Drug Control Policy struggled for
survival in the bureaucratic jungles of Washington. It was criticized for lack
of cohesion, and failure both to define the problem clearly and subsequently
provide the people with a national strategy. Even today, this office is
ambiguous in the chain-of-command and, until recently, had little budget
support. Credit should thus be given for the way in which it has gained
recognition.
Succumbing to the pressures of Congress and the White House, the first
National Drug Control Strategy was released in 1989. Before reviewing the
National Drug Control Strategy, it is important to note that regardless of its
shortcomings, no other political institution has published a similar
document. In Congress the issue has been debated both in the House and the
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Senate and it is clear that the issue is gaining more attention. However a
parallel strategy has yet to be published. 172 Since the Administration's
National Drug Control Strategy stands alone as the current plan of action, it
will be examined in detail.
In the introduction of the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy, William
Bennett illustrates the magnitude of the drug problem in the United States.
His data, collected from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), serves
as a preface and perhaps a justification for the strategy that follows. The
following areas are highlighted because above and beyond the
multidimensional nature of the narcotics issue, they are perceived as
indicators that the drug problem is getting out of control.
Crime: Three fourths of all robberies and half of all felony assaults
committed by young people now involve drug users. Reports of
bystander deaths due to drug related gunfights and drive by shootings
also continue to climb.
Health: ... The number of drug-related emergency hospital
admissions increased by 121 percent between 1985 and 1988. As many as
200,000 babies are born to mothers who use drugs.
Economy: ...One U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimate puts annual
drug sales at $110 billion-more than double all the profits enjoyed by all
the Fortune 500 companies combined. 173
This data is no more striking than that which is found throughout this
thesis, in the morning newspaper, or on the evening news hour. This type of
172The role of Congress will be discussed later in this chapter.
173The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, September 1989), p. 1-2.
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information prefaces almost all reports on the "drug war" and has yet to dull
the senses. Bennett effectively uses the data to paint a bleak picture in defense
of his methodology.
The Administration's "drug control strategy" can be divided into a two
pronged approach involving "supply" and "demand" areas of concern. This
approach is needed because of the economic nature of the narcotics problem.
In supply side tactics, the enemy, predominantly in Latin America, is the
focus and his market is the target of elimination. It is believed that
eradicating drugs at the source will ultimately result in less of a problem for
the domestic U.S. population or the demand side of the equation as a whole.
The "demand" approach, so named because of the consumers desire for
the product, is much more amorphous. It includes many politically sensitive
subjects such as treatment, education, over-crowded prisons, increased health
risks, crime and the functions of the justice system. Theoretically in a purely
demand side strategy the focus would be on eliminating the consumers desire
for narcotics, and with attention given the aforementioned areas, completely
eliminate the profit in narcotrafficking. Obviously any serious strategy
involves blending both the supply side and demand side tactics into a single
effort. This, in fact, has been accomplished. The controversy, however,
comes from the degree to which each of these strategies, "supply" or
"demand" are applied. The Bush administration and the Office of National
Drug Control Policy have focused their primary attention on supply side
tactics or eliminating narcotics at the source. In all fairness it should be noted
that the administration has shifted more emphasis on the demand side
equation, partly as a result of criticisms of previous strategies. However the
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scales are still tipped in favor of the supply side approach. These facts will
become more clear in the review of the 1990 National Drug Control Strategy.
A. THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
1. Supply Side Specifics:
International efforts and all forms of interdiction fall into the supply
side category. However, domestic interdiction carries qualities of both
strategic approaches. This point is important when outlining the specific
plans because in real terms domestic interdiction interrupts the supply side of
narcotics at the final distribution points, yet the coordination and funding of
domestic law enforcement agencies would be identified as a demand
requirement.
Focusing further on international efforts and international
interdiction it becomes apparent that the narcotics issue transcends many
areas of political concern. Whereas the main concern would appear to be
narcotrafficking, other items of equal importance are deeply intertwined. As
a consequence the supply side strategy is tantamount to a pyramid with
eradication of narcotics at its apex. Moving down the pyramid towards the
base, other items of interest include, political and economic stability, foreign
relations, trade agreements, security agreements and even ideological
differences, all of which make up the foundation of the structure illustrated.
Each influences the other and subsequently all must be dealt with, or at least
considered simultaneously.
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Therefore the national strategy consists of three primary near-term
goals in the international arena. The first goal is to strengthen the political
will and institutional capabilities of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. 174 Each
country is considered separately due to the varying degrees of institutional
stability and economic capability. The second goal is to strengthen the law
enforcement and military activities of the three primary actors against the
cocaine trade.175 Enhancing their capabilities is being accomplished through
the use of both law enforcement and military advisors and with the supply of
an assortment of hardware. Currently the hardware includes everything
from communications equipment to small arms weaponry and ammunition
and in some cases even aircraft. The degree to which this effort has been
applied varies from country to country. Colombia has received the most
equipment and assistance and appears to be sincere in the fight against the
major cartels. Peru, on the other hand, continues under the Alan Garcia
tradition in refusing most of the assistance offered by the United States.
Peru's rejection in part is a reflection of the different light in which they see
the "drug war."
The second goal is to provide acquired and real time intelligence. In
reaching the second goal a myriad of United States agencies have been
employed to provide better coordination and timely processing of
information. These particular assistances are not usually provided in country
174White House, Strategy, p. 50.
1751bid., p. 50.
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and consequently pose the least risk, in so far as they do little to upset
international harmony within the region.
The third goal is to inflict significant damage to the narcotraffickers
within the four major countries of Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico. This
is accomplished by working with the individual governments in disrupting
or dismantling trafficking operations.1 76 This goal involves sensitive
coordination between all players involved. The idea is to incapacitate the
major traffickers and their lieutenants through arrests, prosecution and when
necessary extradition. Additional damage will be inflicted by the destruction
of cocaine producing laboratories and eliminating coca and marijuana crops.
As these crops are destroyed and the trafficking is dismantled, it then becomes
an additional requirement to provide a form of substitution to fill the
economic vacuum and maintain economic and political stability.
Keeping the three primary goals in consideration, efforts have been
expanded further to encompass the major transit areas of Mexico, the
Caribbean, Central America and the Pacific. Monitoring, surveillance, and
interdiction in these areas is coordinated through the Joint Information
Collection Center (JICC) and Joint Task Force Five (JTF 5) in El Paso Texas.
The purpose of these coordinating centers is to provide more cohesion
between the different -agencies and military services involved. The DEA, as
directed by the President and Congress, will continue to be the chief
1761bid., p. 51.
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coordinating agency and will direct the operations of all agencies and military
services.
Another element of the international effort, which again spills over
into the demand arena, is the money laundering activities.
The Administration's money laundering strategy seeks to attain three
primary goals: the prosecution and incarceration of money launderers and
the leaders and members of drug trafficking organizations; the freezing,
seizure, or confiscation of drug derived assets; and the deterrence of
individuals or institutions from cooperating with money launderers or their
clients through the enforcement of existing laws and regulations where
needed, and certainty of sanctions in the event of non-compliance. 177
As a result the Administration created the Drug-Related Financial
Crimes Policy Group with a "Financial Targeting Group" which wil be
responsible for the investigation and subsequent prosecution of identified
violators.
Collecting these goals together the current Administration has made
an effort to present the National strategy to the major Latin American
governments. President Bush has consulted with the United Nations and
continually seeks approval from this forum on all aspects of the international
effort. In addition, the President desires a continuation of the "drug summit"




The international effort continues to expand and become more costly
in the long run as the narcotrafficking nexus contracts and expands under
pressures applied from various points. Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Chile
are now becoming more of a concern.
In summary of the International Efforts, the following "Highlights"
have been given by the Office of National Drug Control Policy:
International Highlights
* Increased economic, military, and law enforcement assistance to
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.
* Expanded cooperation with Mexico in drug enforcement,money
laundering disruption, drug interdiction and demand reduction
programs.
* Continued support for law enforcement programs in South America
producer and transit countries, including Ecuador, Venezuela,
Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile.
* Continued cooperative law enforcement and intelligence programs
with Central America and Caribbean.
" Development of an international strategy focused on opium and
heroin.
* Broadened domestic and foreign efforts to counter international drug
money laundering activities.
* Expanded efforts to reduce the illegal manufacture and shipment of
chemicals essential to illicit drug production.
" Promotion of international law enforcement cooperation through
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and the pursuit of anti-drug




The 1990 National Drug Control Strategy proposes a total of $2.4
billion for interdiction efforts with the goal of deterring drug smuggling
through interception and seizure of drug shipments. This sum allows for
continuation of current levels of operation and enhances programs focuses
on the problem of the Southwestern U.S.- Mexican Border.
Interdiction is divided into the three primary areas of air, maritime,
and land, and involves the coordination of law enforcement agencies, the
U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Defense. In air interdiction
suspected narcotrafficking aircraft are detected through the use of two primary
radar systems, radar on board platforms such as aerostats or aircraft, and
ground based radar. The combination of current and planned Land Based
Aerostats (LBA's) and sea based aerostats will provide coverage of the U.S.-
Mexican border, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. In addition new
legislation is being sought to provide legal accommodations for intercepting
aircraft to "force down" suspected narcotics carrying aircraft.179 Maritime
interdiction primarily concerns the U.S. Coast Guard and on occasion the
Coast Guard aboard U.S. Navy Vessels. With cooperation of Naval Task
Forces the Coast Guard can essentially bottle up maritime traffic in the
Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. The Pacific coast waterway provides a
much different case for both air and sea interdiction simply due to the
vastness of this ocean and the U.S. coastline. In maritime interdiction the
179Ibid., p. 67.
110
Coast Guard, when embarked aboard U.S. Navy vessels, had all arresting
powers and under no circumstances are DoD personnel allowed to pursue
civil arrests. This procedure is in accordance with constitutional provisions
and both the Administration and Congress have sought to ensure that the
role of the military in interdiction remain so limited. For the two to five year
objectives, outlined in the National Strategy, land interdiction is receiving
the most attention. The border has become the major avenue for
narcotrafficking in the past decade. Unlike marijuana, cocaine is much easier
to conceal and significantly more compact. In addition the border cannot be
effectively "sealed" against increasing or outgoing traffic. Indeed several such
proposals have generated heated political debates within the U.S. and Mexico.
As a result the Administration is seeking to significantly increase the
manpower of the border patrol and custom agents, in part with augmentation
of DoD personnel. The increase in manpower requires an increase in
coordination and intelligence capabilities which will be directed through JTF-
5 in El Paso, Texas.
As noted before interdiction overlaps into the demand side of the
equation and can not be neatly isolated into a specific strategy. A bullet
summary of Interdiction Efforts as outlined by the Office of National Drug
Control Policy follows:
Interdiction Highlights
" Enhanced and expanded role for the Department of Defense in
Detection and Monitoring. (Emphasis ours)
" Improved coordination of air, land, and maritime interdiction efforts
to deter and intercept drug smuggling and the illegal shipment of drug-
related money, munitions and precursor chemicals as they enter or
leave the country.
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* Increased focus on drug smuggling across the Southwest border.
* Improved automated data processing equipment for use by the U.S.
Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
U.S. Coast Guard.
* Completion of the Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (C3) systems, and their integration with the Department of
Defense Task Forces.18s
3. Demand Specifics
The demand approach to fighting the war on drugs includes three
major categories, the criminal justice system, drug treatment and
rehabilitation and education. Although the Administration's strategy focuses
more attention on supply side solutions, there is growing recognition for the
need to address domestic problems as well. Analyzing the demand
component of the drug war is more difficult because there are infinitely more
variables, and unlike foreign affairs, tend to be more economically and
politically sensitive.
In the criminal justice system, already overburdened, there has been a
tendency to look upon drug related crimes as less severe than other felonious
activities. The average incarceration period for drug offenders across the
board is twenty-two months. This is less than time served for robbery,
aggravated assault and burglary181 Both state and federal courts argue that
due to the time needed to try a case and overcrowded conditions of prisons,





system. By the same token money laundering, which in many cases involves
white collar offenders, has rarely generated the attention it deserves. To
combat these inadequacies the Administration has sought to reinforce the
criminal justice system with more manpower, allocate more funds to increase
the number of beds available in prison, and has introduced legislation
making drug offenses more serious in nature. In fact in 1990 the
Administration introduced legislation making the death penalty available in
areas involving three categories of drug offenders:
* Major Drug Kingpins--those devoted to the large-scale importation or
distribution of controlled substances.
• Drug Kingpins who attempt to kill in order to obstruct justice or those
who knowingly direct, advise, authorize or assist another in an attempt
to kill any public officer, juror, witness or family member of such
persons.
• Federal drug felons whose offenses result in death. Those who,
intending to cause death or acting with reckless disregard for human
life, commit a Federal drug felony resulting in the death of another
person. 182
It becomes readily apparent that such legislation is controversial in
the eyes of many Americans and is therefore to be considered a political risk
for the Administration to actively pursue such a law. Nonetheless the
commitment remains. In addition, the Administration has sought to
increase the police search and seizure powers, when narcotics are suspected,
and to shorten the time from arrest to trial for such perpetrations. Moves in
this direction continue to spark domestic controversy and in part account for
182Ibid., p. 23.
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the emphasis on supply side tactics. Supply side strategies are much less
controversial among .Ie voters and therefore much easier to pursue.
Drug treatment and rehabilitation is another sensitive area that is an
intimate part of the demand category. Although the Administration is
seeking $1.5 billion for the nation's drug treatment system, some members
see it as a non-player in the drug war. According to the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, too few addicts seek treatment voluntarily and of those
who do seek treatment, too many reportedly enter and soon drop out of
programs without ending their addiction. 183
Education and community action against drug usage and trafficking is
the least controversial component of the demand strategy and perhaps the
one demonstrating the most success. This program has been allocated a mere
$54 million in additional funds for 1990184 but less is needed in the long run.
Many educators and members of the community have become the
cornerstone for this approach to the drug war and with remarkable results.
Getting the message across to the young people in the United States requires
little capital support but rather a commitment on the part of the community.
Education and community action against substance abuse is really the only





In 1989, $4 billion was allocated to supply objectives and only $1.7
billion to demand objectives. (Figure 2) An evaluation of the fourteen year
effort indicated a need for fundamental changes if the United States is truly
serious in its quest to win the war on drugs.
The amount of cocaine entering the country between 1984 and 1987
nearly quadrupled while its price went down as much as 40 percent, reaching
a low of $80 a gram on the street. The only real achievement of U.S. drug
diplomacy has been to increase friction with neighboring nations and to
reinforce the stereotype of a heavy-handed Uncle Sam quick to bring his big
stick down on Latin America. 185
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F-*gure 2. U.S. Federal Drug Control Budget (Fiscal Years 1971-89, in SBillions)
Unfortunately for the United States the image of a "war on drugs" is
too simplistic, if it is seen only as a fight between good (law enforcement) and
evil (drug traffickers). There is certainly more to the issue than law and
order. Current policies highlight the supply side of the equation and in doing
so have alienated many of our Latin American neighbors.
In light of the current Middle East Crisis, (late 1990), the United States
government has shifted its attention from the "war on drugs" to the "crisis in
the Gulf." Consequently, drug trafficking has increased an estimated four
percent in the last three months. The governments of Colombia, Bolivia,
Peru and Mexico are sc.n once again questioning the sincerity of the United
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States.186 Granted supply efforts should continue but the United States must
increase its drive in two other principle areas. First, we must demonstrate
sincerity to Latin America and respect the nations who have already made
significant sacrifices in the drug war. This can be accomplished by continuing
to meet with Latin American leaders and encouraging a cooperative attitude
throughout the region. The United States must be willing to demonstrate
reluctance in dictation of policy and agendas. The second area of focus should
be on domestic programs, the attention given to the supply side of the
formula has been less than fruitful. More attention must be given to
education, research, local law enforcement and the overall failure of the
judicial system. Unfortunately this area has been largely ignored, primarily
because of the difficulty of such a task.
There is light at the end of the tunnel. It would appear that President
Bush's proposal for the National Drug strategy has taken into account many
of the problems discussed in this chapter. The following areas have received
more attention by the Office of National Drug Control Strategy:
" Increase assistance to state and local law enforcement.
* Expand resources for treatment and prevention programs
" Initiate a major anti-drug campaign in the cocaine source countries.
* Establish order in the Nation's public housing projects.
* Build more federal prisons, expand federal and state courts and
correctional systems, and add more prosecutors.
* Step up efforts against money laundering operations.
186CNN's "Update on the Drug War," broadcast September 28, 1990.
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* Provide sufficient resources to operate and maintain our border
interdiction system.
* Expand inter-agency drug traffick force operations.
* Augment drug intelligence capabilities.
* Reduce the amount of marijuana cultivated in American soil. 187
As guidelines for the 1990 strategy, each area was further broken
down and resource allocations were proposed. Perhaps this is the best
measure of how rhetorical the above objectives may be.
" State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance
1989 1990
$ 150 million $ 350 million
* Treatment, Prevention and Research
1989 1990
$ 300 million $ 399 million
" Department of Education
1989 1990
$ 355 million $ 392 million
* International
1989 1990
$ 250 million $ 499 million
" Public Housing
1989 1990
$ 8 million $ 50 million
" Federal Prosecutors, Courts and Prisons
1989 1990
$ 143 million $ 183 million
* Money Laundering
1989 1990
187White House, Strategy, p. 114.
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$ 120 million $ 140 million 188
The total increase in Federal Budget Allocation for the National Drug
Strategy rose from $5.6 billion (FY 1989) to $8.0 billion (FY 1990). This is
actually a conservative increase and Congress expected more funds to be
requested, however the report in itself demonstrates a far more cohesive and
sincere approach than those published in previous years. Money is not the
solution, the solution rests firmly upon the United States population and the
people of the drug producing countries, and the solutions must include
coordination and cooperation.
The Administration argues, in defense of its program agenda, that the
effort in supply side tactics must not be judged by resource allocation.
International and interdiction objectives are naturally more expertsive.
Aircraft, surveillance equipment, economic assistance to foreign countries
and the manpower needed to be effective, require an enormous amount of
fiscal support. However, the amount of dollars requested and the amount
spent is not a true reflection of the effort generated to both sides of the
equation. Comparison of the two published National Drug Control Strategies
does reveal a fundamental move to balancing both approaches and making
the efforts more cohesive in their application.
B. THE MILITARY OPTION
One naturally associates the use of the military as an option for fighting
the drug war, if for no other reason than the fact that it has been called a
188White House, Strategy, p. 115-118.
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"war" since Reagan first coined the expression in 1983. However, the
Executive branch has been very careful to limit the active participation of the
military. The DoD's role is expanding substantially, but their anticipated
activities fall short of direct interdiction and confrontation with the
narcotrafficking problem. The President and the Office of National Drug
Control Policy are aware of the constitutional limitations of using military
personnel in civil matters but are currently seeking to expand their role in
other supportive ways. As a result of the long Cold War, the United States
boasts one of the largest and most sophisticated militaries in the world. In the
effort to control narcotrafficking it has become obvious that additional
resources, technology, manpower, and coordination are needed.
Consequently, the military which has an abundance of the above, has been
tasked to act in a supportive role in the war on drugs. It should be noted here
that small groups of Special Forces have been deployed to Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia. However their numbers remain small and they are not authorized
to actively pursue targeted elements. These units share intelligence, provide
training and assist in the coordination of activities by U.S. officials and host
country participants. There has been no move by the Administration to
expand these operations into an offensive arm of the National Drug Control
Strategy.
The role of the military has expanded to support interdiction and law
enforcement. The DoD has been designated by statute as the lead agency for
both maritime and air detection and monitoring. As directed by the Secretary
of Defense, all commands have elevated the priority of the drug war and
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have submitted suggestive commentaries on how their forces might be better
utilized.
Three joint task forces have been established to plan and coordinate
detection and monitoring operations and support local interdiction on the
Southwest border. State National Guard units are increasingly active in
support of interdiction activities as well. From a level of approximately $200
million in Fiscal Year 1988, funding has grown to over $800 million in Fiscal
Year 1990; the Department anticipates spending approximately $1.2 billion on
drug control efforts--principally in the detection and monitoring phase of
interdiction-in Fiscal Year 1991.189
The fiscal budget allocated to the DoD for "drug war" activities is
substantial and it certainly indicates that the military services will be
becoming more involved with the narcotics issue. However, despite rumors
generated by the media and by members of Congress, the National Drug
Control Strategy clearly limits the use of the military. The Administration,
the DoD and all agencies involved in the drug strategy are quite aware that
the military is to provide a supportive role only.
C. CONGRESSIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
1. Congressional Review
Although the Executive Branch has taken the lead on the national
anti-drug crusade, the United States Congress has been quick to assume its
position in the decision making process. As with any issue however, the
189White House, Strategy, p. 71.
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viewpoints of Congress are broad and varied, making an analysis of this
body's position much more difficult.
In reviewing the basic positions of Congress, it is clear that the final
objective is uncontested: narcotics pose a serious threat to society and must be
dealt with accordingly. Such a position is not only politically safe but
beneficial to political opinions as generated by the constituents.
Consequently, in the past seven years Congress has been most active in the
coverage of the "drug war." Like some mythological Greek god, the faces of
Congress, in terms of the narcotics issue, are many. Some see themselves as
the "watchdog" of the Executive Branch and the ONDCP, others promote
more activity in demand vice supply issues, and yet another group seeks
direct foreign interdiction. Albeit all are critical of the current strategy
implemented by the Administration.
The "watchdogs" of the Administration concern themselves with the
particulars of the National Drug Control Strategy and ensure that all facets of
the program remain within the law. For example, the Congressional
Committee on Foreign Affairs demanded details on how the $125 million
requested aid for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, was to be controlled and
allocated, and for what forms of "aid" it was to be utilized. Indeed in Public
Law 101.231, the committee included in the bill a number of safeguards which
limited how the funds could be spent and which ensured that Congress was
kept fully informed of the use of the funds as plans to implement the strategy
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were developed. 190 This body of watchdogs, although supportive of the anti-
drugs campaign, are primarily concerned with the legal aspects of drug
strategy implementation.
Another group in Congress, personified by the Honorable Fortney
Pete Stark of California in the House of Representatives, is critical of supply
side tactics and emphasize more attention to demand side issues. The central
argument is that law enforcement personnel, health care officials and society
as a whole, see the narcotics issue as a domestic problem. According to Stark:
The primary successes in our efforts have been achieved on the
demand side of the equation. The enhancement of drug education awareness
programs, improvements in drug treatment services, and the expansion of
drug prevention programs like law enforcement supplied Project D.A.R.E..
The international drug fighting community has collectively come to realize
that the only way to win a war on drugs in the long-term is through better,
expanded demand-side solutions. 191
This group criticizes the Administration for its approaches and sees
very little success after seven years of anti-drug effort.
The last major group, albeit a bit more radical, is personified by the
Honorable Mr. Burton of Indiana in the House of Representatives.
190Congress, House, The Andean Package and Associated Issues, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess., IR 2105. Congressional Record, v. 136, no. 58, (8 May 1990).
191Congress, House, Congressman Fortney Pete Sark speaking before the
House, The War on Drugs will be Won through Demand Reduction, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess, Congressional Record/Extended Remarks, E1053, (18 April
1990).
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Although it agrees on focusing more attention on demand issues, the central
argument of this group is the complete eradication of narcotics at the source.
This group sees a failure on the part of the Administration as well, but not
because of its strategies but rather the lack of effort. Consequently they
propose crop eradication through the use of a herbicide known as
Tebuthiuron, which kills 95-96 percent of the coca it comes in contact with.
According to this committee the herbicide is not harmful to humans or other
life forms.
The controversial aspect of this plan stems from the suggested
disregard for the national sovereignty of the targeted country.
The idea is that at 6:00 in the morning our President calls the
President of Peru or Bolivia- and he says, 'Mr. President, I apologize for
waking you at such an early hour, but I want to tell you that we are
committed in the United States to winning the war on drugs, and toward that
end we have decided the only way to stop the cocaine from entering the
United States in large quantities is to eradicate it. So we are flying up and
down the Haullaga Valley, starting at this time, and dropping the herbicides
in quantities large enough to eradicate that coca leaf. 192
Although such a radical suggestion appears out of the question it is
interesting that such tactics have been discussed.
192Congress, House, Congressman Burton of Indiana speaking to the
House, Update on the War on Drugs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional
Record, H689 (7 March 1990).
124
Around the three core positions on the drug war there are many
sporadic offshoots, those representatives seeking momentary limelight and
still others who are critical of every position. However, the Congress is
getting more involved in the drug war, as it should, and the drug crisis is
receiving attention as an issue of the government not just an issue of politics.
Presently the Congress has no real drug strategy or agenda on the drug war,
but several acts of legislation have been presented, debated, and enacted, all
pointing to the fact that Congress will be an important facet of any strategy.
2 Current Legislation & Military Matters
The National Drug Control Strategy serves as a blueprint of sorts for
the legislators in Congress. Despite the differences over various particulars,
Congress has nonetheless implemented legislative activities to refine the
National Strategy. The National Drug and Crime Emergency Act, S.
2245/H.R. 4079 has over 50 cosponsors in the House of Representatives and is
designed as an outline for Congressional strategy. It should be noted
however, that the plan is general and void of any detail.
The Bill declares a National Emergency for a period of five years
during which extraordinary, forceful measures will be used to win the war on
drugs and violent crime. The Bill mandates that violent criminals and drug
felons serve their full prison sentence. If necessary they will be housed in
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temporary facilities, not released into general society free to commit further
crimes.193
In addition this Bill suggests a program of "zero tolerance" which
would be initiated in all public schools and as many business' as possible and
finally a drug treatment plan in every state. The Bill is about as generic as
possible and avoids discussion of program funding and implementation, but
it does demonstrate the first signs of Congressional consensus on the drug
war.
In terms of using the military in the drug war, both the Senate and
the House have worked to refine the military question without disturbing
constitutional law. S2728 and S2910 read respectively as follows:
* S-2728-A bill to amend Title 10, U.S. Code to clarify and expand the
authority of the Armed Forces to provide support for civilian law
enforcement agencies to the Committee on Armed Services. 194
* S-2910--An original bill to authorize appropriations of FY91 drug
interdiction and counter drug activities of the Department of Defense
to allow the Department of Defense to provide additional support to
State and Local agencies for such activities, and for other purposes
placed on the calendar.195
The military issue has been discussed at length in Congress and both
houses have gone to great lengths to define the role of the military. At the
193Congress, House, remarks by Congressman Newt Gingrich of Georgia
to the House of Representative, A Strategy for the Drug War, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess., Congressional Record., E736 (20 March, 1990).
194Congress, Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., S-2728, Congressional Record,
(13 June 1990).
195Congress, Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., S-2910 Congressional Record,
(26 July 1990).
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present the position of Congress is identical to the Executive Branch: the role
of the military will remain supportive only, focusing primarily on detection
and monitoring.
Other issues concerning the drug war are being approached in
Congress as well, such as the shipment of legal chemicals to drug trafficking
countries for use in refinement of narcotic substances. Investigations into
these shipments led to the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act which
went into effect on October 30, 1989.
The role of Congress in the drug war is increasing significantly, but
presently consists of minor legislative enactments here and there and an
overall refinement of the National Strategy. Whereas Congress will
undoubtedly be ever watchful of the Executive strategy and quick to remark
on its successes and failures, one should not expect a Congressional plan or
strategy. Although Congress agrees on the severity of the drug problem, and
the need to get this problem under control, the methods of attack have
sparked political controversy. Consequently Congress will avoid conflict with
the voting public and continue its assessment and refining of the National
Drug Strategy.
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VI. THE U.S. MILITARY IN NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT: RECENT
TRENDS
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the historical aspects of U.S.
military involvement in the drug wars. One dimension of this involvement
has been the initial reluctance of the military to become committed to the war
while at the same time being under increasing pressure to do so. An
important test case, if on a small scale, was Operation "Blast Furnace." "Blast
Furnace" was one of the first instances of the U.S. military becoming actively
involved in drug interdiction, and assessing this operation is important in
determining potential roles for the military within narcotics source country's.
The U.S. Navy also has been called upon to interdict drug shipments,
working in conjunction with the Coast Guard, in conducting Law
Enforcement Operations (LEO). LEO will also be assessed in reference to cost
effectiveness as well as its ability to interdict effectively significant shipments
of illicit narcotics. Finally, the use of air assets, the high technology solution
to narcotics enforcement, and an extremely important component of the drug
strategy will be assesed as to its effectiveness.
A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: A RELUCTANT ACTOR
In April 1986 a directive signed by President Reagan named illicit
narcotics as a threat to U.S. national security, and called for the Department of
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Defense (DoD) to expand its role into the anti-drug mission. 196 Congress was
quick to support former President Reagan's effort for an increased military
presence in the drug war, amending legislation which called for additional
military funding for National Guard support as well as empowering military
personnel to make arrests outside United States territory or waters. In
addition Congress called on the President to substantially halt drug smuggling
within 45 days of legislation enactment.1 97
This 1988 legislation reflected a Congressional election year response to a
growing concern over America's drug problem. America's concern with
narcotics was reflected in a series of recent New York Times/CBS poles. In
1985 less than 1 percent of those poled listed drugs as America's most
important problem, in September 1989 this figure had risen to 54 percent.198
In addition, in early 1989, a congressional study team came to the conclusion
that the U.S. anti-narcotics effort in Latin America was in chaos. The report
stated that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was being involved
in a paramilitary mission which it was ill-equipped to handle. 199 In
19 6 Grier, P., "Congress, Pentagon Dispute Armed Forces' Role in Drug
Fight," The Christian Science Monitor, 24 May 1988, p. 24.
197Ibid.
198"War: 1 Percent; Drugs: 54 Percent," New York Times, 28 September
1989, p. A26.
199 Isikoff, M., "U.S. Troops Urged for Latin Drug War," Washington Post,
4 march 1989, p. 4.
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responding to requests to 'do something,' increasing the military's
involvement seemed the logical answer.
For a variety of reasons the military was initially reluctant to become
involved in the drug war. Like the military institutions in Latin America,
some members of the U.S. military saw narcotics enforcement as a law
enforcement function, not one for the military. The DoD feared that an
increased role for the military would take billions of dollars, and divert
personnel and weapons away from their primary mission areas.200 The
Pentagon estimated that to shift its mission to drug interdiction and to seal
the border in the 45 day time limit would require 90 infantry battalions, 50
helicopter companies, 54,000 army troops, 110 AWACS aircraft, 30 E2C
Hawkeye surveillance planes, 50 radar balloons, more than 1,000 fighter
aircraft, and 160 naval vessels.201
Another factor influencing the Pentagon's reluctance to become involved
in the drug war, was the potentially ill-defined nature of the war. Inevitably
parallels to the Vietnam War cropped up. Although there are significant
differences in comparing Vietnam with the Andean drug war, military
personnel had a legitimate concern with the potential rules of engagement
that would be needed if they became involved in the drug war. Since peasant
coca growers and drug traffickers do not wear uniforms, significant problems
occur in just identifying the enemy. Considering that between 200,000 to
20 Wilson, G. C., and Moore, M., "Pentagon Warns of a No-Win
Mission," Washington Post, 13 May 1988, p. 4.
201Ibid.
130
300,000 peasants are directly employed growing or processing coca in each of
the 'first tier' Andean nations the problem would be significant indeed.202
The military is also aware that the drug cartels present a formidable
opposition. The cartels operate with no rules of engagement, of the kind that
would restrict United States forces in any conflict. This fact was
acknowledged by General Alfred Gray Jr., the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. General Gray conceded that the United States risked "winning the
battle but losing the war," if it sent troops into the Andean region to battle the
coca cartels. In addition General Gray called the drug dealers a "formidable
enemy" and predicted that a drug war would be "a long, long campaign." 203
One last concern addressed by the military was the blurred lines between
guerrilla insurgencies and narco-trafficking. In fact in both Colombia and
Peru it is almost impossible to separate narcotics control from insurgencies.
In Peru the "Shining Path" movement is heavily involved in the narcotics
industry, protecting and taxing the coca growers as well as taxing drug
traffickers shipments of coca paste. In Colombia the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), is extremely strong in the coca growing regions
and has become increasingly involved in coca paste processing and
distribution. Even guerilla groups not involved in the narcotics industry,
such as Colombia's Army of National Liberation (ELN), operate in narcotics
202Marshall, J., "In the War on Drugs, Keep the Troops in the Barracks,"
the Wall Street Journal, 27 July 1989, p. A10.
203Ryan, R. A., "Use of U.S. Troops in Drug War Questioned," Detroit
News, 18 August 1989, p. 3.
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regions and would come into conflict with any anti-narcotics forces entering
their areas of control.
Despite the military's misgiving's about the drug war, the U.S. Army was
in fact committed to the conflict, if only on a limited basis, in 1986. This test
case for a U.S. military anti-narcotics mission in the Andean region was
Bolivia's operation "Blast Furnace." This U.S./Bolivian cooperative effort
reflected President Reagan's growing concern that the illicit narcotics industry
had become a national security issue.
B. OPERATION BLAST FURNACE
Bolivia's operation "Blast Furnace" came about at the request of former
Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro, against the advice of some of his
closest advisors. One of the most compelling reasons offered against
involving U.S. forces was the importance of the hard currency earned by
Bolivia's narcotics industry. This, economic benefit coupled with the
militancy and organizational capacity of the Bolivian coca growers union,
gave President Paz quite an incentive to resist U.S. overtures to get tough on
the narcotics industry. Further economic difficulties existed at the time,
arising from an extremely conservative economic austerity program
instituted by President Paz. Paz's economic measures had reduced Bolivia's
inflation from an annual rate of 23,000 percent to near zero. Bolivia's
Planning Minister expressed his opposition to U.S. involvement, at the time,
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by stating "running the economic side, when we're fighting bare handed with
a tiger, we don't want to take on an alligator."204
Despite these factors President Paz did decide to ask for United States
assistance. Several reasons may account for the President's decision. First,
although the Bolivian traffickers did not present as formidable an opposition
as the Colombian cartels did to their government, Paz was concerned about
the the growing power of the narcotraffickers. These Bolivian traffickers had
helped generate the so called "cocaine coup" of General Garcia Meza in 1980.
President Paz also expressed his concern in a Newsweek interview stating "if
we do not address this problem (coca) decisively, to eliminate it, the day could
come when the economic power they (traffickers) wield could result in their
governing the country, including via democratic means. 205 Second, the
economic risk confronting Paz would have been limited. The anti-narcotics
campaign would be directed against Bolivia's coca processing laboratories, not
against the coca growers. Most of Bolivia's coca crop was processed in
Colombia not in Bolivia. Also the U.S. presence would only be for a limited
time, and the stepped up anti-narcotics campaign would cripple Bolivia's
narcotics industry only for that period. Therefore once the operation was
over, though Bolivian traffickers may have been effectively dealt with, there
204Graham, B., "Bolivian Barometer: Coca Price Falls," Washington Post,
27 July 1986, p. A22.
205Newsweek (International Edition), 14 July 1986. Shannon, Desperados,
p. 36 1.
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would still be a market for coca leaf through Colombian processing facilities,
and Bolivian hard currency earnings could soon be restored.
Third, Bolivia was under pressure from the United States to step up its
anti-narcotics drive. Bolivia was facing a U.S. Congressional deadline, in
accordance with the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1986, that mandated a
reduction in U.S. foreign aid unless Bolivia proceeded with an eradication
campaign. 206 Given the economic situation President Paz faced he could ill
afford to resist U.S. overtures.
Once Bolivia's request for assistance reached the U.S., the Reagan
administration decided to commit the DoD to the operation. This was in
accordance with a Presidential directive approved on April 8, 1986 permitting
the use of U.S. forces in helping other nations to fight narcotics trafficking. 20 7
The directive was pushed by Vice President Bush who was also instrumental
in a successful lobbying effort, overcoming Pentagon misgivings about
committing resources to Bolivia.208
1. The Military Committed
The Paz government and the DEA sought to keep U.S. military
involvement to a minimum, to reduce the Bolivian political outcry which
was sure to follow. They envisioned a surgical action using possibly four
helicopters and about twenty U.S. Army pilots and crew members, with most
206Shannon, Desperados, p. 361.
207Hoffman, D., "Drug Raid is 1st under Reagan Order," Washington Post,
16 July 1986.
2081bid., Shannon, Desperados, p. 362.
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of the manpower provided by Bolivia's 650 man anti-narcotics police
(UMOPAR).2°9 When U.S. forces landed in July 1986, the force had grown to
six helicopters and 170 personnel. 210
The United States and Bolivian authorities hoped to keep the
operations a secret, at least until the raids started. But on 15 July 1986, only
one day after their arrival in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, Bolivian newspapers carried
front page reports of the landing of U.S. forces.211 This attempt at secrecy may
have been unrealistic since U.S. forces arrived by a huge C5A cargo plane, an
event highly unusual in the town of Santa Cruz.
The main targets of the raids were coca processing laboratories in the
main processing regions of Beni, and Santa Cruz. The processing labs had
been identified by intelligence gathered by the DEA months previously,. The
DEA had been unable to act against these labs due to a lack of Bolivian
resources.
The first raids were conducted against labs in the Beni region on July
17, 1986. Problems that were to plague the raids from the outset came to the
forefront on these first excursions into the Ben. On the first raid the anti-
narcotics forces uncovered a large processing lab in the process of being
dismantled. Upon questioning the peasants it was confirmed that the
209Shannon, Desperados, p. 362.
2 1 0Lee, R. W., I, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power,
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 198), p. 71.
211Graham, B., "U.S. Army Joins Bolivian Drug Drive," Washington Post,
16 July 1986, p. Al.
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traffickers had been packing even before the story of the operation had hit the
papers. 212 The traffickers own intelligence network within the Bolivian
government and anti-narcotics forces was to prove effective in enabling the
traffickers to avoid arrest. By the time "Blast Furnace" ended in November
1986 only one arrest was made, that of a seventeen year old boy, who arrived
at a laboratory in the process of being destroyed.213 U.S. officials at the time
acknowledged that the high profile traffickers had fled during the first 24
hours of operations. Furthermore U.S. statements indicated that arrests were
not the chief intention of the operation and were to be considered a 'side
thing'.
In the four months of "Blast Furnace" operations twenty-two cocaine
laboratories with a production capacity of fifteen tons of cocaine a year were
destroyed. This loss of productive capacity had a profound effect on the price
of coca leaf in Bolivia. Within two weeks of the raids commencing, the price
of coca fell from 60 to 70 cents per pound to 25 to 30 cents per pound.214 By the
time the raids ended the price for a 100 pound bag of leaf had fallen to
212Shannon, Desperados, p. 363.
213Clistian, S., "Bolivia is Hoping U.S. Drug Forces will Extend Stay,"
New York Times, 22 August 1986, p. B4. Shannon, Desperados, p. 355.
214Graham, "Barometer," p. Al. Though destruction of laboratories was at
a minimum at this time, presumably the fall in price was due to traffickers
fleeing the processing regions in advance of the anti-narcotics raids.
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between $10 to $20, well below the cost of production ($30-$40 per 100
pounds).215
As expected the drop in the price of coca leaf had a dramatic effect on
Bolivia's rural population and economy. The coca industry employed
approximately 400,000 Bolivians and earned $500-600 million per year in hard
currency for the Bolivian economy. With coca production falling by about 90
percent after the start of the raids, Bolivia turned to the United States for
economic assistance to fill the vacuum.216 President Paz estimated that
Bolivia required an immediate $100 million infusion of U.S. economic
assistance to compensate for the losses in coca production and to ensure the
success of the anti-narcotics operations. 217 In November 1986 Paz dispatched
his Planning Minister, Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, to Washington to lobby
the Reagan administration for the economic aid.
When Bolivia's economic request was made known in August 1986,
Reagan administration officials made it known that it could not honor
Bolivia's request for the $100 million loan. The Administration apparently
did not have $100 million available in foreign aid money at the time.218 Early
in 1987 the Paz administration and the U.S. State Department did agree on a
21SLee, Labyrinth, p. 72.
216McFarren, P., "Drug Raids in Bolivia Hurting Economy," Washington
Post, 14 November 1986.
217Ibid.
218Morganthaler, E., "Bolivia Fears an Economic Backlash from U.S.
Aided Cocaine Crackdown," The Wall Street Journal, 15 August 1986.
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plan that fell somewhat short of that originally envisioned by President Paz.
This revised plan provided $68 million, if the Bolivian government
promised to eradicate all coca grown for export within three years.21 9 Given
the importance of the coca crop both politically and economically to Bolivia,
this alternate plan was almost doomed from the start.220
Shortly after the beginning of the "Blast Furnace" raids domestic
political pressure began to bear on the Paz government because of the U.S.
involvement. On 21 August 1986 the main Bolivian workers federation
began a 48 hour general strike to protest the Paz government's economic
policies and to demand the removal of the United States troops, stating that
the U.S. presence violated Bolivian sovereignty.221 As many as 20,000 people
at a time would participate in the demonstrations organized by the worker
federations. The Bolivian left took the opportunity to accuse President Paz of
being a tool of American interests. A former president of the Bolivian Senate
called the U.S. intervention illegal, and the head of Paz's own MNR
(National Revolutionary Movement) Party in Santa Cruz resigned to form a
new party and called for the president's impeachment.222
219Shannon, Desperados, p. 362.
2 2 0 1n fact in all of 1986 and most of 1987, the Bolivian government
eradicated less than 500 acres of coca (Shannon, Desperados, p. 365.)
221Christian, "Extend Stay," p. Al.
222
"MNR Leader Scores President, Founds Party," Paris AFP, 31 July 1986.
Lee, Labyrinth, p. 72.
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Protests by Bolivia's well organized and often militant coca growers
union (ANAPCOCA) were on some occasions able to interfere directly with
"Blast Furnace" operations. In the town of Santa Ana De Yacuma an
estimated crowd of 3,000 people surrounded and forced a combined
Bolivian/U.S. anti-narcotics strike force to abort their mission in the area.2M
2. Blast Furnace: An Assessmnet
In the short run operation "blast furnace" could be called a technical
success. As intended, the operation did disrupt the Bolivian coca industry to
the point where the price of leaf fell below the threshold of profitability to the
coca grower. The strategy in forcing the price of leaf down was that the
peasant coca grower would then be more amenable to switching to an
alternate crop, such as citrus fruits, rice or other cash crops.
However one weakness of the "Blast Furnace" strategy was that there
was no contingency for filling the economic vacuum once the peasants were
in a position to switch from growing coca. This fact was recognized by the Paz
Government but was almost totally ignored by the U.S. Government even
after the price of coca leaf had fallen dramatically.
As such, within two months of U.S. troops departing Bolivia, the
illicit coca industry had bounced back to where a drug intelligence specialist
would comment "everything is back to where it was the day we started (pre-
blast furnace)." The lack of arrests of the major traffickers (apparently not a
major goal of the operation) meant their quick return, and business as usual
223Lee, Labyrinth, p. 72.
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once the pressure was removed. By December 1986 the price of coca leaf had
risen to $50 per 100 pound bag, up from the low of $10 per 100 pound bag it
had fallen to during "Blast Furnace," and $10 more than the break even point
for coca producers. 224 By January 1987 the price of a 100 pound bag had risen
to $150 a $25 dollar increase over the pre-"Blast Furnace" price.225
Bolivia's return to a reliance on hard currency gained through the
narcotics industry was further exacerbated by post--'Blast Furnace" economic
conditions. In early 1987 President Paz closed most of the state owned tin
mines, (a major Bolivian export and suffering from a depressed world price)
throwing about 23,000 miners out of work.226 The coca fields then acted as a
safety valve for the miners with many of them migrating to the major
growing areas to find work. Bolivia was further hurt economically by the
depressed world price of a second major export, natural gas. Loss of revenues
from both of Bolivia's major exports meant that Bolivia was as dependent as
ever on the approximately $600 million generated per year in hard currency
from the illicit coca industry.227
Another shortcomiitg of "Blast Furnace" was the failure of U.S.
planners to assess the internal political dynamics present in Bolivia. The
224Christian, S., "Bolivia Drug Traffick Builds Again as American Troops
Withdraw," New York Times, 2 December 1986, p. A9.
22 Simons, M., "Bolivia Cocaine Trade Revives after G.I.s Go," New York
Times, 3 January 1987, p. 3.
226Shannon, Desperados, p. 364.
227Simons, "Bolivia Bounces," p. 3.
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Bolivian labor movement has been extremely strong since Bolivia's 1952
revolution. The coca growing peasants have organized themselves into the
National Coca Producers Association (ANAPCOCA). 228 ANAPCOCA receives
political support from the 1.3 million strong Bolivian Workers Union and its
main affiliate, the Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers.229 This
translates to an organizational ability to mobilize 20 percent of Bolivia's
population when the need arises.23° In addition coca farmers are able to glean
support from Bolivia's left and far left parties, which have previously
controlled up to one-third of Bolivia's legislative Chamber of Deputies.231
During "Blast Furnace" this clout put extreme political pressure on
the Paz government, with some protests coming from Paz's own MNR party.
Bolivian workers were able to organize massive protests against the Paz
government, and coca growers in the field were able to intefere actively with
"Blast Furnace" operative units. The political influence wielded by those
opposed to U.S. involvement in Bolivia was a considerable factor in the U.S.
Army units eventual departure. 232
228Healy, Coca, p. 109.
229Lee, R., M!, "Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry,"
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 30 (Summer/Fall), p. 93.
2OIbid.
231Ibid.
232Lee, Labyrinth, p. 72.
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A further shortcoming of "Blast Furnace" was the difficulty of
having a permanent impact on the target of choice, the coca paste laboratories.
Calling these processing facilities laboratories gives them a greater
significance than most of them deserve. Most of the paste labs are of the so
called "kitchen sink" types, often only pits dug in the ground, lined with
plastic, where the coca leaf is rendered into paste for shipment to Colombia.
The labs destroyed during operation "blast furnace" were easily replaced once
the pressure was relieved in November 1986. This was reflected in the rapid
rise in the price of leaf within two months of cessation of interdiction
operations. One final weakness of the operation was the lack of any
significant arrests. Though this was not the stated purpose of "Blast Furnace,"
it meant a quick return to business as usual once the operation was
completed. Even if the arrests of traffickers was a major goal of the operation
it is doubtful if this aim would have been a realistic one. Given the level of
corruption within the Bolivian government and law enforcement
institutions, the coca traffickers intelligence network, as demonstrated by
traffickers departing the area of operations prior to "Blast Furnace" meant
they could effectively counter government efforts at apprehension.
However "Blast Furnace" did show that an up-tempo militarized
anti-narcotics campaign could influence the price of coca leaf. The price of
coca leaf did fall below the profitability threshold for the coca farmer. But the
short duration of the operation, coupled with the lack of a long-range outlook
prevented a fully successful outcome in Bolivia.
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C. LEO: THE MARTIME PERSPECTVE
As the amount of drugs entering the United States from Mexico
diminished throughout the decade of the 70's, the vacuum was filled by drugs
entering from Colombia. Initially the drug of choice being shipped was
marijuana, later as America's demand for cocaine grew it overwhelmingly
eclipsed marijuana shipments.
The amount of Caribbean narcotics shipments intercepted by the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) increased correspondingly with Colombia's growing
importance as an illicit narcotics trans-shipment point. Before 1973 the USCG
intercepted and seized only six drug running boats. In 1974 a joint USCG and
DEA operation dubbed "Buccaneer" seized seven vessels and ten tons of
marijuana. Between 1973 and 1978 the number of vessels seized by the USCG
had risen to 189, carrying 250 tons of marijuana.233
The amount of vessel seizures not only indicated that the USCG was
becoming more proficient at intercepting the drug smuggling boats, but the
number of boats transporting illicit narcotics had also shown a dramatic rise.
Through the 1980's it has been estimated that the number of vessels shipping
narcotics had risen to over 18,000 per year.234 Having to cover the 1,664,500
square miles of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the number of vessels
233Trainor, J. C., "Coping with Drug Runners at Sea," Naval War College
Review. (December, 1989).
234ABC, "World News Sunday," 3 September 189, "Military's Role in War
on Drugs," Peter Collins and David Ensor, narrators.
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transporting narcotics was clearly surpassing the capabilities of the USCG to
intercept them effectively.
The recognition by the Reagan Administration that illicit narcotics had
become a US. national .*curity issue, and that the U.S. military was an asset
to be used against this threat meant the U.S. Navy was called upon to assist
the USCG in intercepting narcotics vessels. The Defense Authorization Act of
1982 allowed USCG personnel to ride navy ships and exercise law
enforcement authority from those ships. 235 These joint U.S. Navy/USCG
operations became known as Law Enforcement Operations (LEO), with a
USCG Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) assigned to the naval vessels
participating.
The LEDET's would usually consist of one USCG officer and four to six
men. The detachments are utilized as boarding teams. When a suspect ship
was identified, the USCG pennant is run up on the naval ship before attempts
at boarding the suspect vessel are made by the LEDET.
Like her sister services, the Navy was reluctant to be cast into a law
enforcement role. The Navy felt that these operations would draw ships
away from their primary mission areas, and would expend resources that
could be used more effectively elsewhere. Backers of Navy involvement
argued that drug interdiction sea patrols could be substituted for training
exercises. The Navy countered with the argument that a drug interdiction




requirements, and that it was not possible to foresee drug interdiction as
enhancing naval readiness or training.236 Despite this reluctance, pressure by
the Administration slowly drew the Navy into the drug war.
The number of naval ship days dedicated to LEO has steadily increased
throughout the 1980's. In 1983 there were zero ship patrol days dedicated to
LEO.237 By 1987 the number of patrol days had increased to 2,325 days with 178
navy ships involved.238 Thereafter the Navy has kept its LEO patrol days at
around the 2000 day level.239 The Pentagon revealed that it hopes to expand
LEO when it revealed its 2 year, $2 billion anti-narcotics package in March
1990.240
Ships utilized in LEO run the gamut from destroyers to logistics ships.
The naval patrol hydrofoils are probably the most effective ships involved in
anti-drug maritime operations. The six Pegasus class hydrofoils belong to
Patrol Combat Missile Squadron #2, operating out of Key West, Florida. The
patrol hydrofoils are on call to any law enforcement agency that requests their
236Carrington, T., "Senate Votes to Use Military in War on Drugs: But
Tactics Remain Formidable," The Wall Street Journal, 16 May 1988, p. 46.
237Longo, J., "Tempers Rise during Face-Off over Initiatives," Army
Times, 23 May 1988, p. 1.
238Schwerzler, N. J., "Congress Seeking Larger Role for Pentagon in
Election-Year Drug Campaign," Baltimore Sun, 22 May 1988, p. 18.
239Diaz, C. L., "DoD Plays in the Drug War," Naval Institute Proceedings,
(Naval Review, 1990), p. 78.
240Moore, M., "Pentagon Announces $2 Billion Anti-Drug Plan,"
Washington Post, 10 March 1990, p. A12.
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services from Joint Task Force #4 (JTF4). The hydrofoils have been
increasingly called into service by law enforcement. Since being utilized in
anti-narcotics operations, (from 1985 to mid-1989), they have accounted for 30
percent of the Navy's overall drug busts, despite operating with only 6
platforms.241
Since implementation, LEO has shown some positive results in the war
on drugs. From 1984 through March 1988 LEO was responsible for seizing 39
vessels. Those vessels were carrying 450,000 pounds of marijuana and 1,890
pounds of cocaine. In addition LEO produced 198 arrests.242
1. Maritime Interdiction: An Assessment
Use of the Navy in assisting the USCG has brought in a needed asset
as the USCG was being overwhelmed by the influx of illicit narcotics entering
the United States. But several problems and criticisms have cropped up with
LEO that have made the maritime anti-narcotics strategy less effective than it
might be.
One shortcoming of the program are the restrictive rules of
engagement that the naval vessels must operate under in international
waters. In international waters boarding procedures of suspect vessels fall
under National Security Council Order #27 and Presidential Directive #27
(NSC-27/PD-27). 243 If a suspect vessel is encountered NSC-27/PD-27 requires
24 1Thomas, V. C., "Terrors on Patrol," Sea Power (May 1990).
242Schwerzler, "Congress Seeking," p. 18.
243Trainor, "Coping."
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that the intercepting vessel contact the U.S. State Department at the U.S.
embassy in the Flag State, the embassy will then contact the Flag State and
request permission to board the suspect vessel. If permission is granted by the
Flag State and the suspect vessel refuses to stop the PD-27 procedures are
repeated to obtain permission to fire warning shots and disabling fire.244
Needless to say such procedures are time consuming and give the
suspect vessel time to escape or dump its cargo. In President Bush's 1990
Drug Control Strategy the goal is to expand the USCG Shiprider program.
This program allows for source/ transshipment country law enforcement
personnel of each country to accompany one another on ships to conduct
operations in and around the territorial seas of their countries.245 Expansion
of such a program could possibly increase the efficiency of maritime
interdiction outside the territorial waters of the United States.
Another issue in the Navy's involvement in maritime drug
interdiction, is the question of cost effectiveness. A 1987 Government
Accounting Office (GAO) report addressed the question of cost, utilizing the
LEO program. The GAO determined that the Navy spent $27 million and the
USCG spent $13 million under the LEDET program. 1987 LEDET operations
resulted in the seizure of 20 boats carrying 225,000 pounds of marijuana, 550
pounds of cocaine, and yielded 110 arrests. 246 This amounted to a cost of $2
244Ibid.
245White House, Strategy, p. 68.
246Moore, M., "Pentagon Almost a Bust in Drug War," Washington Post,
3 June 198, p. A17.
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million per seizure. The large cost associated with these anti-narcotics
operations led the GAO to reach an ambiguous conclusion as to the value of
DoD in the war on narcotics.247 The report stated that there was no agreement
among experts that increased federal interdiction efforts, with or without
increasing levels of DoD assistance, will significantly reduce the amount of
drugs entering the United States.248
The use of U.S. Naval forces has also become a foreign policy issue for
the United States. This has been a relatively recent concern since the use of
U.S. Naval assets are strictly under U.S. control and was not a serious concern
of the drug producing nations. The benign use of U.S. Naval forces in drug
interdiction was in for a rude awakening with the U.S. attempt to tation a
naval battle group off the coast of Colombia in January 1990. The plan called
for the stationing of an aircraft carrier battle group off the coast of Colombia to
monitor all sea and air traffic, and was conceived prior to President Bush's
1990 drug summit in Cartegena, Colombia. On 5 January 1990 the carrier USS
John F. Kennedy battle group departed Norfolk, Virginia for the Caribbean.249
The problem with the plan might have been that United States
intentions were poorly articulated to the Colombian government. Although
247Ibid.
2481bid. General Accounting Officer (GAO) (1988b) "Drug Control: Issues
Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction
(GAO/WSIAD0880156), Washington: GAO.
249Trainor, B. E., "Colombians Balk at Crucial Part of U.S. Drug Plans,"
New York Times, 7 January 1990, p. 1.
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the Bush Administration denied that the stationing of the carrier battle group
off the Colombian coast was intended as a blockade, it seems many
Colombian's saw it that way. The issue for many Colombians quickly became
one of "American intimidation" and a question of sovereignty regarding the
United States. The resulting political furor caused the Bush Administration
to shelve its plan, and the Kennedy battle group was never deployed off of
Colombia. By the Cartegena summit on 15 February 1990, Colombian attitudes
had still not wavered. When queried about a change in attitude regarding
such a mission former Colombian President Viriglio Barco stated "Colombian
territorial waters are being patrolled by us and controlled by us."250
Despite some cumbersome Rules of Engagement (ROE) and questions
of cost, there have been positive aspects to the LEO program. First, the
increased tempo of maritime operations provided by U.S. Navy support has
forced the narco-traffickers to re-think their routing procedures. The
Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico is no longer quite as easy a transit route. As
maritime interdiction pressure has increased the U.S./Mexican border has
increasingly become the transit point of choice. Second, use of Naval forces is
also relatively free of foreign policy restrictions, despite the Colombian outcry
over the deployment of the USS Kennedy battle group. With maritime forces
under singular United States control and operating in U.S. and International
waters, the United States need not be concerned with the variety of foreign
250Rosenthal, A., "3 Andean Leaders and Bush Pledge Drug Cooperation,"
New York Times, 16 February 1990, p. Al.
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domestic political anxieties that have plagued the use of U.S. resources within
the "first tier" narcotic nations.
D. AIR INTERDICTION: THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY RESPONSE
With the effort to gain increased military support for the war on drugs, it
was realized by 1986 that air coverage along the United States Southern border
was severely inadequate. With an estimated 18,000 illegal flights entering the
United States each year, and with drug smugglers increasingly operating
sophisticated long-range aircraft, the inadequate resources of U.S. civilian law
enforcement agencies were being taxed beyond their capabilities. 25 '
Proposals were made to utilize Aerostat radars, helium filled balloons
equipped with a powerful radar, along the United States southern border, and
to equip civilian agencies with more sophisticated aircraft assets. But the
main push was to bring in the U.S. Air Force, with her formidable
surveillance assets, into the anti-narcotics air interdiction mission.
The initial Air Force surveillance effort was centered around the E-3A
Advanced Warning And Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft. The E-3A, a
radome equipped Boeing 707, has a surveillance radius of over 250 miles.
During fiscal year 1987 the Air Force flew 4,000 hours of drug related
surveillance flights, passing information about suspicious aircraft to law
enforcement agencies. 25 2 By March 1990, the amount of AWACS flight time
251Dillin, J., "Congress Drafts Military to Battle Drug Traffickers," The
Christian Science Monitor, 23 march 1989, p. 1. "Drug War Goes Airborne,"
The Christian Science Monitor, 23 May 1986, p. 1.
2S2Schwerzler, "Congress Seeking," p. 18.
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in support of counter drug operations had increased significantly. Forty
percent of AWACS operations worldwide are now devoted to anti-narcotics
operations and away from its primary mission as an air war command
center. 253
By the end of 1989 the air force anti-narcotics mission area was expanded.
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was called in
to assist in stemming the flow of narcotics into the United States. NORAD
created its own intelligence center, but initially would only intercept planes
when U.S. Customs aircraft were not available.254 An initial weakness found
in utilizing NORAD's 47 radar sites was that aircraft could not be detected
flying under 2,000 feet. 255 With most drug smuggling aircraft flying below
this altitude NORAD had only a limited input against the war on drugs. To
compensate for this NORAD is installing an Over The Horizon Back Scatter
Radar (OTH-B).256 This radar system bounces radio waves off the upper
atmosphere and back down to earth. OTH-B will give NORAD the capability
to detect aircraft up to a distance of 2,000 miles away, an increase of over 1,700
253Gordon, M. R., "U.S. is Stepping up Efforts to Seize Cargoes of Drugs,"
New York Times, 10 March 1990, p. 1.
254
"Drug War," Air Force Times, 25 December 1989.
25 Balman, S, Jr., "In Drug War the Weapon of Choice is Radar," Air Force
Times, 18 June 1990.
256The U.S. Navy is also developing a land-based over-the-horizon radar
system dubbed ROTHR, which could be used in an anti-narcotics role. (Diaz,
"DoD Plays," p. 83.)
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miles over NORAD's other radar systems, and at altitudes down to ground
level. 257
Another asset utilized by the U.S. Customs Service, with Air Force
assistance, was the network of Aerostat balloons. The balloons are tethered at
an altitude of 10,000 to 12,000 feet, and are equipped with radar. They have a
range of 200 miles, and are capable of detecting low flying aircraft.2s8 The
balloons are currently deployed in the Florida Keys, Grand Bahamas Islands,
Denig, New Mexico, Fort Huachuca and Yuma Arizona, with plans to station
an additional thirteen balloons in the Caribbean, and along the United States
border.259
The increased use of satellites by the Pentagon, and other Federal agencies
is probably the ultimate use in technology in the war on narcotics. The
satellites are used to spy on clandestine airstrips as well as roads and
laboratories used by the narcotics traffickers. In addition, civilian and military
satellites are being used to locate remote areas under drug crop cultivation,
and are being planned for the task of tracking drug smuggling aircraft and
257Ibid.
2SBalman, "Weapon of Choice."
2-"Ibid.
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ships.26 0 The DEA has considered the use of satellites for reconnaissance and
intelligence gathering as an important tool in the war on drugs.261
1. Air Interdiction: An Assessment
As with the Navy, the use of high technology Air Force assets has
called into question the cost effectiveness of such operations. One AWACS
cost $10,000 an hour to operate. Although the Aerostats cost only $500 an
hour to operate they cost $12 to $15 million each and $5 million annually to
maintain. 262 In a 1987 GAO study it was found that the Air Force spent
$433,000 per seizure.263 The Aerostats have also been accused of being too
fragile with a down time of 50 percent. 264 The use of satellites has also come
under some foreign criticism. In March 1990 Mexico protested the use of a
U.S. satellite to observe drug cultivation without Mexico's knowledge.
The main difficulty of air interdiction is the fluidity of the task.
Unlike ships which can be stopped and searched, aircraft can only be caught
once they are on the ground. This requires a high degree of coordination,
often between several agencies and cutting across international borders.
26
°Broad, W., "Charting Drug Trade from the Skies," New York Times, 14
October 1989, p. 6.
2611bid.
262Balman, "Weapon of Choice." Schwerzler, "Larger Role," p. 18.
2OMoore, "Pentagon Almost," p. A17.
264Weiner, E., "Loss of Balloons Hinders Drug Vigil," New York Times, 9
February, p. 12.
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An incident which occurred in March 1989 illustrates the point. In
this case an Air Force AWACS detected a low flying aircraft off the East Coast
of the United States. NORAD launched two F-16 fighters to intercept, the F-
16's tracked the aircraft until they ran low on fuel after which NORAD
dispatched two additional F-16's. With no powers of arrest the Air Force
handed the mission over to the Customs Service operating an aircraft near
the Canadian border. The drug smuggling aircraft landed in Canada and
before permission could be obtained to pursue, the narcotics had already been
unloaded and sent on its way.265
Despite questions of cost and shortcomings with coordination, the air
interdiction campaign in conjunction with the maritime campaign, have
forced drug smugglers to rethink their strategy. It is now estimated that up to
70 percent of the cocaine entering the United States comes through Mexico, as
against 30 percent a few years ago.266
Similar to Naval assets, air interdiction generally does not suffer
from the political constraints inherent in the use of forces within narcotic
source country borders. Under U.S. control, air assets can generally be
deployed as the United States deems necessary.
Coordination problems are correctable and have been targeted in the
White House National Drug Control Strategy. Nevertheless part of the
shortcomings associated with the use of these high technology systems is that
265Fialka, J. J., "The Military Enters the War on Drugs, and Find Elusive
Foe," The Wall Street Journal, 31 August 1989, p. All.
266Weiner, 'toss of Balloons," p. 12.
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the equipment and the men who operate it were designed and trained for an
entirely different mission. As the coordination problems are corrected and as
personnel become more proficient operating in the new environment, the
number of successful interdictions should rise and the costs per seizure
decrease.
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VII. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to examine closely the dynamics of the
Latin American narcotics trade and to identify the role for the United States
military, if any, in the interdiction of illicit narcotics. Determining the role
for the U.S. military lends itself to two levels of analysis, 1) Use of U.S. forces
within the territory of narcotic source and transshipment nations, and 2) Use
of U.S. assets outside the territorial limits of the "first tier" narcotics
countries.
Since operation "Blast Furnace" the use of U.S. military assets within the
source countrries has been extremely limited. This is not to say that there are
no U.S. military personnel workirg within the "first tier" nations, but rather
that they have kept a low profile, mainly working within an advisory
capacity.
Currently there are U.S. military advisors present and conducting
training missions in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, all coordinated by the U.S.
Southern Command. U.S. Marines are leading Colombian troops on anti-
narcotics patrols, U.S. Army Special Forces are based in Mazamari, Peru
undertaking training patrols, and within Bolivia training anti-narcotics
police. 267 The critical question is whether the United States should seek to
267Jehl, D., "GI's Escalate Attack on Drugs in South America," Los Angeles
Times, 2 July 1990.
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expand the role of "in country" miltary anti-narcotics assets by pressuring the
"first tier" nations to accept them.
One thing that must be realized is that the anti-narcotics mission, even
under the best of circumstances, is an extremely difficult one. The domestic
constraints currently existing within the "first tier" nations make their
mission nearly impossible. Each of these constraints will now be examined in
turn.
A. ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS
Given the difficulty of the problem of illicit narcotics within the Andean
region, it is vital that U.S. forces receive full cooperation from the nations
within which they would be operating. Considering the dire economic
conditions that exist within two of the Andean nations (Peru, and Bolivia), it
is not clear these country's would render full cooperation if the U.S. military
anti-narcotics role were expanded.
Both Bolivia and Peru rely on hard currency generated by the narcotics
industry to the detriment of their legitimate economies. The coca fields in
Bolivia and Peru have also acted as an economic safety valve for the
unemployed when their jobs were eliminated by depressed world prices for
legal exports. The narcotics indastry has thus then been able to co-opt a large
pool of potential social discontent.
The importance of the coca economies is manifested in the foreign policy
relatioiLs between the "first tier" nations and the United States. The Andean
political leaders are extremely sensitive to the linkage of increasing U.S.
economic support to their accepting U.S. efforts at increasing anti-narcotics
enforcement. This was manifested by former Bolivian President Paz
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Estensorro seeking U.S. economic support during operation "Blast Furnace."
It was also apparent in Peru when former President Alan Garcia &nd current
President Alberto Fujimori rejected $35 million in U.S. military aid and the
training of six Peruvian battalions in counter-insurgency for assignment to
the upper-Huallaga Valley, without it being linked to increased U.S.
economic aid to compensate for the loss in coca revenues upon which the
campasinos depend.
Even Colombia, the strongest economically of the "first tier" countries is
sensitive to the effects of the narcotics industry on its economy. Restrictions
on U.S. import of Colombian flowers may not be seen as a serious issue in the
United States, but in Colombia, a nation bearing the brunt of narco inspired
terrorism, it is seen as a major foreign policy issue as the nation tries to wean
itself away from coca.
Without a major economic plan in conjunction with a militarized
interdiction strategy, it is doubtful that any "first tier" nation will give its full
cooperation to United States forces. Without that full cooperation it is
doubtful that any military strategy will have any long-lasting effects in the
war on drugs.
B. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Leaders and former leaders in all three "first tier" nations at one time or
another have made statements concerning the detrimental effects that the
narcotics industry has on their societies.268 At the same time these leaders
268Lee, Labyrinth, p. 194.
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acknowledge how important the cocaine industry has been to the
revitalization of their countries. 269
The narcotics issue has thrown the political leadership into the jaws of a
domestic political dilemma in regards to the narcotics industry. On one hand
the desire to rid their nations of the cocaine trade and all the negative
connotations that it entails, and on the other the fact that the narcotics
industry has created some powerful domestic constituencies that cannot be
ignored. In addition the questions of sovereignty and U.S. imperialism are
constantly waiting just under the political surface any time the issue of
increased U.S. military involvement in narcotics interdiction is raised.
One reason that Andean politicians have not pursued the narcotics
problem to U.S. satisfaction is the lack of consensus in these countries that the
drug problem is as serious as the United States claims. This position is
reflected not only among political circles, but among the general populace as
well. The Andean region tends to see the problem as being driven by U.S.
demand not Andean supply. The Latin governments tend to be more
concerned about domestic issues such as unemployment, widespread poverty,
lack of housing, and availability of healthcare, rather than the narcotics
issue.270 This lack of concern in the general populace is then manifested by an
ambivalence on the part of political institutions. Like many politicians major
2691bid., p. 195.
270Lee, Labyrinth, p. 194. "Urban Colombians Favor International
Coop'-ration Against Drugs, but Reject Extradition and Fear Herbicides," USIA
Research Memorandum, Washington, DC, 22 February 1988, p. 3.
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interests rest with those issues that concern their constituents, and there is a
tendency to not be overtly active in narcotics problems.
The narcotics industry and threat of U.S. interference in anti-narcotics
enforcement has also created some powerful political lobbys. These lobbys
cannot be ignored by Andean political leaders.
In Bolivia this is illustrated by powerful labor organizations, including
the coca growers union. In numerous instances these organizations, have
actively interfered with anti-narcotics operations. On more than one occasio -
Bolivian leaders have had to bend over backwards in order to placate aroused
Bolivian labor. This was amply demonstrated during U.S. involvement in
operation "Blast Furnace."
Restrictions on Peruvian leadership not only include a politically
powerful left, but the most serious leftist insurgent group in Latin America in
the "Sendero Luminoso" movement. These political restrictions have made
Peruvian political leadership extremely sensitive to any U.S. overtures of aid
or military assistance. This sensitivity was demonstrated by former President
Garcia switching positions agreed upon at the Cartegena Drug Summit in
February 1990. The political outcry over an increased U.S. presence for the
training of Peruvian troops forced Garcia to reject the plan. His position has
since been endorsed by his successor President Alberto Fujimori.
Finally all three "first tier" countries are extremely sensitive to what they
perceive as U.S. "imperialism," and threats to their sovereignty. This
sensitivity has produced various degrees of reluctance in conducting anti-
narcotics operations or in accepting U.S support.
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The Andean countries are extremely uncomfortable with U.S. military
intervention, both past and present, even when it has not directly affected
them. The U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 provides a case in
point. The invasion was roundly criticized by Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
As a result of the invasion Peru suspended all anti-narcotics operations, and
former President Garcia suspended his plans to attend the Cartegena Drug
Summit. Although Garcia later recanted on both counts, the invasion did
demonstrate Andean sensitivities to the issue. The question of U.S.
interference has also been particularly relevant to Colombia, as was amply
displayed by the U.S. battle group incident in January 1990. Despite United
States assurances that a blockade was not intended, Colombian perceptions
quickly turned the issue to one of sovereignty,with Colombian outcry forcing
President Bush to shelve the plan.
C. ESCALATION CONSTRAINTS
One criticism of an increased U.S. military presence in the "first tier"
nations in order to interdict narcotics is the potential for U.S. forces to be
drawn into conflicts of an ill defined nature. This potential is made apparant
by the presence of leftist insurgency groups, particularly in Peru and
Colombia, m y of which operate in coca growing and processing regions.
In Peru the "Sendero Luminoso" movement is undoubtedly the most
well organized insurgency group in Latin America. Sendero is solidly
entrenched in Peru's major coca growing region, the upper-Huallaga Valley.
Peru's military has heretofore been unsuccessful in defeating this movement,
and their prospects in doing so in the future is extremely doubtful. There are
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now reports that U.S. Army Special Forces advisors have conducted patrols
into Sendero country.271
In Colombia two insurgency groups are of particular concern, one with
strong ties to the narcotics industry, the other not, but still operating in
n- -cotics areas. The first is the FARC. As stated earlier in this thesis FARC
has become extensively involved in Colombia's cocaine industry, graduating
from protecting cartel processing laboratories to actual participation in coca
growing and paste production. The other Colombian insurgency group still
active is the pro-Castro Army of National Liberation (ELN). Though smaller
than FARC, ELN has been extremely active, particularly against Colombia's
oil industry. ELN has already attacked Venezuelan National Guard troops
undertaking anti-narcotics missions across from Colombia's major marijuana
growing regions in the north-east and would surely be encountered if U.S.
troops were committed to the region.
The presence of these insurgencies, and the fine line drawn between
them and narcotics industry, would make narcotics interdiction extremely
difficult without U.S. forces becoming involved in counter-insurgency.
While there is evidence of United States domestic support for the U.S. Armed
Forces in a drug interdiction role, it is doubtful that support could be





One problem that must be addressed on the subject of increased United
States involvement in narcotics interdiction is: Where do we draw the line in
sending military support? The drug cartels generally are not restricted by
geographic boundaries, but any U.S. forces would be. Already countries such
as Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile are experiencing increased
instances of narcotics trafficking. But the country which could potentially fill
any vacuum brought about by increased anti-narcotics enforcement in "first
tier" countries is, Brazil. Brazil has the capability to fulfill all the aspects of
narcotics trafficking, from growing coca, to processing, to transshipment.272
Brazil has 9,100 miles of land borders, much of it with Colombia, Bolivia,
and Peru, all of it rugged terrain and hard to effectively patrol. Brazil has a
well developed chemical industry capable of providing precursor chemicals,
such as acetone, for processing coca into cocaine hydrochloride. 273 To
underscore Brazil's growing importance to drug traffickers, in 1981
approximately 200 pounds of cocaine were seized in Brazil, this increased to
2,000 pounds in all of 1987, and further to 2,000 pounds in just the first six
months of 1988.274 Recently Brazilian authorities seized over half a ton of
272The domestic Brazilian version of the coca plant is known as "epadu"
and can be grown profusely in the Amazon region.
273Riding, A., "Brazil now a vital Crossroad for Latin Cocaine Traffickers,"
New York Times, 28 August 1988, pp. 1 and 18.
2741bid., p. 1.
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cocaine on a single raid in Sao Paulo, Colombia's Cali cartel was thought to be
behind this particular shipment.1
Therefore it will be difficult to limit the interdiction strategy to the "first
tier" nations. The Latin drug trade almost always follows the path of least
resistance. If the United States is to seriously considering sending troops to
the Andes to fight the drug wars, it must realize that the drug war is unlikely
to be limited to the geographic boundaries of the "first tier" nations.
All of these constraints make an "in country" U.S. military solution a
dubious undertaking. In addition, plans such as that outlined by General
Maxwell Thurman, former commander of the United States Southern
Command, would seem to fall far short of bringing ultimate success. General
Thurman's proposed plan entails a lightning strike to simultaneously take
out the drug infrastructure in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The plan would
rely on Andean military resources aided by U.S. intelligence.2 Such a strike
would seem of doubtful merit given the limited military capabilities of the
Andean countries. Moreover, as was seen with operation "Blast Furnace,"
the narco-intelligence network is often much more effective than the anti-
narcotics forces.
If a major U.S. military response seems an uncertain proposition in
providing a decisive outcome in the Andean Region, what then should be
1
"Brazilian Police Seize Half-Ton of Cocaine," San Jose Mercury News, 4
November 1990, p. 23A.
2Waller, D., et al., "Ri-ky Business," Newsweek, 16 July 1990, p. 16.
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the U.S. Military response, if any, within the "first tier" narcotic source
nations?
As stated earlier there already is a U.S. special operations presence in the
Andes. Thirty percent of U.S. military personnel located in the Andean
region are of a "special forces" nature but carry a wide array of job
qualifications ranging from construction (as in roads and bridges) to medical
and combat training analysts.277 These U.S. missions are small and so far
seem to be politically palatable to the "first tier" governments. Although
political flare-ups do arise occasionally to this U.S. presence, it falls far short of
that exhibited during "Blast Furnace," or the stationing of the USS Kennedy
battle group off the coast of Colombia.
If a U.S. advisory capacity is needed in the Andes, this also implies that
there is a role for the "first tier" military institution in the Latin drug wars.
Though the U.S. should encourage the maximum use of civilian law
enforcement in battling narcotics, in some instances the "first tier" nations
are faced with a "fait accompli" in regards to involving their military
institutions. Though there are political pitfalls in the U.S. encouraging a
Latin military response to the narcotics problem, on a case by case basis it can
be encouraged.
In Colombia the military is already extensively involved in the drug war.
It is hard to see how this could be avoided. Colombia's police forces were
277 nterview with Dr. Anthony W. Gray Jr., Deputy Director Inter-
American Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, conducted on
November 30, 1990 at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
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clearly being overwhelmed by narco-terrorism, and do not have the
capabilities to challenge guerilla groups within the coca growing and
processing regions. Though there have been problems of corruption and
tolerance of paramilitary groups by the Colombian military, the military has
also provided some significant successes. The Colombian government has
also taken the military to task when positive results have not been provided,
going so far as firing senior military commanders.
Peru is another case in which the local military may have to become
involved in drug interdiction. "Sendero's presence in the upper-Huallaga
Valley has rendered attempts by law enforcement at eradication and
interdiction relatively ineffective. Peru's government and military
institution have both been resistent to the notion of militarizing their
narcotics problem. But the realization that Sendero draws much of its
support from the financing it receives from narco-dollars may yet force the
Peruvian government to involve the army. There are definite pitfalls in
involving the Peruvian military, but Peru is rapidly approaching a situation
of "in extremis" in regards to the situation.
Unlike Colombia, and Peru, Bolivia is not plagued by a narco-terrorist
mafia or a serious insurgency movement. Thus Bolivia does not represent
such a clear cut case for domestic military involvement in anti-narcotics
operations. Operation "Blast Furnace" was conducted primarily by Bolivian
law enforcement units with U.S. logistical support and was ultimately
successful in forcing down the price of leaf, as indicated earlier. But, it is
unclear whether civilian law enforcement could sustain such an operation
again without more significant help from the Bolivian Military. What
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remains clear is that the Bolivian government has not shown any inclination
at duplicating the results of "Blast Furnace," possibly finding the decision too
difficult politically, though the military has recently been more receptive to a
drug enforcement role.
Even with no Latin military involvement in the Andes it is still
necessary for the U.S. to maintain advisory missions in the region. Given the
paramilitary nature of the anti-narcotics operations in the region, the civilian
law enforcement institutions require some level of military training to
effectively carry out their mission. This is necessary just to maintain the
status quo in the region, in trying to keep some type of control on narcotics
production and trafficking. By encouraging an increased interdiction role by
the "first tier" nations it makes efforts by assets directly under U.S. control
much more effective.
If the U.S. military role within the "first tier" countries, should remain
limited, what then should be the mission of the other U.S. military assets
currently conducting counter narcotics operations? It is the contention of this
thesis that military assets directly under U.S. control should be the primary
means utilized in conducting counter-narcotics interdiction missions.
Having direct control of naval and air assets is itself a positive aspect.
From a foreign policy standpoint, concern with sensitive Andean opinions
on the use of such forces is much less complex. Occasionally mistakes do
occur such as with the Kennedy battlegroup, or with the use of satellite
surveillance with Mexico, but for the most part these concerns are minor and
can be smoothed over with a minimum of damage control. In emphasizing
use of U.S. military forces outside of the Andean region the United States
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does not have to be concerned with the almost byzantine restrictions that
have plagued our interdiction efforts within Latin America to date.
This is not to say that emphasizing a maritime and air interdiction
strategy is not without its problems. But these problems are manageable, and
could make our strategy much more effective.
The question of cost effectiveness is a legitimate one, but one that should
become less of a factor as time progresses. Adapting equipment and
personnel to a different mission, is not an easy task. U.S. Military equipment
and training is generally geared towards dealing with a high-tech fast moving
adversary, and this is usually just the opposite with narcotics enforcement.
The results of GAO studies have indicated that military assets have been too
expensive for the results shown. But what the GAO did not emphasize was
that there could be a learning curve associated with U.S. forces involved in
drug interdiction. As these forces move up the learning curve their efficiency
in conducting successful anti-narcotics missions should rise correspondingly,
with a significant drop in cost.
A critical area that could make milit;-y interdiction much more effective
is in the area of intelligence. Senate rts have indicated that there are
serious shortcomings in intelligence ga .-ing and sharing among the variety
of agencies tasked with drug enforcement, including DoD. Part of this is
caused by confidentiality and sensitivity of sources. Many military
intelligence gathering assets are classified, and there is a reluctance to share
this information due to its nature. Federal agencies utilize confidential
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informants for much of their intelligence and for bureaucratic reasons there
is a reluctance to share this information with other agencies. 278
The President's National Drug Control Strategy has identified intelligence
gathering and coordination as a vital area of concern. The administration has
provided for the creation of a National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) to
improve this area of our interdiction strategy. The effective dissemination of
timely intelligence can only make U.S. military interdiction efforts that much
more effective.
Regardless of military involvement, whether by U.S. or Latin military
institutions, it is not the single solution to United States consumption or
Andean production problems. The United States must proceed with a viable
education and treatment strategy, and the Andean region must get its
economic house in order for any type of strategy to be effective. Reduction in
demand and supply must proceed in conjunction with each other, this is the
only way for interdiction to make a dent in the shipment of narcotics.
Economically it will be difficult for the Andean region to go it alone.
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru rely on the United States for both markets and
economic aid. With Colombia's relatively healthy economy it is more a
question of the United States guarding against policy decisions that adversely
affect the Colombian -economy. Often American decisions are made with
little foresight as to how it will effect Colombia's war against the cartels.
Bolivia and Peru are more in need of direct economic aid. Their economies
278Ostrow, R., "Senate Report Cites U.S. Intelligence Gaps on Colombian
Drug Cartels," Los Angeles Times, 12 September 1989., 12 September 1989.
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are both in dire straits, and consequently rely on narco-dollars to offset the
imbalance in hard currency earnings. But if the United States does step up
economic aid to both of these countries it must guard against throwing good
money after bad. The same errors made by these countries being mired in
their economic difficulties cannot be repeated.
The question of the United States placing increased emphasis on
education and treatment is a vital one. It will be virtually impossible for the
United States to win the war on drugs without significantly reducing
demand. But this strategy is not one for the short term. It is one for changing
a value system currently existing in the United States, and by its very nature
will take a significant period of time. Some advocate completely abandoning
interdiction in favor of devoting assets strictly to education and treatment.
This could be a serious mistake, strictly emphasizing a long-term solution
could be just as fallacious as only devoting assets to interdiction. The
potential could exist for the U.S. market to be saturated with cheap narcotics,
overwhelming the best efforts at education and treatment. Interdiction has
an important role to play in eventually winning the war on drugs, and the
United States military is a significant asset that must be utilized in that war.
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